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This dissertation engages with the question of how much access to free time citizens should enjoy 
in a just society. A sophisticated liberal egalitarian approach holds that social justice requires 
protecting at least the freedom to work no more than 8 hours per day.1 It is unclear whether this 
approach supports more radical expansions of access to free time, such as the institution of a 4-
day work week, a 6-hours work day, or a right to periodic sabbatical leave. Those who support 
these more radical demands often appeal to controversial perfectionist ideas about the importance 
of free time for human flourishing to justify their position. This dissertation rejects these 
perfectionist justifications and explains why those committed to political liberalism can get on 
board with more radical demands, such as the 4-day work week. Chapter 1 explains why existing 
approaches to social justice don’t offer satisfactory answers to the question of how much access to 
free time citizens should enjoy. Chapters 2 and 3 explain that some policies to expand opportunities 
for free time are justifiable on the grounds that they help address morally objectionable collective 
action problems in the labour market. Chapter 4 lays out a feminist case for improved access to 
part-time employment. Chapter 5 explains that policies that expand access to free time for middle-
aged persons are necessary to address an unfairness in access to free time at different life-stages. 
Taken together, these considerations make a strong case for policies that aim at expanding access 









The ancient Greek fable of the ant and the grasshopper tells the story of a work-loving ant, who 
spends the summer collecting food, and a leisure-loving grasshopper, who spends the summer 
singing. When winter arrives, the hungry grasshopper begs the ant for food and is rejected. The 
fable is often interpreted as a lesson about the importance of hard work. I shall argue there is need 
for a very different kind of lesson in most societies today – one that emphasises the importance of 
free time and the interests of the leisure-loving grasshopper. My aim in this dissertation is to 
illuminate what a just society owes to grasshoppers. 
To illustrate why one might be concerned about the plight of grasshoppers, i.e., those who would 
prefer to work less, consider the following observations. 48% of Americans say they don't have 
enough time and 35% say they’re always rushed.1 In the UK, over thirty percent of individuals 
employed in the labour market want to work fewer hours.2 And of these, about a third want this 
even if it means lower pay.3 One of the most frequently expressed regrets by individuals in the last 
twelve weeks of their lives is that they spent too much time at work.4 Overwork impacts workers’ 
health and stress-related sick leave poses a significant burden for the economies of industrialized 
countries.5 In Germany for example, job strain is estimated to create an economic cost of 30.8 
billion Euros each year.6 What makes these observations particularly striking is that since the 
Industrial Revolution, the average UK citizen has seen a 29-fold increase in income but working 
time today remains about as high as before the onset of the Industrial Revolution.7 
 
1 Frank Newport, ‘Americans’ Perceived Time Crunch No Worse Than in Past’ (Gallup, 2015), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/187982/americans-perceived-time-crunch-no-worse-past.aspx. 
2 UK Office For National Statistics (2019) EMP16: Underemployment and overemployment, April 2019 
(https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/d
atasets/underemploymentandoveremploymentemp16). 
3 This phenomenon is called overemployment and it occurs whenever an individual would like to work 
fewer hours, even if this results in reduced income. 
4 Bronnie Ware, The Top Five Regrets of the Dying: A Life Transformed by the Dearly Departing, 1st ed (Carlsbad, 
Calif: Hay House, 2012). 
5 European Agency for Safety and Health at Work. et al., Calculating the Costs of Work-Related Stress and 
Psychosocial Risks: Literature Review. (LU: Publications Office, 2014), 
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2802/20493. 
6 Wolfgang Bödeker, Michael Friedrichs: Kosten der psychischen Erkrankungen und Belastungen in Deutschland, in: 
Lothar Kamp, Klaus Pickshaus (Hrsg.): Regelungslücke psychische Belastungen schließen, August 2011. 
7According to Juliet Schor, “One of capitalism's most durable myths is that it has reduced human toil. […] 
These images are backward projections of modern work patterns. And they are false. Before capitalism, 
most people did not work very long hours at all.” Juliet B. Schor, The Overworked American: The Unexpected 
Decline of Leisure, vol. Paperback (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1993); Jon C Messenger, Sangheon Lee, 





It seems puzzling that time poverty, long working hours and overwork are so widespread in spite 
of the great technological achievements of the past century that had the potential to free up more 
time for us. If it is true that many would prefer to work less, even if this meant a consequent 
decrease in wages, then how should policy-makers respond to that? To what extent, if at all, should 
a just society adopt public policies that regulate work hours and expand access to free time?  
Throughout most of this dissertation I use the term ‘work’ to refer to ‘time spent on paid 
employment’. This is not to deny the importance of other forms of work, such as care work and 
household work (I engage with these forms of work in chapter 4) that occur outside formal labour 
markets. My choice of this simplistic definition of work reflects the fact that much of my analysis 
focuses on collective action problems that arise in formal labour markets, which makes it 
convenient to use the term work as short for ‘time spent on paid employment’.8 
A growing number of politicians, activists, and scholars claim that governments should undertake 
efforts to reduce the amount of time people spend at work, or at least to expand opportunities to 
access free time for those who wish to work less. Working time reduction is frequently touted as 
an elegant solution to a number of pressing problems, such as overwork, unemployment, 
environmental destruction, gender inequality, and depression. If everyone worked less, people 
might be less stressed, there might be more jobs, less resource depletion, less greenhouse gas 
emissions, a more equitable sharing of work between men and women, and more wellbeing.9 
At first glance, the arsenal of arguments in favour of reduced work hours that have been put forth 
in recent years is rather impressive and one might question whether more work is needed to 
establish the desirability of reduced work hours. As I will show, more work on this front is indeed 
needed because many of the above-mentioned considerations that seem to recommend a reduction 
of work hours are less conclusive than they appear to be. 
Two kinds of flaws significantly limit the strength of many prominent arguments for reduced 
working time. The first flaw is that many arguments rely on controversial assumptions about the 
likely consequences of reduced working time. The second flaw is that many arguments appeal to 
 
Comparative Perspective. (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2011) Chapter 3. See also: James Suzman, Work: A 
Deep History, from the Stone Age to the Age of Robots (New York: Penguin Press, 2021). James E. Thorold 
Rogers, Six Centuries of Work and Wages (London: Allen and Unwin, 1949), 542-43.” Max Roser (2020) - 
"Economic Growth". Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: 
'https://ourworldindata.org/economic-growth' [Online Resource] 
8 Section 1.5 elaborates on the question of how to define and measure work and free time. 
9 Anna Coote, Aidan Harper, and Alfie Stirling, The Case for a Four-Day Week (Cambridge, UK ; Medford, 
MA: Polity Press, 2021); Carl Benedikt Frey, The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of 




controversial assumptions about the kind of work-life balance that is best for humans. Let’s 
consider each of these in turn to understand what exactly these argumentative flaws are and to 
appreciate how widespread they are. 
Speculative Consequentialist Arguments 
One of the most prominent consequentialist arguments for working time reduction holds that 
everyone should work less because this reduces unemployment. The idea underlying this argument 
is that an economy where everyone works fewer hours requires more employees than an economy 
where everyone who is employed works fulltime. If average working time was reduced, so the 
argument goes, there would be more jobs because the available amount of work is split between 
more workers. What’s more, reduced work hours might also address the problem of ‘working time 
bifurcation’, which describes the problem that there are many countries where some work excessive 
hours while others are involuntarily underemployed, which means that they work fewer hours than 
they would want.10 
The idea that we can increase employment and reduce bifurcation through working time reduction 
is appealing because unemployment and underemployment are harmful to those who experience 
it. The involuntarily unemployed often suffer from social stigma, poverty, and poor health and the 
underemployed often suffer from poverty.11 One way of improving their situation might be to 
expand the availability of jobs through working time reduction. Many advocates of reduced 
working time put this ‘employment argument’ front and centre of their argumentation.12 
 
10“[W]“hile the mean workweek in the U.S. has not changed dramatically during the past half century, 
there are now a higher proportion of workers in low-hour (less than 30 per week) and in high-hour 
(greater than 50 per week) schedules than there were previously. As of 2004, 26.8% of American men 
worked more than 50 h per week, up from 14.7% in 1980.” Allard E. Dembe, ‘Ethical Issues Relating to 
the Health Effects of Long Working Hours’, Journal of Business Ethics 84, no. S2 (2009): 197. See also Alan 
Bogg, Cathryn Costello, and A. C. L. Davies, Research Handbook on EU Labour Law, Research Handbooks 
in European Law Series (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), 274. 
11 Andrew E. Clark and Andrew J. Oswald, ‘Unhappiness and Unemployment’, The Economic Journal 104, 
no. 424 (1994): 648–59; Tor Eriksson et al., ‘Unemployment and Mental Disorders’, International Journal of 
Mental Health 39, no. 2 (2010): 56–73; H. Häfner, ‘Does Unemployment Cause Illness? A Review of the 
Status of Knowledge of the Correlation between Unemployment, Physical and Psychological Health 
Risks’, Fortschritte Der Neurologie-Psychiatrie 56, no. 10 (1988): 326; Andrew Clark, ‘A Note on Unhappiness 
and Unemployment Duration’, Applied Economics Quarterly 52, no. 4 (2006): 291–308; Adrian Chadi, ‘How 
to Distinguish Voluntary from Involuntary Unemployment: On the Relationship between the Willingness 
to Work and Unemployment-Induced Unhappiness’, Kyklos 63, no. 3 (2010): 317–29; Babette Pouwels, 
Jacques Siegers, and Jan Dirk Vlasblom, ‘Income, Working Hours, and Happiness’, Economics Letters 99, 
no. 1 (2008): 72–74. 
12 Stan de Spiegelaere and Agnieszka Piasna, The Why and the How of Working Time Reduction, 2017; Coote, 




The employment argument assumes that there is a fixed amount of work in society that must be 
carried out every year and that this work can either be carried out by a smaller number of people, 
who each work a lot, or by a larger number of people, who each work fewer hours. However, there 
is disagreement among economists as to whether it is true that reduced working time leads to more 
employment. Many think it is a mistake to assume that there is a fixed amount of jobs that can be 
distributed in different ways across a population.13 Demand for labour (i.e. the number of available 
jobs) might change as a result of changes in working time regulation. For example, some employers 
might not be able or willing to offer jobs on part-time conditions, and as a result there might be 
fewer jobs available in an economy where working time has been reduced. Empirical findings on 
the subject are mixed, but most economists agree that the question of whether reduced working 
time leads to higher employment depends on several circumstantial factors, so that there is no 
guarantee that working time reduction always, or even normally, has an employment effect.14 
This highlights an important limitation of highly speculative consequentialist arguments, i.e., 
arguments that make support for working time reduction policies contingent on rather uncertain 
effects of these policies. The strength of these arguments depends on the truth of assumptions 
about complex causal mechanisms that are sensitive to several circumstantial factors. For example, 
the employment argument favours reduced work hours only to the extent that it increases 
employment.15 Working time reduction increases employment only when a number of conditions 
are met. To illustrate, there must be sufficient training opportunities available to those who seek to 
occupy newly created jobs, employers must be able to redesign tasks in a way that makes it possible 
to offer jobs on a part-time basis, employees must be willing to take up part-time jobs, offering 
jobs on a part-time basis must be profitable for employers, etc.16 
To be sure, this doesn’t mean that those who are in favour of reduced work hours should dismiss 
the employment argument, or other speculative consequentialist arguments. It merely illustrates 
that a convincing case for reduced work hours, which applies widely across different countries and 
 
13 This is referred to as the “lump of labour fallacy”. Tom Walker, ‘Why Economists Dislike a Lump of 
Labor’, Review of Social Economy 65, no. 3 (2007): 279–91; Paul Krugman to The New York Times, ‘Lumps 
of Labor’, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/07/opinion/lumps-of-
labor.html?scp=1&sq=lumps%20of%20labor&st=cse. 
14 Gerhard Bosch and Steffen Lehndorff, ‘Working-Time Reduction and Employment’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 25, no. 2 (2001): 209–43; Pedro S. Raposo and Jan C. van Ours, ‘How Working Time Reduction 
Affects Jobs and Wages’, De Economist 158, no. 2 (2010): 193–207. 
15 Another consequentialist argument that has recently gained currency in academic and popular discourse 
is that reducing work hours can help combat climate change because it leads to a reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions. I will engage with this argument in chapter three and show that it is less forceful than is 
often assumed by its proponents. 




different labour markets, should also receive support from considerations that rely on less 
controversial assumptions about the likely consequences of working time reduction. The 
arguments I advance in this dissertation thus don’t compete with the employment argument but 
strengthen the case for shorter work hours from a different angle by showing how it receives 
support from less controversial considerations.  
It bears emphasizing that most arguments for reduced working time – including the ones I advance 
in subsequent chapters – rely on some assumptions about the likely consequences of shorter work 
hours. For example, I will claim that the effect of some competitive pressures is to increase the 
amount of time workers spend on the job. The difference between the arguments I advance in this 
dissertation and speculative consequentialist arguments, such as the employment argument, is thus 
not one in kind but one in degree. What makes my arguments less controversial is that they rely on 
assumptions that are likely to hold true under a variety of circumstances.17 
Perfectionist Arguments 
Let’s now turn to the second flaw that plagues many popular arguments for reduced work hours. 
Many scholars attempt to establish the desirability of reduced working time in a ‘perfectionist’ 
fashion, which means that they rely on assumptions about what is best for human flourishing. An 
example of a perfectionist argument is the idea that expanding everyone’s free time is desirable 
because the kinds of goods we can access through free time are more valuable than the kinds of 
goods we can obtain through work. To illustrate, free time enables people to be creative and artistic, 
to contemplate, to have conversations with friends, to be political activists, or to spend time with 
their families. According to philosophers like Aristotle and Nietzsche, these kinds of activities are 
highly valuable because they allow us to cultivate noble virtues and realise ourselves. Work, in 
contrast, is considered less valuable because its aim is merely to preserve humans’ continued 
material subsistence – a more basic and less noble task.18 Aristotle believed that the less valuable 
tasks of material production and housework ought to be carried out by women and by slaves, so 
that men can be free to dedicate themselves to the higher tasks of political deliberation, 
contemplation and artistic production. 
 
17 In chapter three I discuss another prominent consequentialist argument for reduced work hours that 
relies on highly speculative empirical assumptions – the idea that reduced work hours are necessary to 
combat climate change because they lead to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. 
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, vol. 3. print 




Of course, no one today claims that there ought to be a subservient class of persons who should 
work to enable another more privileged class to carry out ‘higher’ activities. But many think we 
should retain Aristotle’s judgment that work is less valuable than free time.19 Contemporary 
perfectionists claim that we should use advanced technology to replace servants with robots and 
machines, so that we are free from work and can flourish and achieve excellence through higher 
activities.20 
Another prominent perfectionist argument for reduced working time holds that long work hours 
are bad for workers’ happiness. There is evidence that people who work less are on average happier 
than people who work a lot and many politicians, activists, and scholars take this to be a decisive 
argument in favour of reduced working time.21 Unlike the Aristotelian argument, this argument 
doesn’t rely on the idea that free-time-activities are more valuable than work. It simply observes 
that a society where people work less is one that produces more happiness. No judgment is made 
about the value of the activities that humans can engage in when they work and when they enjoy 
free time. Proponents of the ‘happiness argument’ for reduced working time are not committed to 
the idea that it is better for humans to engage in artistic production or contemplation, rather than 
in material production or housework. The happiness argument is perfectionist in a different way, 
however. It assumes that it is governments’ duty to increase citizens’ happiness because our lives 
go better when we are happier. Many would agree with this assumption but we can’t expect that 
everyone should accept it. Imagine for example a mathematician who undergoes great hardship to 
discover proof of a certain theorem. The happiness she derives from discovering the proof might 
not outweigh the hardship she incurred during her search but she might nevertheless think of her 
endeavour as worthwhile.22 This points us to an important shortcoming of perfectionist arguments. 
 
19 Bertrand Russell, In Praise of Idleness: And Other Essays, vol. 5. impr (London: Allen Unwin, 1958); Josef 
Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture; The Philosophical Act (Ignatius Press, 2009); Julia Maskivker, Self-
Realization and Justice: A Liberal-Perfectionist Defense of the Right to Freedom from Employment, Routledge Studies 
in Contemporary Philosophy 35 (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
20 Russell Muirhead, Just Work (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 2007); David Frayne, The Refusal of 
Work (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2005); Coote, Harper, and Stirling, The Case for a Four-Day Week. Erik 
Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant 
Technologies (York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014) 
21 Tim Kasser and Kennon M. Sheldon, ‘Time Affluence as a Path toward Personal Happiness and Ethical 
Business Practice: Empirical Evidence from Four Studies’, Journal of Business Ethics 84, no. S2 (2009): 243–
55; Pouwels, Siegers, and Vlasblom, ‘Income, Working Hours, and Happiness’; Anthony Lepinteur, ‘The 
Shorter Workweek and Worker Wellbeing’, 2016; Cem Başlevent and Hasan Kirmanoğlu, ‘The Impact of 
Deviations from Desired Hours of Work on the Life Satisfaction of Employees’, Social Indicators Research, 
no. 118 (2014): 33–43. 
22 Apart from being objectionably perfectionist, the happiness argument is also consequentialist in a way 





The happiness argument and the Aristotelian argument I just described are problematic because 
they aren’t justifiable to all reasonable citizens. In plural societies, citizens hold a variety of views 
about what is good in life and at least some will disagree with the idea that free time is more valuable 
than work. Political liberals think that the kinds of reasons that states offer to justify interventions 
like working time reduction should be neutral between the various conceptions of the good that 
exist in society.23 
Roughly, the idea behind this demand for justificatory neutrality is the following. Citizens are 
regarded as free and equal in some fundamental sense. State-imposed limitations of freedom and 
unequal treatment require justification. Modern states yield tremendous power and the laws and 
regulations issued by states impact citizens’ lives and limit their freedom in various ways. If states’ 
use of power is to be legitimate, it must be justifiable to everyone whom it affects – not just to a 
subset of the population. States must justify their exercise of authority in a way that is analogous 
to the exercise of power among individuals. If an individual wants to exercise authority over 
another, she must be able to offer reasons that the person she exercises authority over can 
reasonably be expected to endorse – otherwise her exercise of authority is illegitimate. Similarly, 
the exercise of state authority is illegitimate when there are some citizens to whom it can’t be 
justified. 
To illustrate, consider the case of controversial practices like drug use and gambling. Sometimes 
governments justify policies to restrict or prohibit these practices by arguing that people have better 
lives when they abstain from gambling and drug use. Political liberals, in contrast, think that we 
shouldn’t invoke such controversial judgements about what makes for a good life when justifying 
public policy. The same is true for policies that regulate work hours. Political liberals think that 
these policies mustn’t be justified with reference to an idea of how much free time a good life 
 
contingent on a number of mediating variables that should make us doubt whether further working time 
reductions would always increase happiness. One reason why many workers are happier when they work 
less is that their work is boring, stressful, painful, or otherwise unpleasant. If these workers had access to 
jobs that are interesting, meaningful, or simply enjoyable, then they might not become happier if they 
worked less. I will get back to this concern about job quality in a moment. Another reason why further 
working time reductions might not always increase workers’ happiness is that the returns of free time on 
happiness diminish at the margins. For someone who works very long hours, an additional hour of free 
time might bring a significant increase in happiness. But as workers gain more and more free time, each 
additional hour might add less to their happiness. If this is true, the scope of the happiness argument is 
rather limited. 
23 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded ed, Columbia Classics in Philosophy (New York: Columbia 




ideally contains. After all, there is reasonable disagreement about the question of what makes for a 
good work-life balance. 
In what follows I will endorse this liberal neutrality constraint as one of the benchmarks that a 
convincing argument for reduced work hours must meet. I will not however argue for it. Much has 
been said about the plausibility of political liberalism and I will simply take its attractiveness for 
granted.24 This might be disappointing to those who disagree with the ideals of political liberalism. 
But the fact that my arguments are compatible with liberal neutrality doesn’t mean that 
perfectionists can’t get on board with them. On the contrary, liberal anti-perfectionist arguments 
of the kind I will explore have wide appeal because one can get on board with them independently 
of one’s convictions about what makes for a good life. My aim is thus to complement the existing 
literature on working time regulation, so that proponents of reduced work hours can rest their 
demands on a more solid basis. 
One implication of my commitment to political liberalism is that I favour policies that expand 
opportunities for free time over policies that force workers to work less. There is a ‘coerciveness 
spectrum’ of working time reduction policies, on one end of which lie maximum hours laws that 
limit the amount of time during which employees can work, and on the other end of which lie 
incentives and free time protections, such as for example subsidies for part-time work, or a right 
to part-time work. Another example for a non-coercive policy is the right to disconnect introduced in 
2017 in France, whose goal it is to reduce cases of burnout among employees by requiring large 
and mid-sized firms to propose timeframes during which workers are not expected to be online 
and respond to emails. The French law imposes no legal consequences for non-compliant firms, 
which places it at the very ‘non-coercive’ end of the spectrum. Reductions of average working time 
can also be achieved non-coercively by strengthening the bargaining position of those who have 
preferences for more free time. 
Given my endorsement of political liberalism, I will assume that the most attractive policies are 
those that lie close to the ‘non-coercive’ end of the spectrum because these policies are least 
restrictive of individual freedom. I assume that the task of government is in most cases to provide 
citizens with fair opportunities to access free time – rather than forcing them to have more free 
time. However, while in many circumstances working time reductions can be brought about 
through expanding opportunities for free time, there might be exceptions to this rule, for example 
when alternatives to maximum hours legislation are unavailable or highly inefficient. Some of the 
 
24 For a compelling defence of political liberalism see Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford 




arguments I advance in subsequent chapters will be relevant in such circumstances, because they 
justify not only opportunities to work less but also policies that lie closer to the ‘highly-coercive’ 
end of the policy spectrum. 
Related to this, it bears emphasizing that there are two ways in which we can understand the term 
‘working time reduction’. On one reading, working time reduction refers only to coercive policies, 
such as maximum hours laws, that restrict the amount of time during which citizens are allowed to 
work. On a broader interpretation, the term working time reduction refers to the goal of decreasing 
the average amount of time that is spent on work in a given society. This broader interpretation of 
the term is consistent with the idea that reductions in average working time should ideally be 
brought about through non-coercive measures that expand access to free time. Insofar as workers 
have preferences for more free time, the effect of policies that improve access to free time will be 
that average working time per worker in society goes down. I will subsequently use the term in this 
broader sense. 
Scope and Limitations 
My analysis is limited to identifying reasons that a politically liberal society can offer for policies 
that aim at improving individuals’ opportunities for free time. It is also limited in several other 
ways. Apart from setting aside perfectionist and consequentialist arguments, I must set aside several 
other issues pertaining to the expansion of access to free time. 
First, I lack the space to discuss in detail the empirical features of specific policies that can be used 
to achieve the aim of improving access to free time, such as, for example, the likelihood or extent 
to which they can achieve their aimed-at consequences. Policy makers have a variety of tools at 
their disposal to affect the opportunities people have to reduce the work they do, including, for 
example expansions of entitlements to annual vacation, the right to work part time, the 
introduction of a right to sabbatical leave, or the prohibition to work more than a certain number 
of hours per week. Subsequent chapters contain some discussion of policy-options as they relate to 
the different arguments I present. My main goal is however not to assess the soundness of the 
empirical assumptions made by specific policies, but to assess the normative arguments for whether 
they are in principle justified. 
Second, I focus narrowly on the quantity of work that is carried out in society, thereby largely 
bracketing concerns about the quality of work. There is an emerging literature on the question of 




interesting though it is, I must set to one side.25 To some, this might look like a concerning 
omission, which is why I will justify the decision not to engage with the quality of work in a 
moment. 
Third, I lack the space to engage with many of the interesting psychological and sociological aspects 
of free time, time-pressure, and time poverty. Feelings of time-pressure arise not only from 
‘objective’ circumstances, such as low income and social pressures, that I discuss in this dissertation, 
but also from several psychological mechanisms.26 For example, people feel more time-pressured 
when they have high opportunity costs. Someone who earns $500 per hour perceives her free time 
to be more precious and scarcer than someone who earns $50 per hour. People also feel more 
time-pressured when they don’t enjoy what they’re doing or when they perceive their goals to stand 
in conflict with each other, so that dedicating time to the pursuit of one goal sets back the pursuit 
of another goal.27 I mention these psychological dimensions of time pressure for the sake of 
completeness but will subsequently set them aside. There are also interesting sociological and 
historical findings on the topic of overwork, time-pressure, and acceleration that I cannot address 
in my discussion.28 I also lack the space to engage with the history of ideas in philosophy as it 
pertains to the demand for a shortened workweek, the value of free time, and what it means to be 
‘at work’ in an abstract philosophical sense. 
Before I begin to describe the content of subsequent chapters, I must engage with three important 
objections that might appear to undermine the proposal to regulate working time from the very 
outset. The first is that working time regulation would be unnecessary if all citizens had access to 
meaningful work, so that they wouldn’t perceived work as burdensome. The second objection 
holds that there would be no need for working time regulation if everyone received a sufficiently 
generous basic income that provides them with the freedom to reject work arrangements that don’t 
suit their preferences. The third objection takes the form of a dilemma according to which there 
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are two ways in which working time reduction can be implemented, one of which causes 
unemployment and the other causes poverty, so that working time reduction always involves a 
choice between two bad options. 
Meaningful Work 
Let’s first consider the meaningful work objection. According to this objection, complaints about 
excessive work hours are widespread because most people don’t perceive their work as meaningful 
or enjoyable. Working time regulation might be unnecessary if everyone had access to high-quality 
work because workers wouldn’t mind spending their time on enjoyable and meaningful activities. 
In other words, complaints about excessive work hours are ultimately triggered by the quality of 
work, not by its quantity. 
A reply to this objection should begin by conceding that some complaints about excessive work 
hours could indeed be ameliorated or eliminated by improved working conditions. Long working 
time is much easier to accept when work is fun and meaningful. But it is unlikely that all complaints 
about excessive hours would disappear if workers had access to good work. Even the most 
enjoyable activity can become frustrating if we must pursue it over a very long stretch of time. And 
although work might be a highly meaningful activity, it competes for our time with other 
meaningful activities that we could pursue outside work. Some complaints, including those I 
describe in subsequent chapters, would therefore persist even in a world where access to good 
work is universal, or at least greatly expanded.  
We must also bear in mind that providing everyone with access to good work would be extremely 
costly. One reason why many perceive their work as burdensome is that it is highly specialized and 
repetitive. It might be possible to improve the quality of jobs by making them less specialized, so 
that workers could “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, [and] 
criticise after dinner”.29 However, this would arguably risk an unacceptable loss in productive 
efficiency. The affluence of industrialized societies is largely due to a highly specialized division of 
labour and reducing that specialization would result in a much lower standard of living.30 
Improving the quality of work should therefore not be regarded as a substitute but as a complement 
to policies that expand opportunities for free time. Given that it is very costly to provide everyone 
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with access to high-quality work, we should be open to the idea of using working time reduction 
as a way of addressing complaints about unpleasant working conditions. Complaints about bad 
work can be addressed either by improving the quality of work, or by reducing the amount of time 
workers must spend on unpleasant jobs, or, of course, a combination of both. 
Basic Income 
Let’s now turn to the second objection according to which any need for working time regulation 
could be obviated by the introduction of a basic income. To understand how the introduction of a 
basic income might address complaints about long work hours, it is helpful to observe that working 
time mismatches – i.e., situations where workers work fewer or more hours than they would like 
to work – often result from workers’ inability to bargain for working time arrangements that better 
suit their preferences. In contemporary societies employers normally enjoy more bargaining power 
than workers. This is because most workers depend on a monthly income to sustain themselves 
economically so that they can’t credibly threaten employers with quitting their jobs or refusing 
proposed work contracts. Employers, by contrast, often have savings that allow them to withhold 
their offers. Employers’ bargaining power is further enhanced by the fact that there is involuntary 
unemployment in most societies, which makes it possible for employers to credibly threaten 
workers with dismissal. Proponents of basic income maintain that workers and employers would 
bargain on a much more even footing if workers received an income that is not conditional on 
their willingness to sell their labour. One consequence of this ‘levelling’ of bargaining power might 
be that workers would be able to bargain for working time arrangements that suit their preferences.  
One attraction of this solution to the problem of working time mismatches is that it is anti-
perfectionist. As I emphasized in the previous section, citizens have different conceptions of what 
an ideal work-life balance is. Some citizens are grasshoppers, others are ants. The introduction of 
a basic income would make it possible for workers to bargain for contracts that suit their 
preferences – whatever these preferences are. States that introduce basic income, don’t thereby 
endorse any view of what an ideal work-life balance is. We might say that basic income offers a 
procedural solution to the problem of work hours mismatches, whereby the total amount of work 
carried out in a society is the product of individual choice rather than a top-down implementation of 
an independently identified work-quantity, such as the 40 hours work week. 
Another advantage of basic income is that it would help both waged workers and self-employed 




legislation, face the difficult problem of dealing with the self-employed. Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght describe this problem as follows. 
if the compulsory reduction in working time were meant to apply to all workers, whether 
waged or self- employed, a nightmarishly expensive and intrusive bureaucracy would be 
required to achieve anything approaching a fair implementation. If, instead, the measure 
were restricted to waged workers, then the self-employed, both real and fake, would 
proliferate. Employers would rather hire the services of self-employed workers— highly 
skilled or not— who could work without time limit than have employees on their payrolls 
with tightly limited hours. As a result, an unhealthy bubble of pseudo- self-employed, 
precarious workers would develop and the expected impact on job-sharing would fail to 
materialize. 31 
In summary, there seem to be two weighty reasons for preferring basic income over working time 
regulation: on the one hand, basic income is more respectful of individual choice and on the other 
hand it is more efficient because it circumvents the need to regulate the self-employed. 
Several things can be said in response to the basic income objection against working time 
regulation. Let me begin by noting that it is somewhat misleading to characterise basic income and 
working time regulation as two competing policy options. If it were true that the introduction of a 
generous basic income leads to a reduction in work hours, then we should perhaps endorse it as 
an interesting and perhaps necessary part of a policy-package whose aim it is to reduce working 
time. In that sense I don’t regard the proposal to introduce a basic income as an objection to the 
proposal to reduce working time. 
I do however reject the idea that the introduction of a basic income would be sufficient to achieve 
the end of reduced working time. Basic income addresses some but not all morally objectionable 
causes of excessive work hours. It expands workers bargaining power and thereby mitigates the 
problem that workers must often sign contracts that are unfair to them. But unequal bargaining 
power is not the only cause of objectionably long-working-time. As I will explain in chapters 2, 3, 
and 4, excessive work hours are sometimes caused by collective action problems that arise even 
under circumstances where workers and employers bargain on an equal footing. Chapter 5 contains 
a more detailed discussion of the proposal to achieve justice in access to free time through fair 
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bargaining and concludes that though enhancing workers bargaining power is important, it is not 
enough to provide everyone with fair opportunities to access free time.  
It also bears emphasizing that basic income is not the only anti-perfectionist way of achieving 
reduced working time. As I just explained, basic income is attractive because it leaves the decision 
of how much to work to each individual. But there are other policies that are respectful of individual 
choice. To illustrate, states can institute a right for workers to take sabbatical leave. Those who 
wish to make use of this right can take it up but there is no requirement to take sabbatical leave.  
There is another reason to be suspicious about the idea of relying solely on basic income as a means 
of achieving justice in access to free time. Many philosophers argue that basic income is most 
attractive and most defensible when it is unconditional and when it is pitched at the highest 
economically sustainable level.32 This kind of basic income is somewhat more utopian than working 
time regulation in the sense that it is more difficult to institute under conditions that are currently 
given in most societies. Instituting a generous basic income requires a very significant redistribution 
of wealth and is likely to face fierce resistance from privileged classes.33 The fight for a shortened 
workweek in contrast is somewhat more realistic in the sense that it already enjoys broad support 
in the worker movement and governments around the world have gathered extensive experience 
with the implementation of policies that regulate working time. In the short run it might be easier 
to achieve significant working time reductions than to achieve a generous basic income. 
The fact that basic income is more difficult to achieve doesn’t mean that activists should give up 
the fight for this idea. But we should be open to the idea of making progress towards social justice 
on different fronts, both in the short run and in the long run. The urgency of the problem of 
excessive work hours makes it imperative to explore alternatives to basic income that have a chance 
of being implemented in the near future. 
The Dilemma between Poverty and Unemployment 
I now turn to the third concern that threatens to undermine the proposal to reduce working time. 
To understand this concern, we must observe that there is a distinction between working time 
reduction policies that compensate workers for the loss of income that fewer work hours entail, so 
that their absolute monthly income remains the same although they work less, and policies that 
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don’t foresee such compensation, so that those who work less, receive less pay. The objection 
holds that each of these choices, compensation, and no compensation, has unpalatable 
consequences, so that proponents of reduced working time are faced with a dilemma. 
Consider first cases where governments issue coercive working time restrictions without 
compensation. This threatens to harm those with little marketable skill, who must work long hours 
to earn enough to meet their basic needs. Imagine someone whose income is very low, so that she 
has no choice but to work a lot in order to afford life’s basic necessities. Governments that prevent 
low-income earners like her from working enough to make ends meet harm these persons because 
they make them substantially worse off than they would be if they could work enough to meet their 
basic needs. One of the most fundamental tasks of a just society is to ensure that all its members 
can meet their basic needs. Yet, maximum work hours legislation might have the effect of pushing 
low-income earners beneath a subsistence threshold. 
Faced with this unacceptable consequence, proponents of reduced working time might propose 
that workers should receive wage compensation when their working time is reduced, so that their 
monthly income remains the same, although they work less. This leads us to the second horn of 
the dilemma. Imagine that governments require employers to increase workers’ hourly wages when 
their working time is reduced, so that workers’ absolute income remains the same before and after 
working time has been reduced. 
Such a policy resembles minimum wage legislation in that it forces employers to pay workers more 
than they would pay in a free market setting. This makes working time reduction vulnerable to an 
objection that is often levelled against minimum wage legislation. The objection assumes that 
employers’ demand for labour goes down when the price of labour goes up, so that employers who 
are required to pay wages that lie above the market equilibrium will offer fewer jobs than they 
would otherwise offer. According to the neoclassical model of the labour market, free bargaining 
between workers and employers under idealised conditions maximises employment because it 
helps identify an equilibrium price of labour where the market clears and no involuntary 
unemployment occurs.34 In a world where states require employers to deviate from this equilibrium 
price, there might be more unemployment because employers are not willing to hire some workers 
under these conditions. The upshot of this is that working time reduction with wage compensation 
might cause unemployment. 
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Consequently, advocates of reduced working time seem to face a dilemma. If working time 
reductions are implemented without wage compensation, low-income earners might be pushed 
beneath a subsistence threshold. If workers receive wage compensation, unemployment might 
increase.  
One response to this purported dilemma is to deny that raising workers’ wages does in fact lead to 
higher unemployment. We can grant, for the sake of argument, that neoclassical theory is right in 
assuming that deviations from a free market equilibrium wage lead to higher unemployment. But 
real existing labour markets differ from idealised models in various ways. One difference between 
real labour markets and the idealised model is that employers often enjoy an unfair advantage in 
bargaining power over workers. The neo-classical model assumes that employers have no market 
power to determine wages. In real labour markets, this requirement is often not met because 
unemployment, asymmetric information, and imperfect labour mobility give some degree of wage-
setting power to employers.35 We can speculate that an economy where workers and employers 
could bargain on a more or less equal footing would be one where most workers earn substantially 
higher wages than they currently do.36 The upshot of this is that legislation to increase workers 
hourly wages doesn’t distort ideal free market outcomes but brings economies closer to the kind 
of outcome that would emerge from an ideal free bargaining setting. 
An alternative reply to the dilemma-objection points out that it need not be employers who must 
subsidise workers’ wages. The task of compensating workers for the income-loss they incur as a 
result of reduced working time can be assumed by the state. Governments can use tax revenue to 
subsidise workers’ wages so that they don’t fall below a subsistence threshold. This ensures that 
employers aren’t forced to pay higher hourly wages and thus have no reason to hire fewer workers. 
This approach has been endorsed among others by John Rawls, according to whom governments 
should subsidise wages in cases where workers would otherwise be unable to meet basic 
necessities.37 
Finally, governments can avoid the dilemma by providing welfare services to those who are at risk 
of poverty, so that lower wages don’t result in lower living standards. This would leave the market 
price of labour unchanged while ensuring that no one falls below a subsistence threshold. 
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Summing up, I have responded to three objections against the proposal to regulate working time, 
showing that improving the quality of work and introducing a basic income is not sufficient to 
address concerns about excessive work hours and that governments who aim at reducing working 
time are not forced to choose between increasing either unemployment or poverty. This clears the 
path for subsequent chapters, where I explain how collective action problems, negative 
externalities, and concerns about fairness can ground a liberal and anti-perfectionist case for 
reduced working time. 
Chapter Overview 
My main point of departure is that collective action problems and negative externalities sometimes 
cause objectionably long work hours. Politically liberal societies should be concerned with 
externalities and collective action problems when they impose objectionable limits on individuals’ 
ability to choose a work life balance that fits their preferences. Under some circumstances, working 
time regulation enhances individuals’ ability to act in line with their preferences and therefore 
doesn’t violate the liberal neutrality constraint. 
The first chapter situates my philosophical project in the context of liberal egalitarian approaches 
to social justice. It sets the stage by describing what implication these approaches have for the 
question of how governments should regulate work hours. I engage in some detail with the most 
prominent liberal egalitarian approach to social justice – John Rawls’s theory of justice – and discuss 
how it can inform discussions of working time regulation. I explain how his theory generates a 
‘sufficientarian’ concern for free time, according to which governments must ensure that citizens 
have enough opportunities for free time to be able to enjoy the fair value of their basic liberties, 
and a ‘fairness’ concern, according to which citizens are entitled to a fair share of the primary good, 
‘leisure’. I discuss how free time might be incorporated into an index of advantage and what 
implications follow when free time is treated as a primary good. To that end, I discuss how free 
time can be defined and measured. Finally, I point out several difficulties that the Rawlsian 
approach faces when it is applied to the problem of working time regulation. One particularly 
important shortcoming of the Rawlsian approach is that it doesn’t yield sufficiently precise 
judgements to evaluate the above-mentioned demands for a shortened workweek. In subsequent 
chapters I show how more specific conclusions as to how much working-time regulation is morally 
justifiable can be reached.  
Chapter 2 engages with a collective action problem that occurs between workers in the labour 
market – the working time rat race. What causes this collective action problem is that employers 




work particularly long hours are awarded benefits such as raises or promotions or are spared from 
dismissals. This makes it individually rational for each worker to work extra-hours in an attempt to 
out-compete colleagues. However, if many workers pursue this strategy, it loses its effectiveness. 
My analysis shows that workers with preferences for more leisure have a claim to state intervention 
to remove the rat race when this doesn’t impose disproportionate harm on third parties. 
Chapter 3 extends discussion of the rat race by showing that collective action problems that cause 
long work hours arise not only between individuals but also between firms. Firms often use novel 
technology to increase production of goods and services. An alternative to using novel technology 
to increase output is to use it to reduce the amount of working time that goes into the productive 
process. I show that firms often prefer expansions of output over expansions of workers’ leisure 
because they face a collective action problem that makes it rational for each firm to enhance 
competitiveness by increasing output although this strategy is self-defeating when a large number 
of firms pursues it. This gives rise to a complaint for workers, whose preferences would be better 
served if firms sometimes used novel technology to reduce working time. 
Up to this point my focus is on interactions between workers, employers, and firms in the labour 
market. Chapter 4 broadens the scope of my discussion by considering the problem of unpaid work 
and the gendered division of labour. Until today, most heterosexual couples with children follow a 
division of labour whereby men engage in more paid work and women conduct more care- and 
housework. Many regard the persistence of this division of labour as morally objectionable, but 
philosophers have difficulties explaining why exactly it should be condemned and overcome. I 
criticise various accounts of the injustice of the gendered division of labour and claim that 
considerations around voluntariness, equality of opportunity, discrimination and autonomy fail to 
detect the distinctive moral wrong of the gendered division of labour. I then argue that this moral 
wrong is best cashed out as a negative externality imposed by those who divide work along 
traditional gender lines on those who would like to split paid and unpaid work more equally. 
Finally, chapter 5 discusses the problem of differential costs that individuals face when they want 
to access free time at different life-stages. Here I don’t ask how much individuals would work in 
the absence of morally objectionable externalities and collective action problems but how costly 
access to free time should be at different stages of an individual’s life. In most industrialized 
countries, citizens enjoy a very large amount of free time towards the end of their lives, when they 
are retired, but find it very costly to access free time during the middle part of their lives. This is 
concerning because those who die early are deprived of the reward of free time that retirement 
holds. Extreme discrepancies between a time-rich old age and a time-scarce middle age are not, 




with early retirement, whereas others incentivize shorter work hours during middle age and later 
retirement. I argue that justice requires a redistribution of access to free time from old age to middle 
age, so that access to shorter work hours during middle age becomes less costly and early retirement 
becomes more costly. 
The main contribution of this dissertation is then to show why we should endorse demands to 
increase citizens’ access to free time, such as for example the introduction of a four-day work week 
or the right to periodic sabbatical leave. Existing liberal approaches, such as Rawls’s theory of 
justice, don’t provide specific enough guidance to decide whether or not justice requires expanding 
protections of free-time. Perfectionist approaches reach more determinate conclusions but they 
can’t be justified to all members of a society. Evaluating the morality of externalities, problems of 
collective action, and fairness in access to free time at different life-stages helps appreciate several 
thus far overlooked reasons to be concerned with the fate of grasshoppers. Each chapter offers 
some reason to be concerned about the fate of grasshoppers in our societies. Taken together, these 
different considerations make a strong case for working time reduction. Justice requires facilitating 




1. Liberal Egalitarianism and Free Time 
As I explained in the introduction, demands for reductions in working time have gained much 
prominence in recent years. For political philosophers, this raises the question of whether a 
significantly reduced work week is compatible with or indeed required by social justice. In this 
chapter, I discuss what resources existing liberal egalitarian approaches offer to understand 
demands for expansions of free time and how they judge the above-mentioned demands for 
significant expansions of access to free time. 
1.1 Preliminaries 
The most prominent liberal egalitarian approach to social justice is John Rawls’s Justice as Fairness, 
and much contemporary theorising on free time is informed by Rawls’s theory. Most notably, Julie 
Rose has recently produced seminal work on how Rawls’s liberal egalitarian framework generates 
a concern for justice in the distribution of free time.1 Rawls’s theory is a natural starting point for 
my discussion, not only because it remains one of the most influential approaches to social justice 
but also because Rawls acknowledges the importance of free time and offers some – albeit very 
brief – comments on what his approach might entail for justice in access to free time. 
The implications of Rawls’s theory for how we should think about justice in the distribution of 
income and wealth have been discussed at great length. Here, my task is to explore what 
implications his conception of justice has for the way we should think about justice in access to 
free time. How much guidance can we derive from a suitable interpretation of Rawls’s theory to 
judge the idea of reducing the average workweek?  
To answer this question, I first describe some aspects of Rawls’s theory that are relevant to 
assessing problems of free time and that explain why free time is a good whose distribution must 
be evaluated separately from the distribution of other goods, such as income and wealth. Section 
1.2 explains how Rawls’s theory generates a concern for the protection of free time on the grounds 
that citizens can only make effective use of their basic liberties if they have enough free time. 
Section 1.3 explains that beyond the provision of an amount of free time that is sufficient to protect 
basic liberties, Rawls’s theory also requires that all citizens must enjoy a fair share of free time. In 
section 1.4, I discuss how free time should be defined and measured. This is important because 
answers to the question of how much access to free time citizens should enjoy partly depend on 
how exactly free time is defined. Section 1.5 discusses how the size of a fair share of free time 
 




might be determined. I explain that Rawls’s theory faces significant difficulties in determining how 
much free time should be made available to everyone. It doesn’t yield sufficiently precise advice to 
judge popular demands, such as the introduction of a four-day work week. This observation 
motivates subsequent chapters, where I explain how morally objectionable collective action 
problems give rise to a liberal, anti-perfectionist case for working time regulation. 
1.2 Rawls’s Theory of Justice, Free Time, and the Convertibility Objection 
According to Rawls, we should conceive of justice as requiring a fair distribution of the benefits 
and burdens that individuals incur when they cooperate in society.2 In order to discover the content 
of such fair conditions of cooperation, Rawls proposes the following contractualist thought 
experiment. A group of individuals is tasked with designing the constitutional setup of a society 
that specifies how the benefits and burdens of social cooperation ought to be distributed. The 
participants of this fictitious bargaining process are guided by rational self-interest and have no 
knowledge of the social position they will occupy in a future society. Crucially, they lack knowledge 
of their personal characteristics such as age, gender, race, or social class and are therefore unable 
to bargain for rules that favour the particular group to which they belong.3 
Rawls argues that it would be rational for individuals in this situation to agree on three principles 
of justice that would guide cooperation in society. The first of these principles secures an extensive 
set of basic liberties for everyone. The second principle establishes that competition for advantaged 
social positions be open and fair, and the third principle demands that there be no social and 
economic inequalities unless these inequalities work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society.4 The first principle takes priority over the second and the second takes priority 
over the third, which means for example that restrictions of basic liberties can’t be justified by 
improvements in equality of opportunity to access attractive social positions. In order to identify 
who belongs to the group of the ‘least advantaged’ and in order to determine which positions count 
as ‘advantaged social positions’, Rawls proposes an index of goods that all citizens can reasonably 
be expected to want more of, independently of their particular conceptions of the good life.5 Those 
who fare worst with regards to their endowment of these goods are considered least advantaged. 
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To preview, concerns about justice in the distribution of free time are generated by two different 
aspects of Rawls’s theory. First, some working time regulations and entitlements to free time are 
needed to ensure that citizens can make effective use of the liberties protected by the first principle. 
Second, citizens need free time to advance their life plans – whatever they are. Therefore, a 
plausible interpretation of Rawls’s theory entails that all citizens are entitled to a fair share of free 
time. 
Before I explore these implications of Rawls’s theory in more detail, it is important to engage with 
an objection according to which it is superfluous to think about justice in the distribution of free 
time in the context of Rawls’s theory. This objection – let’s call it the convertibility objection – holds 
that once a fair distribution of income and wealth is achieved, a fair distribution of free time will 
automatically follow. This is because citizens can supposedly use money to buy free time. Those 
with preferences for lots of free time can choose to give up some of their money in order to work 
less and those with preferences for lots of income can choose to forgo free time and work long 
hours. Therefore, in order to achieve a fair distribution of free time, it suffices to achieve a fair 
distribution of income and wealth. Moreover, in order to ensure that citizens have enough free 
time to make effective use of their basic liberties, it is not necessary that states attend to 
distributions of free time directly. Instead, endowing everyone with enough money suffices to 
guarantee that citizens can buy any amount of time needed for the exercise of their basic liberties. 
If this were true, it would not be necessary to analyse injustices in access to free time because these 
injustices would be corrected as soon as a fair distribution of money is achieved. 
According to Julie Rose, this objection fails because it rests on the mistaken assumption that money 
and free time are perfectly convertible.6 Rose defines free time as the number of hours that are left 
to a person after she has met life’s necessities. I will discuss this and competing definitions of free 
time in more detail in section 1.4. For now, to understand the convertibility objection, it suffices 
to know that Rose calculates the amount of free time that a person has by summing up how much 
time that person spends on unavoidable activities, such as earning money, sleeping, or caring for 
dependants. This sum of ‘unfree’ time is then subtracted from the 24 hours of time in a day and 
the resulting figure is a person’s free time. Rose claims that money can’t always be converted into 
free time because of two reasons – each of which suffices to demonstrate their imperfect 
convertibility. 
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First, workers are in many cases unable to choose their preferred working-time. Many jobs are 
available only on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, so that workers often have to spend more or less time 
at work than they would actually like.7 Second, time spent on unavoidable private activities such as 
personal care, housework and care for dependants cannot always be reduced by buying services in 
the market. The amount of time individuals devote to these activities varies greatly, and often this 
variation is not just a result of differential preferences. Some individuals need more sleep than 
others, some (for example those with disabilities) must devote more time to personal care than 
others, and some have to spend more time on care for dependants than others. Many activities of 
personal care, such as sleep, must be performed by each individual herself and can therefore not 
be bought in the market. Moreover, even when time-saving services are available in the market, 
individuals cannot always legitimately be expected to use money to outsource activities such as 
caring for one’s frail mother. Citizens sometimes have weighty reasons to perform these activities 
themselves, e.g. in order to protect valuable emotional bonds. In some cases, the decision to care 
for someone should not be treated as a discretionary use of a person’s free time but as something 
that deduces from that person’s free time. 
According to Rose, each of these two considerations shows that money and free time aren’t 
perfectly convertible and as a result we cannot achieve a fair distribution of free time indirectly by 
distributing income and wealth fairly. Issues of fairness in the distribution of free time arise even 
against the backdrop of a fair distribution of money and therefore we must attend to justice in the 
distribution of free time separately.8 
Note that Rose shows only that an extreme claim according to which money and free time are 
perfectly convertible is false. She doesn’t engage with a more moderate claim according to which 
money and free time are largely convertible. Rose points out that workers are often unable to choose 
their preferred working-time. For example, many law firms offer jobs on the condition that 
employees agree to working long hours. Those who would like to work fewer hours cannot get 
these jobs at all. What this shows is that within particular occupations or firms, workers are often 
unable to choose their preferred working-time. However, this doesn’t rule out another way of 
trading money for time: Those with strong preferences for fewer work hours might be able to 
choose to work in different jobs that require fewer work hours. The upshot of this is that there 
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might be some cases where workers cannot trade money for time but they can do so most of the 
time. Something similar might be true for individuals who must spend more time on necessary 
activities, such as personal care and sleep, than others. These individuals might not be able to offset 
their entire free time-disadvantage through purchasing services and time-saving technologies but 
they might be able to offset their disadvantage to a very large extent in this way. If this were true, 
it would show that generating a fair distribution of income and wealth could suffice to generate a 
largely fair distribution of free time. 
In reply to this, one might point out that expecting workers to change jobs when they want changes 
in working time is excessively demanding. Changing one’s job is often a difficult and costly 
endeavour – especially when it involves re-training and or moving houses, for example. Moreover, 
expecting workers to change jobs when their working time preferences aren’t met arguably conflicts 
with protecting their freedom of occupational choice. The freedom to pursue an occupation of 
one’s choice is important, among other things, because most people spend a significant part of 
their lives at the workplace and the workplace affects their well-being in a profound way. Telling 
workers that they can’t have their fair share of free time unless they agree to switch to whatever 
occupation is compatible with having that fair share greatly reduces the value of their freedom of 
occupational choice. 
Similarly, it might be unreasonable to expect individuals with disabilities to buy whatever time-
saving services are available in the market, so that they don’t fall short of their fair share of free 
time. This is because those who are being cared for can have weighty interests in being cared for 
by relatives or others with whom they have strong emotional bonds or relations of trust that would 
suffer if care was outsourced. In the same way, those who provide care to relatives, partners of 
friends can have a strong interest in providing this care themselves as opposed to buying care 
services in the market. As I mentioned above, we might have to regard time devoted to caring for 
one’s disabled mother as something that reduces this individual’s free time even if the market offers 
a service that performs the same caring task. These considerations suggest that even if money and 
free time are largely convertible, it might be a mistake to expect citizens always to carry out these 
conversions when they lack free time. 
But there is a more fundamental reason why it is important to think about free time as an object 
of distributive justice. Recall that according to the convertibility objection it is not necessary to 
think about fairness in access to free time because individuals can use money to buy as much time 
as they need. However, in order to figure out what a fair money-distribution is in the first place, it 
is indispensable to have knowledge about people’s time-needs. Even if time and money are 




distribution of money must be appropriately sensitive to this. To illustrate, imagine a person whose 
disability causes her to be objectionably time-poor unless she buys some time-saving services in 
the market. We can’t determine how large this person’s fair share of money is unless we know how 
much money she needs to buy the time-saving services she needs. We must have knowledge about 
her time-deficit in order to allocate enough compensatory money to her. What this means is that 
even if money and free time were perfectly substitutable, we would nevertheless have to think 
about fairness in the distribution of free time in order to find out what justice in the distribution 
of money requires. If money and free time were perfectly convertible, we might not need policies 
that regulate the availability of free time because people could simply buy as much time as they 
need. But we would still need to know how much money must be allocated to those who would 
otherwise fall short of their fair share of free-time. This shows us that thinking about justice in the 
distribution of free time is indispensable – even if money and free-time are largely convertible. As 
a result, the convertibility objection fails. 
It bears mentioning that there are different ways in which governments can respond to cases where 
individuals have less than their just share of free time. First, governments can attend to the 
availability of free time ‘directly’, for example by subsidising childcare facilities or by regulating 
work hours. Second, governments can sometimes compensate individuals for free time disadvantages. 
In other words, even if an individual’s free time can’t easily be expanded trough subsidies and 
regulations, and even if that individual can’t use money to buy more time, it might still be possible 
to offset the disadvantage she suffers by granting her additional money. Plausibly, some but not all 
injustices in the distribution of free time can be remedied in this way. As I explain in the subsequent 
section, citizens need a certain amount of free time to be able to make use of their basic liberties. 
Given the priority for the protection of basic liberties in Rawls’ theoretical framework, citizens who 
don’t have enough time to exercise their basic liberties can’t be compensated for that shortfall with 
money. In other cases, where basic liberties aren’t threatened by a shortfall in free time, money can 
plausibly compensate for this disadvantage. Consider the case of harried wall street bankers. Their 
time-poverty arguably doesn’t normally ground a complaint of justice because it is outweighed by, 
or compensated for, by their high income or by other advantages they enjoy, such as comfortable 
working conditions.9 
It also bears mentioning that the degree to which money and free time are convertible changes 
over time and can be influenced by state action. For example, states can subsidize research on time-
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saving technology, so that more of this technology becomes available. Or states can subsidize 
already existing time-saving technology, such as washing machines or internet access, so that it 
becomes less costly for citizens to convert money into free time. 
With these preliminary considerations in mind, let’s now turn to a specific argument for the 
protection of free time according to which states must ensure that citizens have enough time to 
make effective use of their basic liberties. 
1.3. Protecting the Fair Value of Basic Liberties 
One particularly important way in which Rawlsian justice can be compromised is when citizens 
can’t make use of the basic liberties protected by the first principle. According to Rawls, the 
protection of some liberties such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom 
of occupational choice is especially important because only when these liberties are protected can 
citizens develop what Rawls calls a ‘moral personality’. Having a moral personality means, among 
other things, that citizens are capable of devising and revising life plans and of understanding and 
endorsing fair terms of cooperation. We can’t hope to construct a just society unless citizens have 
these abilities because without these abilities, citizens would be unable to appreciate the merits of 
a social system where people come together to interact on mutually advantageous terms.10 What 
distinguishes basic liberties from non-basic liberties is precisely that only the basic liberties are 
necessary for the development of a moral personality and it is for this reason that Rawls grants a 
special status to them.11 
Arguably, two conditions must be met to make the basic liberties effectively available to everyone. 
First, citizens need a formal entitlement to each of the basic liberties, such as for example the legal 
right to freedom of association. Second, citizens need enough resources to be able to exercise the 
basic liberties. This second condition is often emphasized by authors belonging to a Marxist 
tradition of thought. Marx pointed out that under capitalism, workers’ rights are often empty 
because workers are deprived of the resources they need to make use of their rights.12 For example, 
the right to private property is of little use to workers if their income and power are too small to 
accumulate any such property.13 
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According to Julie Rose, something similar is true for the resource of free time. Following a religion, 
discussing politics with friends, and voting in elections are all ways of exercising one’s basic liberties 
and all require a certain amount of time that is not consumed with work and other necessities of 
life.14 Lukas Stanczyk illustrates this insight, explaining that 
if you have to work five days a week from morning till night as well as on weekends just to 
pay the rent and avoid eviction, then many of the most important liberties of citizenship 
will for this reason be rendered worthless to you. Forced to be at work at all hours on pain 
of losing your job, falling behind on the rent, and getting kicked out by your landlord, you 
will have little use for the freedom to engage in protest and peaceful assembly, to join a 
political or social organization, or to make other uses of the freedoms of speech, 
conscience, and association. More generally, in order to make effective use of the numerous 
legal freedoms you have as a citizen to pursue your personal projects whether alone or with 
others, you need not just the money but also the time away from work that is required to 
make some meaningful headway on your goals. 15 
If basic liberties are to be protected not merely in a formal but in a substantial sense, it follows that 
citizens need a certain amount of free time that enables them to make effective use of their legal 
freedoms. This type of argument justifies the protection of a certain amount of free time that is 
sufficient to ensure that citizens can make use of their basic liberties. In other words, protecting 
the fair value of the basic liberties can be achieved by providing a threshold entitlement to free 
time that ensures that all citizens have enough time e.g., to go to assemblies, to vote, and to inform 
themselves. This threshold might not be the same for everyone. Some citizens will need larger 
shares of free time than others to reach the same adequacy threshold. This is because some can 
make more effective use of their free time than others (think for example of people who live far 
away from public forums, or people who read more slowly than others, etc.). 
Apart from arguments of this ‘sufficientarian’ kind, there are also arguments about fairness that 
make entitlements to free time depend on how much free time an individual has in comparison to 
someone else. My task in the next section is to explore this type of argument. 
Before that, it is worth pausing to ask how contemporary societies fare with regards to the 
requirement that everyone must have enough free time to be able to exercise their basic liberties. 
As I mentioned, the requirement that everyone must have enough free time is weaker than the 
requirement that everyone must enjoy a fair share of free time. We can speculate that a relatively 
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small amount of free time, say 3 or 4 hours per week, is enough for citizens to exercise their basic 
liberties. During this time citizens can for example inform themselves about political developments, 
participate in political organizations or go to demonstrations. But most countries, including affluent 
western democracies, fail to protect even this minimal amount of free time that citizens need to 
exercise their liberties. Those who must work long hours in order to make ends meet often find it 
difficult even to find enough time and energy to meet basic needs, such as conducting housework 
or attending to the needs of children and other dependants.16 People who earn low wages are not 
only disadvantaged because they have little money, but also because they have too little free time 
to make effective use of their basic liberties. States can respond to this problem by redistributing 
money. Severe time-poverty that curtails citizens ability to exercise their basic liberties is normally 
caused by money-poverty and can be remedied by redistributing wealth. Another way of putting 
this is that money and free time disadvantages often cluster.17 Focusing on the fact that people need 
a minimal amount of free time to be able to function as competent citizens thus helps us appreciate 
an important and often neglected argument for redistributing wealth and income. I now turn to 
the question of fairness in the distribution of free time between different groups and individuals in 
society. 
1.4. Free time as a social primary good? 
Rawls specifically addresses one concern about free time according to which his theory is unfairly 
biased in favour of those who have preferences for lots of free time. This implication of Rawls’s 
theory was first noticed by the economist Richard Musgrave, who notes that the Difference 
Principle counts those who deliberately decide not to work and to live off social benefits, in order 
to “surf all day off Malibu”, as members of the group of the least advantaged, whose position ought 
to be maximally improved.18 This is because those who decide not to work have less income 
available to them than those who do, which in turn makes them fare worse with regards to Rawls’s 
index of advantages. Musgrave correctly points out that this is an implausible implication of Rawls’s 
theory because under the assumption that there is no involuntary unemployment, a lifestyle of little 
income and lots of free time will likely be chosen and enjoyed by some citizens.19 Given that these 
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leisure-loving individuals may enjoy opportunities that are identical to those who prefer to work, it 
seems unjust to count them among the least advantaged, who benefit from redistribution that the 
Difference Principle requires. 
Rawls proposes to remedy this flaw by including approximately 16 hours of leisure per day to the 
index of social primary goods. As a result, those who decide not to work will have an additional 8 
hours of leisure (assuming that the average work day is 8 hours), which makes them better off 
compared to those who spend 8 hours at work. Consequently, the voluntarily unemployed and 
those who voluntarily work few hours are less likely to count among the least advantaged (though 
this of course depends on how well or badly they fare with regards to their possession of other 
social primary goods). 
These comments by Rawls on free time make it seem as if the main reason for incorporating leisure 
to the index of primary goods is to remedy the “surfer problem”. Yet, there are other, arguably 
stronger, reasons to justify this move.20 According to Julie Rose, free time should enter Rawls’s list 
of social primary goods because citizens need free time to advance their conceptions of the good 
life – whatever they are.21 Meeting friends, doing sports, going to the church, reading books, taking 
piano classes, etc. all require free time.  
According to Rose, many political philosophers have mistakenly assumed that free time is a specific 
good, not an all-purpose means. This is important because according to Rawls, the Difference Principle 
only governs distributions of all-purpose means, not distributions of specific goods. Specific goods 
are goods that are desired by some and not by others. Ice cream is a specific good because some 
enjoy eating it and others don’t. To understand why the Difference Principle does not apply to 
specific goods, consider the following example. Some individuals in a society like ice cream but 
haven’t got any. Governments can remedy this by delivering ice cream to those who like it. 
Alternatively, governments can ensure that citizens have fair shares of the all-purpose means 
money that citizens can then use to purchase ice cream themselves. One advantage of the latter 
strategy is that it is not paternalistic. Paternalism occurs when governments’ actions are guided by 
the idea that the government’s judgment of how individuals should lead their life is superior to that 
of each individual.22 Delivering ice cream to citizens amounts to treating them like children who 
ought not to determine themselves the amount and type of food they eat. 
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Another advantage of this strategy is that it allows governments to comply with the liberal principle 
of neutrality. As I explained in the introduction, governments ought not to justify their actions by 
appeal to conceptions of the good that citizens can reasonably disagree about. This is attractive 
because citizens can and do in fact reasonably disagree about the worth of different ways of life. 
By supplying only all-purpose means, governments do not favour or encourage the leading of some 
ways of life over others. 
Rawls believes that free time qualifies as a social primary good because it “meets the essential 
condition that primary goods must not presuppose any particular comprehensive doctrine.”23 
Plausibly, this is the case. Providing citizens with fair shares of free time doesn’t amount to 
favouring one conception of the good over another because free time is needed to pursue all sorts 
of activities. 
Yet, in order to establish the claim that free time is a social primary good, two further conditions 
must be met. First, a good qualifies as a social primary good only if an objective measure exists to 
establish who possesses how much of this good. Applied to the case of free time, the criterion of 
objective measurability entails that equally situated individuals with equal amounts of free time are 
judged as having the same amounts of free time. Conversely, if two individuals have different 
amounts of free time, this difference must be accurately detected by our tool of measurement. 
Objective measurability is important because it is necessary to ensure fairness: imagine that you 
and I have equal amounts of free time but a flawed measurement tool determines that your free 
time is 20 hours less per week than mine. This entitles you to unwarranted compensation. Objective 
measurability also requires that researchers can rule out (or correct for) bias that occurs through 
self-reporting. We can expect that individuals’ own judgments about how much free time they 
enjoy are sometimes distorted. For example, someone might feel time-pressured and harried 
although she enjoys a lot of free time. As a result, the harried person reports that she enjoys less 
free time than she actually possesses.24 We can also imagine that some individuals would 
deliberately provide false information about how much free time they enjoy, for example because 
they expect to be compensated for their purported time-poverty or because they want to appear 
‘busy’ and productive in the eyes of others.25 
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The second criterion social primary goods must meet is that the information necessary to establish 
who possesses how much of the good in question must be publicly available. This is important for 
two reasons. First, the public availability of information makes it possible for everyone to verify 
whether the information governments use to inform redistributive policy is accurate or not. This 
establishes trust and enhances stability. The second reason why using only publicly available 
information to determine how many social primary goods citizens possess is that this helps protect 
citizens’ right to a private life. Liberal states may not closely monitor sensitive aspects of citizens’ 
private lives in order to obtain knowledge about their possession of certain goods.26 Consider the 
example of self-respect. In principle, self-respect would seem to be an attractive candidate for a 
social primary good because possession of it arguably helps advance any conceivable life plan that 
citizens may have. However, in order to obtain information about the degree to which someone 
possesses self-respect, states would have to intrude that person’s private sphere in objectionable 
ways. Therefore, according to Rawls, self-respect should itself not be considered a social primary 
good.27 In order to ensure fairness in the distribution of the important good self-respect 
governments should therefore provide a fair distribution of the social bases of self-respect. What this 
means is that governments should facilitate access to goods that are necessary for developing a 
secure sense of self-respect, such as for example the possibility of making meaningful contributions 
to society through work.28 
Given the fact that knowledge about the distribution of social primary goods is fundamental for 
the pursuit of social justice, we might ask why citizens can’t be expected to put up with the idea 
that the state should monitor some aspects of their personal life. After all, private firms routinely 
monitor sensitive aspects of people’s lives and they do so for reasons that seem much less 
important, morally speaking.29 For example, many firms gather extensive data about the preferences 
and personality types of the users of their products in order to improve the effectiveness of their 
 
workers talents and motivations that isn’t publicly available. For discussion of this problem see Andrew 
Williams, ‘Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 27, no. 3 (1998): 225–47. 
26 James Rachels, ‘Why Privacy Is Important’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (1975): 323–33; Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, ‘The Right to Privacy’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (1975): 295–314; Carissa Veliz, 
Privacy Is Power: Why and How You Should Take Back Control of Your Data (London: Transworld Publishers 
Ltd, 2020). 
27 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 60. 
28 Arnold, ‘The Difference Principle at Work’. 
29 Olivia Solon, ‘Big Brother Isn’t Just Watching: Workplace Surveillance Can Track Your Every Move’, 
The Guardian, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/06/workplace-surveillance-big-
brother-technology; Kirstie Ball, ‘Workplace Surveillance: An Overview’, Labor History 51, no. 1 (2010): 
87–106; Michel Anteby and Curtis K. Chan, ‘A Self-Fulfilling Cycle of Coercive Surveillance: Workers’ 




advertisement.30 What’s more, these practices are legal and most users consent to terms and 
conditions that make the use of smartphone apps and other software conditional on giving up 
information about their private lives. This raises the question of how strictly the publicity criterion 
ought to be interpreted. Perhaps the gathering of data about some aspects of citizens lives is 
justifiable because it helps states to pursue the ends of social justice more effectively. 
Rawls is convinced that intruding upon citizens’ private lives in order to obtain information about 
their possession of free time is not necessary because free time meets the criteria of objective 
measurability and publicity. Free time “[…] has a reasonably objective measure and is open to 
view.”31 However, Rawls offers no further arguments to support this claim. My task in the next 
section is to discuss whether it is true that free time can be operationalized in a way that complies 
with the criteria of objective measurability and publicity. This is important because in order to 
fruitfully apply Rawls’s theory to questions of free time, it is necessary to identify a definition of 
free time that is both philosophically appealing and empirically measurable. As we shall see, these 
requirements can come into conflict with each other. 
1.5 Defining and Measuring Free Time 
Before I begin to analyse different definitions of free time, it bears pointing out that there are two 
different reasons for attempting to define free time. On the one hand, there is an abstract, 
philosophical question as to what it means for time to be free. On the other hand, there is a 
‘political’ question as to how free time should be defined, given that this definition will be employed 
by policymakers in order to design legislation that attempts to promote justice in the distribution 
of free time. To illustrate this distinction between a philosophical and a political definition of free 
time, consider the analogous question of how to define work. It is interesting to understand what 
it means ‘to be at work’ in the most fundamental and abstract sense, and philosophers have devoted 
a lot of thought to this question. But knowing the most appealing philosophical definition of work 
is of limited use when it comes to implementing policies that attempt to regulate working time or 
improve working conditions. To illustrate, Andre Gorz proposes a philosophical definition of 
work, according to which work is an activity that is primarily aimed at meeting needs that are not 
ends in themselves.32 This definition might or might not be philosophically appealing but it is clear 
that it is of limited use when our task is to find out for example whether the introduction of a 
universal basic income discourages people from working. In order to find this out, we must find a 
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measure of how much people work, that is we must empirically operationalize the concept of work. 
Gorz’s philosophical definition of work is rather vague and therefore difficult to empirically 
operationalize. Political definitions are designed with an eye on the requirement for empirical 
application. 
To be sure, the task of finding the best political definition of free time shouldn’t proceed 
independently from the search for the best philosophical definition. But it might deviate from the 
philosophical definition and compromise some philosophical depth in order to meet the criterion 
of measurability, and perhaps also the criterion of publicity. In what follows, I’m exclusively 
concerned with finding an appealing political definition of free time. 
One common understanding of free time is that of time not spent on paid employment. This 
negative definition is attractive because of its simplicity. Let’s refer to it as the simple approach to 
defining free time. Free time understood as time not spent on the job is relatively easy to measure 
in an objective way and information about how much time people spend on the job is publicly 
available for most jobs. After all, this definition of free time doesn’t require states to obtain 
knowledge about the types of activities that individuals pursue when they’re not on the job. Instead, 
it suffices to know how much time an individual spends on paid employment. Whatever time is 
left after this is done counts as free time. 
The simple approach faces some difficulties. Sometimes individuals work from home without 
registering their work as working-time. Self-employed workers sometimes don’t keep track of their 
working-time. Some workers think about their work outside the workplace, for example when they 
try to solve intellectual or emotional problems related to their job. Others pursue leisure activities 
during their official working-time. 
Yet, the greater worry about the simple approach is that it disregards activities other than paid work 
that arguably also reduce an individuals’ free time. In particular, it regards time spent on 
unavoidable activities such as housework as free time. This seems arbitrary. Citizens’ free time is 
not only limited by paid- but also by unpaid activities. 
To illustrate why the simple approach is problematic, imagine that a government decides to 
compensate people for time-poverty and it regards everyone as time-poor who works more than 8 
hours per day. Judged by this definition, someone who works 10 hours on a paid job is entitled to 
compensation. Someone who works 6 hours on a paid job and 6 hours on care and housework 
isn’t entitled to compensation although the latter person arguably makes a greater effort.33 
 




Most empirical time-use studies employ a more sophisticated way of conceptualising free time that 
avoids this pitfall.34 These studies begin by defining a number of activities that individuals 
necessarily have to carry out. Roughly, these activities fall into the categories of paid labour, unpaid 
household labour and personal care. For example, most individuals must spend some time earning 
money, preparing food, cleaning the house, washing their teeth, and sleeping. Free time is then 
calculated as the number of hours that is left for an individual after having completed all 
unavoidable activities. We can refer to this as the basic needs approach to defining free time because 
it relies on the idea that some activities are necessary to meet basic needs and therefore these 
activities limit people’s free time. 
Researchers gather this information by sending out questionnaires and diaries that ask respondents 
to keep track of their time use by noting down how much time they spend on what kind of activity 
every day. Defining free time in this way requires more detailed personal information but this need 
not be problematic because researchers can use representative samples from voluntary respondents 
and infer from these samples to larger groups of persons. 
Yet, the basic needs approach also faces a serious problem. It is true that activities such as cooking, 
sleeping, or earning money are obligatory and unavoidable in one sense. But it is also true that 
many individuals decide to spend significantly more time on these activities than would be 
necessary to cover their basic needs. To illustrate, some persons enjoy cooking and decide to spend 
several hours every day preparing sophisticated dishes. It would seem odd to regard this way of 
spending their time as strictly necessary and as something that reduces their free time. Similarly, 
many individuals decide to earn significantly more money than they would need to cover their basic 
needs and it would seem odd to treat harried Wall Street bankers as seriously disadvantaged because 
of their lack of free time. After all, they could decide to work in occupations that pay less and 
require fewer hours. And of course, those who have enough savings can (and sometimes do) decide 
to not work at all. 
Goodin et al. propose to remedy this defect by employing novel empirical methodology that 
modifies and improves the basic needs approach: the social benchmark approach.35 This approach 
begins by defining how much time individuals in a society must spend on a certain activity in order 
to meet their basic needs. For example, it stipulates that in order to meet one’s basic financial needs, 
one must at least earn a poverty line income – defined as half of the median income of one’s society. 
 
34 Jonathan Gershuny and Kimberly Fisher. (2013) Multinational Time Use Study. Centre for Time Use 
Research, University of Oxford.Hamermesh, Spending Time. 
35 Robert E. Goodin et al, Discretionary Time: A New Measure of Freedom, (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge 




Time spent on paid employment that goes beyond the number of hours necessary to earn a poverty 
line income is regarded as free because it is a discretionary use of one’s time. This makes it possible 
to distinguish cases where someone is time-poor because she decides to work a lot from cases 
where someone is time-poor because she must work a lot in order to make ends meet. 
It is important to note that this approach employs a socially relative measure of what is necessary to 
cover one’s basic needs. Whether someone is considered time-poor depends on how much time 
other individuals in a society typically need to perform a particular activity. Like the above-
described time-use studies, this measure of free time can meet the criterion of publicity because it 
draws on similar data than ‘standard’ time-use studies – data that is publicly available. 
It is not clear whether the social benchmark approach can meet the criterion of objective 
measurability. This is because it is not sensitive to some circumstances that affect individuals’ time 
needs. Imagine two individuals, A and B, who are equally situated except that A has a disability and 
B doesn’t. As a result of her disability, A must spend more time on personal care.36 The social 
benchmark approach will incorrectly register the additional time that the disabled person spends 
on personal care as discretionary time. This is because the social benchmark approach measures 
differences in only household structure, such as the question of whether a household consists of a 
double-earning couple without kids or whether it consists of a part-time-employed single parent. 
It also measures how much income each member of a household earns, but it doesn’t measure 
whether someone has a disability or not. This means that it can’t detect whether someone 
voluntarily spends a lot of time on personal care because she enjoys spending her time in this way 
or whether someone spends a lot of time on personal care because she must do so. The criterion 
of objective measurability demands that such differences between voluntary and non-voluntary 
time-use be detected but the social benchmark approach fails to do so. 
This shortcoming of the social benchmark approach points us to an important trade-off that 
objective-list measures of free time face. Fine-tuning the concept of free time by adding further 
variables such as disability generates two kinds of costs. First, it is more difficult and therefore 
more costly for researchers to gather additional data on personal characteristics such as disability. 
Empirical research in the social sciences always faces the problem that examining an object of study 
in further detail comes at the cost of not being able to study as many objects as would be possible 
if each case were studied in less detail. In other words, large-N studies reveal less information about 
the details of each object of investigation than small-N case studies. Goodin et al decide to exclude 
additional criteria, such as disability from their empirical analysis in order to be able to examine a 
 




number of cases large enough to allow for some degree of generalisation and inference. Second, 
gathering further information about personal characteristics comes at the cost of further intrusions 
into people’s private lives. Evaluating someone’s household structure is arguably less intrusive than 
enquiring about physical or mental disabilities that that person might have. 
Apart from its problems with objective measurability, the social benchmark approach has another 
disadvantage: it is sensitive to spurious social factors.37 To illustrate what socially spurious means, 
imagine you live in a society where everyone spends 4 hours cooking each day. Stipulate 
furthermore a measure of basic necessity according to which everyone falls short of their basic 
cooking necessities who spends less than 75% of the median cooking time of that society on 
cooking. In that society, everyone who cooks less than 3 hours per day counts as time-poor in that 
domain. This is implausible but the fact that the social benchmark approach is a socially relative 
measure makes it susceptible to this kind of problem. 
More realistically, imagine two identical societies that differ in that only one of them has lots of 
competitive pressures and the other doesn’t. In the first society, average working time is high, at 
say 50 hours per week, because workers face competitive pressures that make it rational for them 
to work a lot. For example, workers might attempt to out-compete each other by increasing their 
working time in order to impress their employers or in order to be able to buy status objects, such 
as fancy cars or watches. In the second society, working time is much lower, at say 30 hours per 
week, because workers can coordinate their conduct and avoid outcomes where competitive 
pressures make everyone work more. Because the social benchmark approach is a socially relative 
measure, it will determine that the amount of time spent on paid employment that is necessary to 
meet one’s basic needs (calculated as the time that is necessary to earn 50 per cent of the society’s 
median income) is lower in the first and higher in the second society. This is implausible, because 
by assumption workers in both societies have the same preferences and the same basic needs. 
Lastly, and related to the previous point, the social benchmark approach is problematic because 
the definition of free time that it provides is somewhat arbitrary. Why exactly should we decide 
that the amount of time that is necessary to meet one’s basic needs in terms of sleep lies at say 75% 
of the median sleeping time in a society? What good argument could be offered for this definition 
of how much sleep people minimally need, as compared to an alternative definition according to 
which people’s basic sleeping needs lie at 85% of a society’s median sleeping time? It is not obvious 
at all which of these two definitions is superior and given that the social benchmark approach must 
 




somewhat arbitrarily settle on one specific definition, it risks reflecting the researcher’s conviction 
about what life’s necessities are, rather than detecting what life’s necessities are in fact. 
For these reasons, Rose suggests another variation of the basic needs approach. She defines free 
time as time available to us after having performed all activities that are necessary to meet our basic 
needs or the basic needs of our dependents.38 More specifically, Rose conceives of basic needs as 
“the material needs one must meet in order to attain a basic level of functioning in one’s society”.39 
Again, these needs are made up of financial needs, household needs and bodily needs. Rose 
suggests that the social benchmark approach that defines free time exclusively in a socially relative 
way be complemented with other more objective information such as expert judgments and 
proposes to approximate her favourite definition of free time by using a measurement tool that is 
“moderately tailored to individual circumstances”. Such a hybrid account could use both 
information about statistical distributions and individual circumstances for example by consulting 
experts as to how certain disabilities impact individual’s time needs. This is appealing because it 
makes it possible to detect differences in time-use that are outside an individual’s control and 
should therefore not be counted as a discretionary use of their time. Unlike the social benchmark 
approach, Rose’s basic needs approach fares better with regards to the criterion of objective 
measurability because it can take into account more detailed information, such as whether someone 
has a disability or not. 
However, as I said earlier, this improvement in objective measurability comes at the expense of a 
loss with regards to the publicity requirement. Detecting how much time an individual objectively 
must spend on necessary activities will likely involve scrutinising sensitive aspects of that 
individual’s life. Moreover, considering more variables (such as different types of disabilities) makes 
representative studies that require a large number of observations much more costly – perhaps 
prohibitively costly. As Goodin notes, Rose’s “philosophically preferred conceptualization of free 
time in terms of how much time it takes each individual to meet “basic needs” in his or her own 
very particular circumstances would almost certainly defy any attempt at systematic empirical 
operationalization.”40 
Among those definitions of free time that have been empirically operationalized, the social 
benchmark approach sticks out as the best available combination of philosophical accuracy and 
empirical precision. It avoids the blunt mistake of treating all time outside paid employment as free 
 
38 At this point I set aside discussion of what exactly is meant by “basic level of functioning in one’s 
society”. I assume that a reasonable definition of what a basic level of functioning is exists. 
39 Rose, Free Time, 58. 




time and it avoids the more subtle mistake of treating any amount of time spent on necessary 
activities as “unfree”. At the same time, it successfully distinguishes between different household 
structures and income categories and makes these comparable between countries. The information 
necessary to make these comparisons is publicly available and although it overlooks some 
important differences between individuals, it successfully measures many time-use differences 
between individuals in a reasonably objective way. 
To conclude this section, let me summarise the two most important difficulties that all versions of 
the objective needs approach to defining free time face. The objective needs approach makes 
somewhat arbitrary judgments with regards to a) which activities should be considered ‘unfree’ and 
b) how much time should be regarded as ‘enough’ to meet one’s basic needs within each category 
of unavoidable activity. To illustrate the first problem, imagine a person who for some reason has 
no options but to stare at a blank wall during her free time. It is implausible to think that someone 
enjoys free time when that person can’t do anything valuable during this time. In other words, the 
basic needs approach might judge that two persons enjoy the same amount of free time when one 
of them has lots of opportunities to use her free time in ways that are valuable to her and the other 
person can’t do anything worthwhile during her free time. To illustrate the second problem, 
imagine someone who is convinced of the paramount importance of sleep for human health and 
flourishing. This person might define ‘basic-sleep-necessity’ more generously than someone who 
thinks that six hours of sleep per night are more than enough. Similarly, someone who enjoys fast 
food and who dislikes cooking might reach a different judgement about what should count as time 
that is necessary for cooking than someone who believes in the importance of preparing fresh 
ingredients at home. These two problems arise because the objective needs approach is insensitive 
to individuals’ judgments about the value of the activities they engage in. I will get back to this 
important observation in the last section, when I discuss whether we can determine a person’s fair 
share of free time through an envy-test that doesn’t rely on a definition of what exactly counts as 
free time. 
In summary, I have compared and evaluated different definitions of free time with regards to how 
well they meet Rawls’s criteria of objective measurability and publicity. I have argued that the simple 
approach to defining free time is unsatisfactory and that among the objective needs approaches to 
defining free time, Goodin et al’s social benchmark approach strikes the best balance between 
empirical measurability and accuracy in detecting free time disadvantages. In the next section I turn 
to the question of what implications follow from granting free time the status of a social primary 
of the good. According to Rose, citizens are entitled to enough free time to make effective use of 




1.6 Determining the Size of a Fair Share of Free Time 
As Rose points out, the answer to the question of how large a fair share of free time is depends 
roughly on three types of considerations. First, it depends on the theory of justice one endorses.41 
Some theories specify that citizens have a duty to ensure that the basic needs of all members of a 
society are met. Other theories endorse a prioritarian or an egalitarian distributive principle. Here, 
I will exclusively focus on the Rawlsian framework that demands that basic needs of all citizens be 
met, and that deviations from equality be tolerated only if they maximally serve the interests of the 
least advantaged. Second, the size of citizens’ fair shares of free time depends on how much time-
saving technology is available in a society. Members of an impoverished society of peasants may 
have to work more to meet everyone’s basic needs than members of a technologically advanced 
society. In much richer societies, by contrast, accumulated wealth and technology can be used to 
make significant amounts of free time available. Third, the question of how much free time should 
be available to citizens depends on the weight we assign to the resource of free time as compared 
to other resources. In other words, we must decide how important expansions of free-time are, 
given that reductions in work hours normally lead to reductions in the production of goods and 
services. 
1.6.1 Does the Difference Principle Require the Fostering of a Work Ethos? 
With regards to the first point, one might think that an implication of Rawls’s Difference Principle 
is that it imposes sharp limits on the amount of free time that citizens may enjoy. This is for the 
following reason. The Difference Principle requires that institutions be designed in a way that 
maximally benefits the worst-off members of a society – insofar as these efforts don’t conflict with 
the requirements set out by the first two principles.42 A society whose institutional setup encourages 
an ethos of work will arguably produce more goods and services that are then available for 
redistribution to the worst off.43 A society that doesn’t encourage productive activity will not be 
 
41 Rose, Free Time, 128. 
42 Samuel Richard Freeman, The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 231; Joshua Cohen, ‘Taking People as They Are?’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 30, 
no. 4 (2001): 363–86. 
43 Authors like G.A. Cohen argue that the difference principle should be understood to apply directly to 
individual conduct. From this perspective, individuals who can choose between more or less working-time 
have a weighty reason to prefer more over a less work: working more will create more wealth available for 
redistribution to the worst-off. Note that it is not necessary to endorse this controversial interpretation of 
the difference principle in order to establish the claim that the difference principle may demand the 
fostering of a work ethos. Governments can incentivize work without persuading individuals of the 
importance of solidarity with the worst-off for example by designing economic institutions in ways that 
make productive activity attractive. 
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able to redistribute as much resources and therefore falls short of the requirement to maximally 
benefit the least advantaged. Therefore, the Difference Principle might require the fostering of a 
work ethos, which in turn means that citizens should enjoy only little free time, so that they can 
maintain a high level of productive activity. From the perspective of someone who belongs to the 
group of the least advantaged it might be preferable to live in a society where everyone works a lot 
because this presumably reduces the cost of consumer items and expands opportunities for 
employment. What’s more, a state whose citizens work a lot can collect more revenue in taxes that 
can be used to benefit the least advantaged, either directly, for example through generous 
unemployment benefits, or indirectly, when it is invested in public infrastructure. If this reading of 
the Difference Principle were correct, then Rawls’s theory would be incompatible the kinds of 
reforms that I mentioned in the introduction, such as the 4-day workweek. 
There are two reasons to think that the Difference Principle does not require the fostering of a 
work ethos. First, the Difference Principle is best interpreted as a constraint on what types of social 
and economic inequalities are permissible, not as a teleological principle that requires moves 
towards alternative states were the least advantaged enjoy more goods and services.44 Imagine a 
society of two individuals with a distribution of material wealth of 3,3. Imagine now that a move 
towards an alternative state of 4,5 is available. On a plausible interpretation, the Difference 
Principle allows but doesn’t require this move. It might allow the move from 3,3 to 4,5 because the 
inequality in the second scenario can be justified to the worst-off person by explaining that she has 
been benefited by the inequality-introducing move. But it would be implausible to think that the 
Difference Principle always requires moving to alternative states of affairs that increase the wealth 
of the least advantaged. By way of illustration, imagine a wealthy egalitarian society where everyone 
enjoys a decent standard of living. This society contemplates implementing productivity-
stimulating reforms that would make it super-wealthy and very unequal. Compared to the previous 
situation, the reforms would benefit the poor to a small extent and the rich to an enormous extent. 
The Difference Principle doesn’t mandate this move because it is constrained by other 
considerations. For example, the move towards a super-wealthy society might reduce the value of 
the basic liberties enjoyed by the least advantaged in objectionable ways. The wealthy might be able 
to use their economic power to buy political power, so that the poor have unfairly little political 
influence. The inequality-introducing reforms might also harm the poor in other ways, for example 
by making them dependant on the rich or by impairing their sense of self-esteem.45 
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The second reason for why Rawls’s theory doesn’t necessarily recommend the fostering of a work 
ethos is that increasing production is not always the best way of benefiting the worst off. Apart 
from income and wealth, there are other social primary goods that co-determine whether an 
individual qualifies as disadvantaged. Importantly, individuals can be benefited by expanding the 
availability of free time or by improving working conditions.46 Often, expansions of free time or 
improvements of working conditions come at the expense of reduced income. Sometimes the best 
way of benefiting the worst-off may not be to encourage more productive activity but to facilitate 
access to free time. To illustrate, some workers might prefer entitlements to longer paid vacation 
over a raise of their income. Similarly, some people might prefer an improvement of their job-
quality, such as more autonomy, less supervision, or more predictable work schedules over a raise 
of their income. 
This leads me to the third consideration that determines how large citizen’s entitlement to free time 
is: The relative weights assigned to different resources. In order to see why the way in which weights 
are assigned to primary goods affects people’s entitlement to free time, imagine that Rawls’s index 
of advantage assigns a lot of weight to the good of income and wealth and much less weight to 
other goods. This means that someone who has little money is considered worse off than someone 
who has little free time. As a result, the money-poor person will receive more in compensation 
than the time-poor person. 
1.6.2 Determining the Relative Weights of the Resources of Money and Free Time 
Imagine that a government decides to increase everyone’s access to free time by subsidising 
childcare provisions or by passing more restrictive maximum work hours legislation. Restricting 
the time during which citizens can work restricts their ability to earn more income through working 
longer hours. Cases like this confront us with a difficult trade-off. If more work is done, more 
goods and services are produced and more material wealth is available. However, this comes at the 
 
46 A concern for the quality of working conditions is expressed by Rawls third social primary good 
“Powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility”. Rawls believes that citizens, in order 
to be able to competently participate in a social system of cooperation, need to dispose of “self-governing 
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are conducive to developing “self-governing and social capacities”. Samuel Arnold offers an interpretation 
of this somewhat opaque primary good according to which it intends to ensure that citizens can develop 
the internal resources of intelligence and virtuosity. Since states cannot provide citizens directly with 
intelligence and virtuosity, they instead ought to ensure that citizens have access to the “social bases” 
necessary for developing these capacities. In the case of intelligence and virtuosity, so Arnold argues, it is 
“positions of authority, responsibility and complexity” that are necessary to develop these capacities. 




cost of a loss in free time.47 In order to know what citizens just share of free time is, we need to 
know something about the relative weights that should be assigned to the resources of money and 
free time. 
Rose proposes three different approaches to determine these weights. As I will explain, none of 
these approaches is entirely satisfactory. The first solution Rose proposes is that the “relative 
weights may be empirically determined. If, for instance, a theory holds that justice requires 
maximizing the real freedom of the least advantaged position, the theory could hold that, in any 
given circumstances, a specific ratio of free time to income and wealth would in fact maximize the 
least advantaged’s real freedom.”48  
It is not entirely clear what Rose means by ‘empirically determining’ the weights. She suggests that 
once we know the objective set out by a theory of justice (for example maximizing the real freedom 
of the least advantaged) we should provide citizens with whatever ratio of money and free time 
that would successfully maximize this real freedom. 
This approach seems to beg the question because it doesn’t specify how we should go about 
determining which money-free time-ratio is the one that maximizes the least advantaged’s real 
freedom. Some individual’s real freedom will be maximised by increasing income whilst that of 
others will be maximised by expanding free time. Absent further elaboration, this approach is not 
satisfactory because it doesn’t provide helpful guidance. It simply reaffirms the idea that there is 
one particular money-free time-ratio that maximizes real freedom without explaining how this ratio 
can be identified. 
The second approach suggested by Rose determines weights by using “intuitive judgments of what 
would be rationally prudent for the least advantaged”.49 This strategy asks us to imagine a 
representative individual from the group of the least advantaged who is tasked with determining 
weights for money and free time in a way that would be rational for her. This approach suffers 
from a similar defect than the first. For how are we to know which individual would best represent 
the group of the least advantaged? On the one hand, a fictitious representative chooser must have 
some preferences in order to decide between different possible ways of assigning weights to primary 
 
47 This difficulty is aggravated by the fact that free time not only needs to be weighted against income and 
wealth but possibly also against the benefits derived from the activity of work itself. Some authors have 
argued that meaningful work should itself be regarded as a social primary good. This is because 
contributing to society through inspiring, self-directed, and complex work is arguably something that 
everyone desires independently of their conception of the good life. Gains in free time not only come at 
the expense of income and wealth but also at the expense of the goods of work other than money. 
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goods. On the other hand, he mustn’t have too specific preferences because he must represent 
everyone who belongs to the group of the worst-off, not just a subset. The main difficulty this 
approach faces is then that citizens of liberal societies – including those who are least advantaged 
– typically have a plurality of preferences and conceptions of the good. Some prefer expansions of 
free time over expansions of their income and others prefer more income over more free time. 
Therefore, intuitive judgments about what is rational and prudent can’t determine the relative 
importance of money vis-à-vis free time. The very point of a good theory of justice in access to 
free time is to shed light on how to resolve such intuitive responses. The theory is therefore 
defective if its solution is simply to rely on the intuitive judgements that it is meant to shed light 
upon. 
Lastly, Rose proposes to determine weights democratically. Here, the idea is to consult citizens as 
to whether they would prefer more money or more of free time and then employ the option that 
is preferred by a majority. Consider the following example. A 10% increase in the availability of 
free time comes at the expense of a 1% reduction in income and wealth. Citizens will disagree 
about the comparative importance of money and free time but only few would argue that income 
and wealth should be considered 10 times more important than free time. Policy makers may be 
able to identify cases like this where one option is preferred over the other by a majority and use 
this majority-vote as guidance for their decisions. 
This approach faces the difficulty that it must explain why the preferences of a majority should be 
decisive when we must determine the relative importance of money and free time. Ronald Dworkin 
refers to political questions that should be solved by majority-vote or by some other appeal to the 
distribution of preferences in a society as “choice-sensitive” and contrasts them with “choice-
insensitive” issues that shouldn’t be resolved by majority-vote. 50 An example for a political issue 
that shouldn’t be solved by majority-vote is the question of whether racial discrimination should 
be allowed or prohibited. 
One important concern about the proposal to treat the relative importance of money and free time 
as a choice-sensitive question is that there can be cases where majority decisions impose excessive 
costs on minorities. Imagine for example a society that consists of many work-lovers and few 
leisure-lovers, where the work-lovers democratically decide to institute public policies that force 
everyone, to work 15 hours per day. Imagine furthermore that free time preferences in this society 
are stable over time, so that work-lovers prevail over leisure-lovers each time a democratic decision 
 




is taken. This is an instance of a ‘tyranny of the majority’, where excessive costs are imposed on a 
minority. 
To be sure, it might be that the democratic approach should be implemented because it is 
legitimate. But this leaves open the question whether it is the truly just one. It would be implausible 
to assume that democracy always produces results that are just. While much more could be said 
about this question, I conclude that absent further argument, the ‘democratic approach’ isn’t fully 
satisfactory because it is vulnerable to a ‘tyranny-of-the-majority-objection’. 
In summary, none of the three approaches identified by Rose offers a compelling solution to the 
problem of how to assign weights to the resources of money and free time. What’s more, the three 
approaches of determining weights either empirically, or through intuitive judgments, or 
democratically are mutually incompatible and might each generate different recommendations. A 
proponent of any of these approaches would not only have to show that one of them is convincing 
but also that it is superior to the others. The trade-off between money and free time is an instance 
of a more general difficulty of establishing the relative importance of different social primary goods 
that is often referred to as the ‘index problem’.51 Critics contend that this is a serious defect of 
Rawls’s theory for it reveals that little concrete policy guidance can be derived from it. 
The difficulty of establishing the comparative weights of resources also gets reflected in Rawls’s 
somewhat arbitrary suggestion to include 16 hours of free time to the index of advantages. As we 
saw, Rawls’s motivation for including free time to the index of primary goods is that his Difference 
Principle is otherwise unfairly biased in favour of the leisure loving surfers. However, Rawls doesn’t 
provide a principled justification for this modification of his theory. Why 16 hours? Why not 12 or 
20? And why exactly should we assume that the free time enjoyed by those who decide not to work 
is equally valuable to the income gained from a low-income 8-hours work day? 
Moreover, the decision to include free time within the index of advantages in this way may have 
the effect of creating a bias in favour of those who have preferences for lots of work. This critique 
is put forth by Philippe Van Parijs, who illustrates his concern with the following example.52 
Imagine that the wealth of a society is increased by an external gain, say the discovery of a natural 
resource. Rawls’s theory mandates that this gain be distributed in the form of a proportional 
increase of workers’ wages. However, as a result of this, the position of those who don’t work 
stagnates in absolute terms and gets worse in relative terms. They haven’t got more than before 
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and compared to those who see their wages increased by the external gain in wealth, their position 
has become worse. Yet, Rawls wants to assume that those who don’t work enjoy an advantage 
equal to the income gained from 8 hours of work done by the least advantaged workers. This makes 
it seem as if the position of those who don’t work has improved. A rise in income of those who 
work is interpreted as an improvement of the position of those who don’t work. This seems wrong. 
Those who would prefer to have more free time are “being treated to a sheer semantic trick”.53 
In reply to the charge that Rawls’s theory offers no principled way of assigning weights to resources, 
one might contend that in some cases, free time can be expanded gratis, that is without any 
reduction in income and wealth. Another way of putting this is that sometimes there is no trade-
off between money and free time because free time can be expanded at no cost. This can be the 
case when the returns to long work hours are low and the costs of long working time are high. 
Returns to long work hours are low when the worker’s ability to work productively declines as the 
length of the work day increases. Workers are normally most productive during the first few hours 
of their workday but as time goes by, energy and concentration diminish until a point is reached 
where an additional hour of working time creates only little additional output. This effect is 
especially pronounced in mentally or physically demanding jobs where workers quickly exhaust 
their physical strength or their ability to concentrate. The costs of long working time are high when 
workers’ health is negatively impacted by overwork. For example, work related accidents are more 
likely to occur when workers spent a lot of time at the workplace and workers are more likely to 
suffer from burnout and other work-related illnesses when they work long hours.54 Taken together, 
diminishing returns to work and the costs of long working time can create situations where 
expansions of free time have no monetary cost: Reductions in economic output are outweighed by 
reductions in health expenditures. 
Nevertheless, such ‘easy cases’ where everyone benefits from the implementation of a policy or 
where those who are adversely affected by a policy can be compensated because the policy creates 
a net benefit are exceptionally rare.55 Often, expansions of free time will cause reductions in income 
and wealth and Rawls’s theory provides only little guidance for deciding such trade-offs.  
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1.6.3 The Envy-Test 
There is an alternative way of determining a person’s level of free time-advantage that avoids both 
the difficulty of assigning weights to different primary goods and the difficulty of defining what 
exactly free time is and which activities should be considered ‘unfree’. According to this approach, 
we should consult individuals’ personal judgments as to whether or not they are disadvantaged, 
rather than constructing an objective metric that determine someone’s level of advantage 
independently of that person’s own evaluation of her situation. In order to see the appeal of this 
approach, imagine that we must judge the level of free time-advantage enjoyed by 
Lena, the happy farmer. Lena works on a farm where she spends almost all of her time 
attending to the needs of her plants and animals. What’s more, she has no discretion over 
when she carries out her work because the cycles of nature and the needs of her animals 
precisely dictate at which moment she must carry out which task. Lena has heavily invested 
in agricultural skills, so that she can’t easily switch to a job that would offer her more free 
time. Yet, she loves her work and doesn’t envy others whose work allows them more free 
time. 
On a Rawlsian index of advantage, Lena would fare worse (assuming other things are equal) than, 
say an office worker whose job offers him more free time. As a result, Lena might be due 
compensation for something that she herself doesn’t regard as a disadvantage. This strikes many 
as a counterintuitive result.56 
In response to this and other problems that Rawls’s approach to identifying someone’s level of 
advantage faces, Ronald Dworkin has proposed to evaluate individuals’ level of advantage not by 
reference to a list of primary goods but through an envy-test that consults individuals’ own 
judgements about their level of advantage. This test imagines that we ask Lena whether she envies 
someone else’s opportunities for free time, whereby envy is understood in the following technical 
sense: A envies B, if A considers her opportunities for free time to be less valuable than the 
opportunities that B enjoys. 
This way of determining someone’s level of advantage is appealing because unlike Rawls’s metric 
of advantages, the envy test doesn’t rely on a potentially controversial list of goods that are assumed 
to be valuable to everyone. We can imagine that citizens will disagree over the comparative value 
of different goods, so that in some cases an individual’s personal judgment about her level of 
advantage will conflict with the judgment of the primary goods metric. In contrast to Rawls’s 
 




objective metric, the envy-test doesn’t isolate the moral question of whether someone is entitled to 
compensation from the ethical question of how someone evaluates her own situation. The envy-
test insists that someone may claim compensation only if she regards herself as worse off than the 
person from whom she claims compensation. As a result, the envy-test doesn’t usurp judgment 
over someone’s level of advantage and is therefore easier to justify to all members of a community.57 
In the case of Lena, the envy-test generates the intuitively plausible result that Lena is not due any 
compensation because she doesn’t regard her lack of free time as a disadvantage. Rawls’s objective 
metric test, in contrast, implies that Lena is disadvantaged although she doesn’t think that this is 
true. 
It is important to mention that for someone to be judged as disadvantaged by the envy-test, that 
person’s claim to be worse off than someone else must be authentic. A person’s judgment to be 
worse off than someone else is authentic, roughly speaking, when it is formed under suitable 
circumstances, that include for example the absence of unjust indoctrination and the absence of 
constraints “on opportunities to form, to reflect on, or to advocate convictions, attachments, or 
preferences.58 To illustrate, if Lena’s parents had brainwashed her to believe that there are no 
worthwhile activities other than farming, then we shouldn’t trust her judgment that she doesn’t 
envy, say an office worker whose jobs offer more free time. Similarly, we shouldn’t trust Lena’s 
judgment when they are significantly affected by psychological biases. 
What’s more, the envy-test doesn’t require that a person actually formulates a belief or a judgment 
as to whether or not she envies someone else’s opportunities. Rather, what counts is whether a 
person’s values imply that she’s disadvantaged because her opportunities are less valuable than 
those of someone else.59 These specifications of the envy-test rule out that its results are distorted 
by a number of mistakes that people can make when formulating their judgments. 
As a result, the envy-test is a philosophically appealing alternative to Rawls’s metric of advantages. 
Crucially, the envy-test generates plausible results in cases that pose severe difficulties to the 
Rawlsian approach. By way of illustration, imagine the case of a corporate consultant whose job is 
very well paid and involves very long work hours. Should we consider the consultant disadvantaged 
because of her lack of free time? Perhaps she isn’t disadvantaged because she could change her 
profession in order to work on a different job that offers more free time. But expecting her to 
change her profession if she wants to enjoy more free time might limit her freedom of occupational 
 
57 Williams op.cit. 
58 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 160. Not everyone agrees with this. See for example Kristi A. Olson, 
‘Impersonal Envy and the Fair Division of Resources’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 46, no. 3 (2018): 269–92. 




choice in an objectionable way. The Rawlsian approach must provide answers to these difficult 
questions. The envy-test, in contrast, handles this case more easily. It asks whether the consultant 
can claim in good faith that she envies the opportunities of someone whose job pays less well but 
offers more free time. If she can’t make that claim, she doesn’t count as disadvantaged. 
Something similar may be true in cases where parents lack free time because of their choice to raise 
children. The Rawlsian approach must answer the difficult question of whether raising children 
(whom one by assumption has chosen to have) is a necessary activity that deduces from one’s free 
time or not. The envy test, in contrast, can ask the parent whether she envies the opportunities of 
someone who doesn’t have children and enjoys more free time. If the parent answers ‘no’, then 
she doesn’t count as disadvantaged. 
In many cases, the envy-test can be carried out without actually asking any particular individual 
whether or not she envies someone else’s opportunities. Imagine for example that we ask ourselves 
whether the consultant from the previous example envies the opportunities of a badly-paid and 
precariously-employed gig-economy worker who enjoys somewhat more access to free time. In 
cases like this, we can confidently assume that the consultant can’t claim in good faith that she 
envies the gig-economy worker’s opportunities. We can reach this judgement without 
operationalizing the envy-test, that is without enquiring about the actual opinions of the individuals 
involved in this example. 
But not all cases are as clear as this one. Imagine that we want to know whether the high-earning 
consultant envies the opportunities of a public administration official who has an attractive and 
convenient office job that pay significantly less but offers more access to free time. Cases like this, 
where disparities in opportunities between two persons are much smaller, intuitive judgment 
doesn’t seem to provide an obvious and appealing solution. In such cases we would have to know 
more about the values and preferences of the individuals involved. 
But operationalizing the envy-test appears to be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Empirical 
researchers tasked with carrying out the envy-test would face many difficulties. For example, in 
order to provide valid answers, respondents must distinguish the technical definition of ‘envy’ 
employed by the envy-test from the more common way in which the term is used in everyday 
language. Moreover, researchers must know whether a respondent has formed his convictions 
under suitable conditions that make them count as authentic. Even more worryingly, researchers 
would have to find ways of knowing whether a person’s judgments coincides with the judgment 




This shows us that operationalizing the envy-test is epistemically very demanding. And even if 
information about the above-listed questions could be obtained in principle, it might not be 
permissible for researchers to acquire this information because it touches sensitive aspects of 
respondents’ private lives. In summary, the envy-test is a philosophically appealing alternative to 
Rawls’s objective metric approach that generates intuitively correct results in some cases. But in 
order to judge a broad range of relevant cases, it would have to be empirically operationalized, 
which is epistemically so demanding that it appears to be impossible, at least in some cases. 
1.7 Outlook 
I have shown that as of now, liberal egalitarian theories of justice have great difficulty evaluating 
the kinds of demands for a reduced work week that I mentioned in the introduction. Is the 4-day 
work week compatible, incompatible, or indeed required by social justice? Julie Rose offers the 
most detailed liberal-egalitarian engagement with the subject of free time and identifies several 
policies to protect citizens fair share of free time. However, her recommendations remain 
somewhat vague and arguably too modest. For example, she suggests that the fair share of free 
time that should be enjoyed by all citizens in industrialized societies is “likely at least the “eight 
hours for what we will” demanded by early labor reformers, if not more.”60 This judgement offers 
little help for evaluating the justifiability of the more radical proposals that I am concerned with. 
In subsequent chapters I attempt to fill in this gap. 
According to Rose, protecting citizens’ fair share of free time can be achieved roughly by two types 
of policies. Some policies, such as wage subsidies, minimum wage laws or a universal basic income 
are needed to ensure that citizens can meet their basic needs without falling short of their fair share 
of free time. Other policies, such as maximum work hours legislation, are needed to protect 
citizens’ ability to choose to not spend more time on meeting their basic needs than is protected 
by their entitlement to free time. This is important because sometimes citizens’ ability to choose to 
spend less time at work is undermined by the desire of other workers to spend more time at work. 
If some workers decide to work unusually long hours, they can create competitive pressures and 
establish a social norm that makes it costly for other workers to choose to spend less time at work. 
Here, Rose touches on an important issue. Competitive pressures often create collective action 
problems where each individual worker finds it attractive to increase her working time although 
 
60 Beyond that, Rose contends that it must be possible to enjoy some free-time together with others. Free-
time is of much less worth if it cannot be spent with family or friends, for example because of 
unpredictable schedules or odd working times. Citizens are therefore entitled to coordinated free-time. 
Rose suggests Sunday closing laws as an attractive way of ensuring that at least some free-time can be 




she might not do that if she reliably knew that others will also refrain from increasing their working 
time. Rose suggests that some working time regulations can be justifiable on the grounds that they 
protect workers from competitive pressures but several important questions are left open.61 
Why exactly should the conduct of workers who decide to compete with each other concern policy 
makers? What different types of competitive pressures that impact citizens’ access to free time are 
there, how do they arise, and what is morally problematic about them?62 I address these questions 
in the subsequent two chapters.
 
 
61 Rose op. cit., 139. 
62 Samuel Arnold agrees that “Rose might have pushed her analysis a bit further here. Overwork, relative 
to what’s objectively necessary for basic needs satisfaction, has multiple causes, only some of which are 
due to employment practices. Surely consumer capitalism plays a large role here as well. Pressured by 
consumerist norms to “keep up with the Joneses”—to have the latest iPhone, the right granite 
countertops, and so on—people spin the hamster wheel of employment far longer than is really necessary 
for basic needs satisfaction. Rose correctly notes that unregulated labor markets jeopardize people’s fair 
shares of free time by leaving them with no good alternative to over-work. Unbridled consumerism, I am 
suggesting, may have the same effect. Might justice therefore require state action to combat, or at least 
moderate, consumerism?” Samuel Arnold, ‘Review of Free Time by Julie L. Rose. Princeton, NJ: 





2. The Rat Race between Workers1 
A significant amount of overemployment in society arises from a dynamic that I will call the working 
time rat race. What drives this dynamic is the fact that employers routinely use ‘time-spent-at-work’ 
as a proxy for their employees’ productivity and commitment.2 Workers who spend a particularly 
long time at the workplace are often rewarded with promotions, raises, bonuses, or are saved from 
dismissals and budget cuts. This creates an incentive for workers to demonstrate their willingness 
to work longer hours than their colleagues, since this increases their likelihood of attaining benefits 
and avoiding burdens. 
However, as more workers work longer hours in order to demonstrate their productivity and 
commitment, this strategy loses its effectiveness. If everyone increases their working time, no one 
will be ahead of the others in the race for promotion but everyone will work more. The working 
time rat race is, in other words, a collective action problem where (i) it is individually rational for 
each worker to spend more hours at work than her competitors and (ii) because of this, the 
outcome is a situation that is worse for most of those who compete in this way.3 
In this chapter I show that working time regulations are sometimes justifiable on the grounds that 
they help workers overcome the rat race, or at least redress its effects. This “rat race” justification 
manages to justify working time policies without appealing to perfectionist views about the ideal 
balance between leisure and work that makes for a “good life”.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 describes the working time rat race and the 
problem of overemployment in more detail. Section 2.2 explains why the rat race sometimes gives 
rise to a complaint on the side of workers who are negatively affected by it. Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 
 
1 Large parts of this chapter have been published in the form of an article: Malte Jauch, ‘The Rat Race and 
Working Time Regulation’, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 19, no. 3 (August 2020): 293–314.‘ 
2 Renée M. Landers, James B. Rebitzer, and Lowell J. Taylor, ‘Rat Race Redux’, The American Economic 
Review 86, no. 3 (1996): 329–48. 
3 The outcome may not be worse for all of the competitors because those who enjoy long work hours may 
not mind participating in the rat race. Nevertheless, it is accurate to refer to the rat race as a collective 
action problem. To see why, consider a classic example of a collective action problem. A group of 
fisherpersons fish in the same lake. Each has an incentive to catch as many fish as s/he can but if 
everyone fishes too much, the fish will die out. This suggests that everyone should have an incentive to 
fish only a sustainable amount. However, realistically, some fisherpersons may not have an interest in the 
long-term stability of the fish-stock. Some fisherpersons may soon retire and others may want to take up a 
different job in the near future. These individuals would prefer to be able to fish as much as they can. 
Nevertheless, we can still refer to this situation as a collective action problem because the interest in a 
sustainable fish-stock is shared by most individuals. I will argue in section 2.4 that most workers have an 




2.5 answer objections to labour market policies that remove the rat race. Section 2.6 sets the stage 
for the subsequent chapter. 
Before I begin, let me issue an important qualification. I don’t commit to the claim that all working 
time rat races call for state intervention. Sometimes, rat-race-removing interventions are morally 
impermissible because they worsen the situation of the least advantaged. Importantly, there are 
working time rat races that occur between privileged workers who possess scarce talents that allow 
them to extract very high wages. If states help these workers overcome their collective action 
problem, so that they end up working significantly less, then there is less income upon which states 
can levy taxes that serve to redistribute wealth to the least advantaged. In other words, regulating 
rat races that occur between very privileged workers can be harmful to the least-advantaged. Section 
2.5 elaborates on this. 
2.1 Overemployment and the Rat Race 
Mismatches between preferred work hours and hours actually worked are widespread and a number 
of studies show that overemployment is pervasive in industrialized countries.4 A survey conducted 
for the European Commission reports that 38% of employees in 12 European countries would like 
to reduce their work hours.5 
One natural explanation for this has to do with transaction costs. Employers prefer to hire a smaller 
number of workers, who each work long hours, than to hire a larger number of workers, who each 
work short hours. This is because employers incur transaction costs when they advertise jobs, select 
and contract workers, supervise and train workers, coordinate tasks between workers, provide 
office equipment, and pay payroll taxes and social security costs. The existence of these costs makes 
it attractive for employers to hire fewer workers that each work longer hours because each 
additional worker adds a fixed amount of these transaction costs. 
However, the “transaction cost” explanation for overemployment is not completely satisfactory. It 
cannot account for all overemployment because, at least in some cases, employers could pass 
transaction costs on to those who prefer to work fewer hours by offering them lower hourly wages. 
According to neoclassical economic theory, workers who prefer working less at lower hourly pay 
 
4 Jerry A. Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson, The Time Divide, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); 
Jeremy Reynolds and Lydia Aletraris, ‘Pursuing Preferences: The Creation and Resolution of Work Hour 
Mismatches’, American Sociological Review 71(4) (2006) 618–38; Jeremy Reynolds, ‘When Too Much Is Not 
Enough’, Sociological Forum 19(1) (2004) 89–120; Maite Martinez-Granado, ‘Testing Labour Supply and 
Hours Constraints’, Labour Economics 12(3) (2005) 321–43. 
5 John M. Evans, Douglas C. Lippoldt and Pascal. Marianna, ‘Trends in Working Hours in OECD 




would still supply their labour at that lower pay in ways that compensate for the higher transaction 
costs of part-time work arrangements.6 
There is a further and more convincing explanation for overemployment that refers to a collective 
action problem between workers. Workers have incentives to pursue a “long work hours strategy” 
although most workers would be better off if no one pursued this strategy. The dynamic of this 
collective action problem runs as follows. Employers have to make decisions about hiring, 
promoting, and firing employees. One of the most important criteria for deciding which person 
gets hired, promoted, or fired is the respective worker’s productivity and commitment. Being 
complex and multi-facetted concepts, productivity and commitment are very difficult to measure. 
Employers therefore regularly resort to approximating workers’ productivity and commitment by 
using their working time as a proxy. Those who work long hours are regarded as especially 
productive and committed. Workers are aware of this practice and often compete with each other 
in order to display their willingness to work long hours so as to increase their chances of getting 
hired or promoted. Landers et al. find evidence for this mechanism and describe it as follows:  
Performing extra work, beyond the norm of a job, workplace or occupation, may 
be a way for a worker to transmit a signal of promotability or value to employers. 
[…] The pursuit of long-term relative status through increasing their own work 
hours promotes a “rat race” with all workers working longer average hours.7 
Rat races of this type may occur not only between employed workers but also between those who 
seek employment. Job applicants sometimes demonstrate motivation and enthusiasm to their 
prospective employers by offering to sign contracts that specify particularly long hours. 
One obvious drawback of showing commitment through long working time is that, if pursued by 
many, this strategy loses effectiveness. Think of the familiar case of a crowd in a concert, where 
everyone stands on their toes in order to improve their sight of the stage. Here, the individually 
rational thing to do for each person ceases to yield benefits if it is done by everyone. These 
situations are referred to as collective action problems and they occur when disincentives make it 
difficult for a group of individuals to pursue a mutually beneficial goal. Most individuals would be 
better off if everyone pursued a common strategy of cooperation, but each individual has an 
incentive to defect. 
 
6 Economists refer to this as the “part-time wage penalty”. See for example Manning and Petrongolo 
(2008). 




It bears emphasizing that the working time rat race is not limited to situations where workers seek 
advantages such as employment, promotions or bonuses. It also occurs when workers attempt to 
avoid disadvantages such as downgrading and dismissals. “If a worker believes their employer uses 
input time as a screen before an anticipated downsizing or reorganization, they may view longer 
hours as a protective device or immunization against the risk of future job loss, income loss or 
demotion”.8 
Furthermore, workers sometimes increase their working time because the sheer fact that someone 
works exceptionally long hours earns that person reputation and esteem. In Western countries, 
“being busy” and having little free-time has become an indicator of a particular social status that 
many strive to achieve.9 On average, individuals with more education and with higher paid jobs 
have less free-time and “being busy” is often associated with being important or sought-after.10 
This can make it attractive for anyone to emulate time-pressured lifestyles in order to gain the 
prestige associated with these lifestyles. This too is an instance of a collective action problem 
because no one will increase their relative social standing if everyone pursues the long-work-hours-
strategy. 
Lastly, working time can be driven up by a desire to protect or enhance one’s social standing by 
purchasing status goods. This kind of competitive consumption occurs when individuals buy products 
whose possession grants them social prestige and sets them apart from their peers.11 For those who 
rely on paid employment as a source of income, competitive spending often requires increased 
working time. However, the relative social standing of those who engage in competitive 
consumption does not improve if this strategy is pursued by a large number of others who do the 
same. Keeping up with the Joneses gets harder if the Joneses are keeping up with the Smiths!12 
Competitive consumption is a different manifestation of the working time rat race where the 
collective action problem is initiated by a desire to set oneself apart through purchasing goods that 
enhance one’s positional standing. 
 
8 Landers et al. op. cit., p. 70. 
9 Ronald J. Burke (ed.), The Long Work Hours Culture (Bingley: Emerald, 2008). 
10 Daniel S. Hamermesh, Spending Time: The Most Valuable Resource (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2018). 
11 See for example Juliet Schor, The Overspent American: Why We Want What We Don’t Need (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1998); Juliet Schor, The New Politics of Consumption, Boston Review, June 1, 1999; Robert 
Frank, Luxury Fever (New York: Free Press, 1999); Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth, Rev. ed (London: 
Routledge, 1995). 
12 Compare Samuel Arnold, Contesting the Work-Spend Cycle: The Liberal Egalitarian Case Against Consumerism, 
Forthcoming in Whither Work? The Politics and Ethics of Contemporary Work, ed. Keith Breen and Jean-




In short, the rat race occurs in different contexts and is triggered by different motivations. What’s 
more, workers can increase their working time in ways other than working extra hours or agreeing 
to contracts that specify long hours. One especially concerning form of increased working time is 
competitive presenteeism. This term is used to describe situations where workers demonstrate 
commitment by coming to work in spite of ill health.13 If one or several workers decide to come to 
work despite being ill, they can set a precedent and an expectation with regards to what can be 
reasonably expected from workers when they are ill. A related phenomenon involves workers who 
take very short periods of maternity leave. A prominent example for this is the case of former 
French Minister of Justice, Rachida Dati, who resumed work after five days of maternity leave. 
Some commentators argued that this was possibly motivated by a concern of no longer being taken 
seriously by members of the Sarkozy administration after a longer maternity leave.14 
In summary, the working time rat race is a collective action problem that occurs in several different 
contexts and that leaves most workers worse off than they would otherwise be if a large number 
of them engage in it. Let me conclude this section by formalising this result. Consider first a simple 
case: 
Promotion: Two workers with preferences for lots of leisure are equally qualified and 
do the same kinds of tasks. Both want to be promoted. Their boss wants to 
promote the more productive employee based on whoever displays higher 
commitment. When leaving the firm each day, she observes which worker’s office 
light is still switched on. Both workers are aware of this and thus face a decision 
between leaving work on time or staying longer in order to increase their chances 
of getting promoted. 
The different outcomes of this decision situation can be presented in the following payoff matrix: 
  Worker A 
  Leave on time Extra hours 
Worker B 
Leave on time 0/0 -2/1 
Extra hours 1/-2 -1/-1 
 
13 Hesan A Quazi, Presenteeism: the invisible cost to organizations (Palgrave Macmillan, London: 2013) 
14 Anne Perkins, Maman sans bébé, The Guardian (January 8th 2009), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jan/08/rachida-dati-france-maternity (accessed on 





This decision situation resembles a Prisoners Dilemma in that it is individually rational for each 
worker to pursue the “dominant strategy” of working extra hours although both are worse off if 
this strategy is pursued by both. When they are unable to coordinate their actions, the workers 
converge on the equilibrium outcome in the bottom right box where both work overtime. Next, I 
will explain why this gives rise to a complaint on behalf of those affected by the rat race.15 
2.2 The Complaint against the Rat Race  
Note that both workers in the above example would prefer to leave on time and that neither of 
them is more likely to achieve the promotion if they both work overtime. In other words, a Pareto-
improving shift (from the bottom right to the top left corner of the matrix) is possible but, in the 
absence of a coordinating mechanism, the workers cannot make that shift. Assume now that an 
outside agent, say the state, could enact a policy that helps the workers coordinate their conduct in 
order to realise the Pareto-improving shift. Assume moreover that the state refuses to enact this 
policy and fails to provide any good reasons for its refusal. In this case it would seem reasonable 
for the workers to mount a complaint against the state. Its refusal to act leaves them worse off than 
they could otherwise be for no good reason. To clarify the nature of their complaint, consider the 
following example: 
Two villages: Two villages are close to each other but separated by a river. Residents 
of both villages have an interest in meeting each other but the absence of a bridge 
makes it difficult and costly for them to do so. To see each other, the villagers must 
cross the river in boats.  
Let’s assume that each villager on either side of the river has an interest in building a bridge because 
the per capita cost of using boats is much greater than the per capita cost of constructing a bridge. 
However, there is a difficulty in that the villagers find it hard to trust each other. Each individual 
has an incentive to free-ride on the efforts others make in order to build the bridge by not 
contributing to the project of its construction. Assume again, that the state could intervene to solve 
 
15 Note that we can draw a distinction between rat races that increase productivity and rat races that do 
not increase productivity. In one version of the rat race, workers work longer hours in order to 
demonstrate commitment and this additional effort does in fact lead to higher productivity (say in the form 
of more goods and services produced). In an alternative scenario, workers pretend to work longer hours in 
order to achieve the same ends. In this case, workers spend more time at the workplace without actually 
increasing productivity. This latter scenario is additionally troublesome – i.e. apart from any complaints it 
might raise on the part of workers who wish to work fewer hours – because it introduces an inefficiency 
into the economy. I will set aside this scenario and instead focus on the more difficult case of the 




this collective action problem, say by raising the necessary funds through taxing the villagers, but 
suppose it refuses to do so for no good reason. Intuitively, this gives rise to a complaint on the 
part of the villagers. 
Collective action problems similar to this occur frequently in the real world and, in some cases, 
they have led states to intervene, and with good reason. One example of this is the educational 
arms race. Sometimes parents seek to enhance their children’s competitiveness by providing them 
with private lessons or sending them to expensive private schools with the aim of increasing their 
children’s future opportunities, such as the likelihood of being admitted to a prestigious college or 
finding high-earning employment. However, given that the number of such desirable positions is 
limited, children will benefit in the competition for these positions from only comparative advantages, 
and not from absolute standards of education. This can lead to an educational arms race, where 
parents have incentives to invest into ever more strategies that will confer advantages on their 
children. But these strategies can lose their effectiveness when similar strategies are pursued by a 
large number of other parents.16 
Arguably the situation of the parents in this case is analogous to that of workers in the labour 
market who work longer than they would like. They are made worse off than they might have been 
in that they are unable to coordinate their conduct and possess a complaint against governments 
that do not assist them in overcoming this obstacle by, say, introducing legislation whose purpose 
is to prevent the collective action problem from arising or to redress its effects.  
Consider now an objection to this claim which holds that the harmful effects of collective action 
problems like this are not enough to justify coercive state intervention. In other words, the benefits 
of regulating a collective action problem cannot justify the costs associated with intrusive 
regulation. To illustrate this, imagine the following scenario:  
 
16 This can cause a number of injustices. One of them has to do with the fact that resources invested in 
the arms race generate no real benefits and could instead be invested in different ways, such as aid for the 
worst off. Certain restrictions of markets in education are therefore justified (among other things) because 
they have the potential to correct for this injustice. For discussion, see Daniel Halliday, ‘Private Education, 
Positional Goods, and the Arms Race Problem’, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 15, no. 2 (2016). There are 
of course other reasons for being concerned about the educational arms race. For example, spending on 




Buying a television: A group of consumers is interested in buying a new television. A 
retailer offers a television at a price of £500 but each consumer would prefer to 
spend only £490 on this product. If the consumers could coordinate their actions 
and collectively bargain with the retailer, they would be able to drive down the price 
to £490.  
Imagine now that a state reacts to this situation by employing public officials whose job is to 
coordinate consumers into large consumer groups who then use their collective bargaining power 
to achieve lower prices. Imagine furthermore that organizing consumers into groups and 
coordinating their interests is a laborious process that involves significant administrative costs. It 
is less straightforwardly clear that this intervention is justifiable because it involves a large effort in 
order to provide a relatively trivial benefit. 
There is however an important disanalogy between Promotion and Buying a television. The interest at 
stake for consumers in Buying a television is relatively small. They face a one-time loss of £10 if they 
are unable to coordinate their conduct. The workers in Promotion, by contrast, spend significantly 
more time at the workplace as a result of the working time rat race. This is time they could otherwise 
spend on activities that they much prefer, such as being with their friends or families, as well as on 
activities that may be socially beneficial, such as learning about and involving themselves in politics. 
The loss of free time associated with the rat race is an important harm that does justify intervention 
on their behalf. Similarly, I believe that intervention is justifiable in Two villages if the cost of using 
boats to cross the river is sufficiently great. 
Summing things up, we can formulate the following preliminary principle: Victims of collective 
action problems like the rat race have a claim to intervention on their behalf only if a Pareto-
improving shift is available and the costs of intervention are strongly outweighed by its benefits. 
By “intervention”, I mean a policy that changes the pay-off structure of a decision situation of a 
group so that it becomes advantageous for each individual to act in a way that is consistent with 
the collective interest of the group. In the case of the rat race, an intervention is a policy that makes 
it easier or less costly for each individual to abstain from participating in the rat race, and so work 
in accordance with her working time preferences. We can contemplate a number of specific policies 
that potentially fulfil these criteria. Consider for example the proposal to strengthen labour unions. 
Unions can provide a platform for overcoming collective action problems like the rat race by 
facilitating communication, issuing and enforcing collectively binding rules of action, and exerting 
power to force employers into acceptance of and compliance with working time regulations. 




and regulating the workplace and today many unions endorse proposals of working time reduction 
such as the 4-day working week.17 
A different way to increase workers’ bargaining power is to equip them with a basic income. It is 
often argued that a basic income would make it less costly for individuals to express their authentic 
preferences for leisure and working time because it provides them with a reliable exit option from 
work contracts that do not suit their interests18 Though there is substantial uncertainty about the 
question what the likely effects of the introduction of a basic income would be, it can be expected 
that most forms of the basic income – if pitched at a reasonably high level – will lead to an increase 
in workers’ bargaining power. This is mainly because it equips them with the freedom to quit 
unpleasant jobs. Insofar as it decreases the severity of the threat of unemployment, it mitigates rat 
races triggered by the desire to avoid dismissals or other disadvantages. It is less clear whether a 
basic income would address rat races that evolve around other competitive goals such as 
competitive consumption or achieving a promotion. 
Rat races can also be tackled more directly through the issuing of maximum work hours laws. Such 
restrictions seem like a natural response to the rat race because they make it impossible for workers 
to use working time as a means of competing with each other. Their main advantage is that they 
are relatively cheap and effective and policy makers can draw on substantial historical experience 
with regards to their implementation. A major drawback of this strategy is that it is a relatively blunt 
instrument that is likely to treat alike different workers in different sectors and with different 
preferences. This is problematic because rat races in different sectors differ in how severe they are 
and should therefore be addressed in different ways. The main advantage of simplicity gets 
undermined the more policymakers attempt to finetune and tailor maximum hours laws to specific 
circumstances. 
2.3 Regulation is Almost Never Pareto-Improving 
I now address an important objection that denies the assumption that the removing of rat races 
constitutes a Pareto-improving shift. While interventions to remove the rat race will benefit 
workers who prefer to enjoy more leisure – the grasshoppers –, they will harm those who prefer 
to work more and enjoy less leisure – the ants. This means that removing the rat race is not a 
Pareto-improving shift. 
 
17 John H. Pencavel, Diminishing Returns at Work, (Oxford University Press, 2018), Ch. 2. 
18 See for example Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? 




To illustrate this concern, let’s go back to Two villages. The objection begins with the insight that 
the example of Two villages is too simplistic in the following way: In reality, not all villagers will have 
an interest in the construction of a bridge. Some will be indifferent and some will be opposed to 
such a project. For some residents, the expected benefit of the bridge does not outweigh the cost 
they would have to bear. Others may even consider the bridge a disutility, say because it ruins a 
beautiful landscape. As a result, the construction of a bridge is no longer justifiable on the grounds 
that it advances everyone’s interest. A similar objection applies against the grasshoppers’ demand 
to remove the rat race. Helping grasshoppers by regulating labour markets harms the interests of 
ants because the introduction of a regulatory mechanism makes it more difficult or more costly for 
them to work as long as they please. If this were the case, interventions would in fact not be Pareto-
improving because they improve the situation of grasshoppers at the expense of the interests of 
ants. 
There are two ways in which defenders of working time reduction policies can respond to this 
objection. First, they can point out that not all forms of intervention harm ants. While coercive 
policies such as maximum work hours laws may well harm ants, a number of other interventions 
may not, such as, for example, non-coercive measures that use incentives and voluntary opt-in 
programmes. An illustrative example of a non-coercive policy is the “Right to Disconnect” 
introduced on 1 January 2017 in France, which requires firms with more than 50 employees to 
propose timeframes during which workers are not required to be online and to respond to emails.19 
As I explained in the introduction, the French government introduced this right as a response to 
widespread overwork and a rising prevalence of burnout syndrome. In contrast with maximum 
work hours legislation, this policy imposes relatively little harm on ants because it strengthens 
workers’ ability to not work overtime without preventing them from doing so. However, while it may 
take the sting out of some rat races, the right to disconnect will not remove them entirely because 
it will be possible and advantageous for workers in many situations to compete against each other 
by working extra hours. Crucially, the right to disconnect does not provide workers with a means 
of coordinating their actions in order to align their collective interest with what is individually 
rational for each worker. Something similar will likely be true for other non-coercive policies 
besides protecting the right to disconnect. 
 
19 Nicolas Boring, ‘France: Right to Disconnect Takes Effect’, (The Library of Congress, January 13th 
2017), section Global Legal Monitor. http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/france-right-to-




For example, states can create mechanisms that allow for an opting-out of established working 
time directives when certain conditions are met.20 States can also take measures to augment 
workers’ individual or collective bargaining power, for example by providing everyone with a basic 
income or by implementing state-supported sectoral bargaining systems. Such policies are 
preferable to coercive maximum hours laws because they’re less restrictive of ants’ freedom to 
work as long as they please. Nevertheless, we must assume that these rat race-removing policies 
too will normally harm ants, at least to some extent, and so this first response to the objection is not 
enough. 
This leads us to a second response to the objection which posits that interventions are justifiable 
even if they are not, strictly speaking, Pareto-improving. Philosophers have dedicated much 
thought to the question of how to evaluate policies that benefit some and harm others and there 
are different approaches to this question. However, reasonable approaches converge on the idea 
that if the affected interests of those who would be benefitted and those who would be harmed are 
identical or similar in strength, we should aggregate these interests across individuals and settle the 
decision in favour of the group who experiences the largest loss. One particularly appealing 
approach is the contractualist ‘Complaint Model’. In the subsequent paragraphs I use the 
Complaint Model in order to adjudicate between the competing interests of ants and grasshoppers 
once we’ve dropped the assumption that regulating the rat race is beneficial to everyone. I’m not 
suggesting that the Complaint Model is the only theoretical approach that provides a satisfactory 
solution to the problem of grasshoppers’ and ants’ competing interests. Here I’m using it merely 
as an illustration for how one can sustain the argument that regulation to remove the rat race can 
be justifiable even though it harms ants to some extent. 
According to the Complaint Model, we should endorse a policy if and only if the strongest 
complaint against it is smaller than the strongest complaint that can be raised against alternative 
policies.21 To illustrate, if we must choose between either saving one person from death or a million 
persons from headaches, the Complaint Model plausibly recommends saving one person from 
death. Other doctrines, such as utilitarianism, that rely on a straightforward aggregation of harms 
and benefits might implausibly recommend saving a large number of persons from headaches. In 
the case of the rat race, the Complaint Model recommends regulation if and only if the complaint 
 
20 See for example Bogg, Costello, and Davies, Research Handbook on EU Labour Law Chapter 12. 
21 See for example T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 




against the rat race that can be raised by the most adversely affected grasshoppers is stronger than 
the complaint that can be raised by those ants that are most adversely affected by regulation.22 
It is likely that the complaint that can be mounted against the rat race by any individual grasshopper 
is similarly weighty or weightier than the complaint that arises for any individual ant as a result of 
regulation. The most significant harm suffered by ants as a result of regulation is a loss of financial 
income. Many types of collectively binding regulation to prevent the rat race from occurring will 
effectively prevent ants from spending as much time at the workplace as they please and, as a result 
of that, prevent them from increasing their income through overtime work.23 On the side of 
grasshoppers, the rat race sets back an interest in free time, which – like money – is an important 
resource that can be used to pursue a wide variety of ends. Moreover, an ample literature 
documents that long work hours have deleterious effects on workers’ safety and health.24 If it were 
true that the loss of free time, taken together with the risks and health effects of long work hours, 
harms individual grasshoppers more severely than the loss of income harms individual ants, the 
Complaint Model would recommend regulating the rat race. 
This simple “minimize the largest complaint” principle can generate implausible consequences in 
some cases. For example, if we have to choose between saving one person from losing three fingers 
and saving 1000 persons from losing two fingers, the simple version of the Complaint Model 
counterintuitively recommends saving one person from losing three fingers. However, the 
Complaint Model can be modified in ways that avoid this troubling implication. For example, a 
sophisticated version of the Complaint Model can allow for the aggregation of individual 
complaints in cases where complaints are similarly severe. Arguably, the complaint that arises from 
a loss of two fingers and the complaint that arises from a loss of three fingers are sufficiently similar 
 
22 One might wonder what exactly is meant by the term ‘complaint’. As I understand it, the concept of a 
complaint within a Scanlonian contractualist framework broadly refers to something that sets back a 
person’s interest. A person has a complaint against a principle to regulate social interaction if that principle 
sets back her interests.  
23One might worry that regulation also restricts ants’ access to goods other than money that are also 
obtainable through work, such as social recognition, self-esteem, and realising community with others. 
However, these goods are not exclusively available through work. For example, individuals can gain social 
recognition and experience a sense of community with others through joining voluntary societies. 
Moreover, acquiring these non-monetary goods arguably does not require that workers be allowed to work 
as long as they maximally wish but only enough to meet a certain threshold. For example, a particular job can 
be a source of self-esteem even when the worker in question is allowed to pursue it for only 30 rather than 
50 hours per week. Recent research suggests that as little as 8 hours per week might be enough to reap the 
‘goods of work’ other than money Daiga Kamerāde et al., ‘A Shorter Working Week for Everyone: How 
Much Paid Work Is Needed for Mental Health and Well-Being?’, Social Science & Medicine 241 (2019). 
24 Kapo Wong, Alan H. S. Chan, and S. C. Ngan, ‘The Effect of Long Working Hours and Overtime on 
Occupational Health: A Meta-Analysis of Evidence from 1998 to 2018’, International Journal of Environmental 




to trigger a concern for the number of individuals who are affected by these losses. I will assume 
that this is the most plausible version of the Complaint Model.25 In order to see how this version 
of the Complaint Model applies to the rat race, consider the following example: 
10-hours reduction: Imagine an economic sector where the rat race leads to an increase 
in average working time from 40 hours to 50 hours per week. A government 
responds to this with an intervention – say a strengthening of labour unions – that 
removes the rat race and leads to a 10-hours working time reduction. 
Let’s assume for a moment that the complaint that arises for ants as a result of regulation and the 
complaint that arises for grasshoppers as a result of the rat race are similarly severe, so that the 
Complaint Model requires their aggregation (I will later defend this assumption). If this is true, the 
Complaint Model would recommend regulating the rat race if grasshoppers outnumber ants. 
Plausibly this is the case in most contemporary societies. Consider the example of the United 
Kingdom. Statistics about overemployment and underemployment can be used as a very rough 
indicator for the distribution of working time preferences and thus for the distribution of 
grasshoppers and ants. In the UK, about 32 million individuals are employed in the labour market. 
Of these, more than 3 million want more hours, 10 million want fewer hours and the rest wants 
neither more nor fewer hours. Of those who want fewer hours, more than 3 million would want 
them even if this means lower pay. 6,5 million want fewer hours but not with less pay.26 This 
suggests that there are roughly three times more grasshoppers than ants.27 
However, not everyone agrees that such statistics reveal conclusive information about working 
time preferences. This is because of a purported process of adaptive preference formation where 
individuals in work-centred societies are nudged into believing that lifestyles centred around gainful 
employment are particularly valuable: “The connection between identity and occupation is forged 
 
25 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explain and defend this version of the Complaint Model. There 
is ample literature on the question of what role aggregation should play in contractualist theory Sophia 
Reibetanz, ‘Contractualism and Aggregation’, Ethics 108, no. 2 (1998): 296–311; Joe Horton, ‘Always 
Aggregate’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 46, no. 2 (2018): 160–74; Veronique Munoz-Darde, ‘In the Face of 
Austerity: The Puzzle of Museums and Universities’, Journal of Political Philosophy 21, no. 2 (2013): 221–42. 
26 UK Office For National Statistics, ‘EMP16: Underemployment and overemployment’, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/da
tasets/underemploymentandoveremploymentemp16 (last accessed 22nd of January, 2020). 
27 We can expect that there are varying shares of ants and grasshoppers in different sectors of the 
economy. A more precise analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper, would disaggregate these 
figures and identify the share of ants and grasshoppers in different sectors of the economy in order to 




from a young age, with children being prompted by parents and educators to refine their career 
aspirations and begin cultivating their employability”.28 
The importance of the institution of paid employment for our identity, social recognition and 
material subsistence, so the argument goes, makes it difficult to form preferences that are not 
aligned with the dominant attitudes towards work.29 Moreover, the advertisement industry 
constantly creates new desires for consumer products that can only be afforded through gainful 
employment. This puts a premium on high-working time, high-income lifestyles and makes it 
attractive to develop preferences for paid employment. The upshot of this argument is that the 
number of “real” ants is likely to be substantially lower than suggested by the statistics. While this 
is perhaps correct, it is entirely unclear what exactly our preferences would look like in an 
“undistorted”, work-morality-free setting. It is also unclear whether theorists opposed to 
perfectionist approaches to social justice have reasons to criticise the above-described process of 
preference-formation in work-centred societies. Interesting though it is, I will set this concern to 
one side. 
However, there is still reason to believe that the above figures overstate the number of ants in the 
UK. In an economy where everyone received the wage to which they’re morally entitled, these 
figures would provide conclusive knowledge about the number of ants in a society. In the real 
world, where many do not receive just wages, these statistics are likely to reflect more than just 
working time preferences. For example, some may want more hours because they need more 
income to survive or because they want social security benefits that are available through full-time 
but not through part-time employment. In other words, not everyone who is overemployed is 
necessarily an ant. The upshot of this is that under any reading of the statistics, ants are 
outnumbered by grasshoppers. 
In order to approximate the number of ants and grasshoppers in the UK, we must also answer the 
question of how we should interpret the divide between those grasshoppers who would like to 
reduce their working time only with full wage-compensation and those who would like to work 
less even if this means less money. On which side of the equation of our harm-comparison should 
 
28 David Frayne, The Refusal of Work, (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2005), pp. 14–15. 
29 Some empirical findings seem to vindicate this hypothesis. Consider the example of Sweden: “Ironically, 
the demand for fewer hours is most pronounced in Sweden, where weekly and annual hours are already 
low and the government has devoted itself to reducing the conflict between work and family. It seems that 
generous social benefits make working fewer hours an attractive option in Sweden, especially for women 
with children. In the United States, where average work hours are high and work-family conflict is severe, 
the working population is split between those who want more hours and those who want fewer” Jeremy 




we register those grasshoppers who are not willing to take an income loss? It is possible that these 
workers are not harmed by rat races because if they were harmed by rat races and if they earn 
incomes above the wage minimally required by justice, they would welcome even those types of 
working time reduction that go along with wage reductions. But we can nevertheless assume that 
those grasshoppers are in favour of the intervention of strengthening labour unions. This is because 
labour unions typically advocate both better pay and reduced working time. Hence, in our calculation 
we should count at least all those on the side of grasshoppers who claim to be overemployed and 
all those on the side of ants who claim to be underemployed. This means that under the most 
conservative estimation (disregarding issues around low wages and adaptive preference formation) 
ants are indeed outnumbered by grasshoppers by three times. The upshot of this is that rat race-
removing interventions are recommended by a reasonable version of the Complaint Model that 
aggregates whenever the competing interests at stake are similar. 
Let me now defend the assumption that the harms at stake on the side of grasshoppers and those 
at stake on the side of ants are sufficiently similar to justify aggregation. As I said, the rat race sets 
back grasshoppers’ interest in free time and regulation sets back ants’ interest in additional income. 
Both free time and money are important resources that individuals can use to advance their life 
plans. The question is how one can vindicate the judgement that these competing interests in 
money and free time are of comparable significance without relying on a perfectionist standard of 
human flourishing. In other words, can we establish that the harm suffered by grasshoppers under 
laissez-faire, that is when no rat race-removing regulations are in place, and the harm suffered by 
ants under intervention, that is when policies to remove the rat race are in place, are sufficiently 
similar to allow for aggregation without making controversial assumptions about human 
flourishing? 
One way to avoid relying on a perfectionist standard is to appeal, instead, to individual judgements 
about the relative significance of money and free time. Such individual judgements can be revealed 
through a “willingness-to-pay” test of the kind that Ronald Dworkin has proposed.30 To see what 
this involves, suppose an ant and a grasshopper each earn an annual salary of £40,000 under a 
regime of laissez-faire with 40 hours of work per week, and that they can instead earn £35,000 under 
a regime of intervention with 35 hours per week. We must decide whether to shift from the regime 
of laissez-faire to a regime of intervention. Using a willingness-to-pay test involves asking the ant how 
 
30 Ronald Dworkin, Law´s Empire, (London: Harvard University Press, 1986) Chapter 8. See also Paul 
Bou-Habib, “Torts, Markets and Equality,” Annual Review of Law and Ethic Vol. 17, 2009: 309-326. Note 
that the willingness-to-pay test is always carried out against a backdrop of equal bidding power. This 
ensures that it doesn’t produce outcomes that are skewed in favour of rich workers who use their high 




much she would be willing to pay to retain the regime of laissez-faire and the grasshopper how much 
she would be willing to pay to shift to a regime of intervention. Suppose that the ant would be willing 
to reduce her salary by £2,500 in order to retain laisse-faire (i.e., so that her salary would shift from 
£40,000 to £37,500). Suppose, next, that the grasshopper would be willing to sacrifice £2,500 in 
order to have intervention instead of laissez-faire (she would accept a salary of £32,500 in order to 
have intervention). On a willingness-to-pay test, the competing interests of this ant and grasshopper 
are equivalent in significance. By contrast, suppose the ant was more extreme in her judgement, so 
that she would derive zero value from the extra free time she could have under intervention, and 
would thus be willing to pay almost £5,000 in order to retain laissez-faire (almost all of the income 
she would gain from laissez-faire). In this case, we should conclude that her interest in laissez-faire is 
weightier than the grasshopper’s interest in intervention. This is because the ant would be willing to 
pay more in order to retain laissez-faire than the grasshopper would be willing to pay in order to 
have intervention. Using a willingness-to-pay test of this kind allows us to reach this judgement about 
the relative significance of their interests without assuming that the ant or grasshopper have the 
better conception of the good life and is thus anti-perfectionist. 
To my knowledge, such a willingness-to-pay test hasn’t been operationalised in the context of 
working time regulation. What I offer here is only a sketch of a theoretical solution to the problem 
of comparing the goods of money and leisure in a way that is anti-perfectionist. My hypothesis, 
that the interests of grasshoppers that would be set back under laissez-faire and the interests of ants 
that would be set back under intervention are sufficiently similar in order to permit aggregation, 
would be confirmed if ants and grasshoppers would offer similar amounts in a willingness-to-pay 
test. And as I have shown above, a reasonable version of the Complaint Model that aggregates 
similar complaints would settle the dispute between ants and grasshoppers in favour of the latter 
because there are many more grasshoppers than ants. 
2.4 Regulation is Harmful to Third Parties 
One might worry that regulating the rat race wouldn’t set back the interests of only ants but also 
those of other parties affected by the rat race and its regulation. Crucially, in the absence of 
regulation, the rat race works to benefit consumers and business owners, for example, because it 
leads to an increased production of goods and services. If regulation to prevent the rat race from 




the additional labour generated by the rat race works to expand the availability of consumer goods.31 
Business owners might also be harmed by regulation because they would no longer benefit from 
the (occasionally gratis) extra work that occurs as a result of the rat race.32 It might seem arbitrary 
to focus discussion of the effects of regulation exclusively on the interests of grasshoppers and ants 
when there are also other parties whose interests are adversely affected by regulatory intervention. 
Taking the interests of these other parties into account might weaken the case for working time 
regulation because it could reveal that regulation is more harmful than the initial analysis that is 
restricted to the interests of grasshoppers and ants suggests. 
However, it is far from obvious that considering additional interests weakens the case for working 
time regulation.33 There are two main reasons to assume that the conclusion of the Complaint 
Model wouldn’t be altered by considering other affected interests, i.e., beyond the interests of ants 
and grasshoppers. First, many of these other affected interests side with the grasshoppers’ 
complaint against the rat race. For example, children would likely benefit from the presence of 
workers who return from work earlier. Other family members, dependents, and friends of those 
who participate in the rat race might favour regulation because it would allow them to spend more 
time with these workers. Moreover, insofar as it is true that long work hours have adverse effects 
on workers’ health, consumers might benefit from regulation because public expenditure to treat 
overwork-related health issues might go down. 
Second, the interests of many parties other than ants that are harmed by regulation aren’t weighty 
enough to alter the recommendation of the Complaint Model. It is true that consumers have an 
interest in cheaper goods and the rat race reduces the prices of consumer goods. But the harm 
suffered by each consumer as a result of slightly higher prices is not enough to outweigh the harm 
experienced by grasshoppers when their free time is significantly reduced by the rat race. Neither 
 
31 As I mentioned above, not all rat races are productive in the sense that they lead to an increased 
production of goods and services. We can imagine cases where workers attempt to impress their boss by 
staying longer in their office without actually carrying out more work during these extra hours. The 
objection I discuss in this section only applies to productive rat races, where competition between workers 
leads to an increased production of goods and services. 
32 This loss suffered by business owners might also be passed on to consumers in the form of higher 
prices. 
33 One might think that there is a straightforward reply to this objection, according to which the interests 
of consumers or business owners wouldn’t be affected by regulation because business owners could pay 
for new workers from the decreased wage of existing workers that are willing to work fewer hours with 
less compensation. However, this reply assumes that it would be easy to transfer these small amounts of 
freed-up time to new employees. This in turn is not a realistic assumption to make because transaction 
costs and other frictions that occur in real existing labour markets (as compared to idealised theoretical 




can somewhat lower prices of consumer goods outweigh the other interests I mentioned above, 
such as the interests of children to spend more time with their working parents.  
What’s more, most people must work in order to be able to consume which means that they must 
weigh their interest in cheaper products against their interest in free time. Another way to put this 
is to say that there is often identity-relation between the groups of grasshoppers, ants, and 
consumers. Grasshoppers and ants are not only workers but also consumers, and consumers are 
often (though not always) workers. We should assume that individuals don’t treat their working 
time and leisure preferences as entirely independent from their consumption preferences. The two 
are intertwined: Supposedly, ants’ main reason for preferring long work hours is that this affords 
them more consumer goods and grasshoppers know that working little is incompatible with a 
consumption-intensive lifestyle. This means that insofar as consumers are grasshoppers, their 
interests in cheaper consumer goods is mitigated by their interest in leisure. Those consumers that 
are ants also have an interest (though a much smaller one) in free time that reigns in their desire 
for cheap consumer goods. 
Having said this, it bears emphasizing that there are some rat races whose removal is impermissible 
because they generate significant benefits for the least advantaged. To understand why this might 
be the case, note that workers whose skills are high in demand on the labour market often earn 
high wages, whilst those whose skills are low in demand are often badly paid. Many think that some 
market-induced inequalities of this kind can be morally objectionable, and that this can justify 
compensation to those whose skills happen to be low in demand. It is even less controversial that 
states have a duty to provide the worst-off with at least enough resources to cover basic necessities. 
One straightforward way of complying with that duty is to impose progressive taxation on high-
income earners. The revenue created by this taxation can then be redistributed in ways that benefit 
the worst off. However, the size of the revenue that can be extracted from high-income earners 
depends on the size of these workers’ income. Much more tax revenue can be extracted from a 
high-income earner who works 70 hours per week than from the same person working only 35 
hours per week. With this in mind, consider now the following scenario. 
Corporate consultants: A group of corporate consultants is affected by a rat race, as a result of 
which they work much longer than they would do otherwise. The consultants are top-
earners and their income is taxed at a rate that is compatible with the demands of social 
justice. The state solves their collective action problem so that each consultant works 
significantly less than before. Consequently, the state-revenue that flows from taxation of 




If states solve the corporate consultants’ rat race, they lose resources that could otherwise be used 
to improve the situation of the worst-off.34 The worst off are of course those who normally rely 
most on tax-funded social services and if the state’s tax base shrinks, they will be the ones who 
suffer most from cuts to these services. This suggests that the removal of rat races between very 
privileged workers is morally impermissible because it harms the worst-off. 
Note that the force of this argument against regulating rat races between privileged workers 
depends on the truth of an assumption that sometimes isn’t met in reality. It assumes that workers 
whose working time increases as a result of the rat race earn higher incomes than those who don’t 
participate in the rat race. But this isn’t always the case. We can imagine that the corporate 
consultants from our example attempt to impress their boss by staying longer in their offices even 
though they know that these extra hours won’t be paid. If those who participate in the rat race 
don’t earn more income as a result of increasing their working time, then there is no additional tax 
revenue that can be extracted from them. 
Nevertheless, we should expect that many rat races between privileged workers create paid 
overtime work that can be taxed to benefit the least advantaged. Regulating these rat races would 
harm the interests of the least advantaged to an extent that makes regulation morally impermissible. 
Another way to say this is that the urgency of the moral concern about excessive working time 
diminishes as workers become better off. Any reason states can have to aid time-pressured top-
earners will often be outweighed by the more urgent moral concern that this will set back the 
interests of those who’re already disadvantaged. In cases like corporate consultants, the complaint 
generated by intervention is stronger than the complaint generated by laissez-faire. The interest of the 
least advantaged in maintaining the same level of tax-funded social services outweighs the corporate 
consultants’ claim to enjoying more free time. 
Contrast corporate consultants with a rat race that occurs among disadvantaged workers. Imagine for 
example a group of gig-economy delivery workers that is affected by a rat race whereby everyone 
accepts delivery-jobs in their free time in order to avoid the threat of being dismissed. Imagine also 
that the state helps these workers overcome the rat race by subsidising gig-economy labour unions. 
In this case, the rat race removal doesn’t harm the least advantaged but rather improves their 
situation because it provides them with access to additional free time. 
What follows from this is that states ought not to solve all rat races indiscriminately but only when 
this doesn’t set back the interests of the least advantaged. In extreme cases, where privileged 
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workers generate enormous tax revenue, states might even have reasons to make it more difficult 
for these workers to solve their collective action problems in order to “squeeze” a maximal amount 
of tax income from them.35 
2.5 Regulation is Ineffective  
I now turn to an objection according to which regulating the rat race is an idle exercise because, 
instead of removing the rat race, regulation will only shift the problem to another field, where it 
then re-emerges. Remember that the rat race occurs when workers use long work hours as a means 
of signalling productivity and commitment in order to achieve, for example, a promotion. Imagine 
now that states pass legislation that makes it impossible for employers to make promotion decisions 
on the grounds that someone works longer than someone else. Obviously, this legislation will not 
remove the worker’s desire to get a promotion. If workers know that they cannot use long work 
hours as a means of demonstrating commitment, they may find other ways of competing that are 
just as harmful to their interests. For example, they may decide to demonstrate their commitment 
by working more intensively. This suggests that regulation to remove the rat race may be futile 
because it only moves the problem and leads to the emerging of another rat race elsewhere. 
The force of this objection mainly depends on two factors: a) How many workers, if any, will enter 
a different rat race once the rat race around work hours is removed? b) How harmful is the new 
rat race as compared to the old one? The answer to these questions will in turn depend on the 
question of how difficult or promising it is to enter into a new rat race, say around the intensity of 
work. 
Remember that the rat race around the length of the working day occurs relatively frequently 
because workers are aware that working time is an easy and inexpensive way for employers to 
approximate productivity and commitment. Often (though not always), it is more difficult and 
more expensive for employers to measure the intensity of their employees’ work. This is because 
measuring work intensity requires information about both quantity and quality of the products or 
services produced by each worker. Goods or services are normally produced collectively by a 
number of workers which makes it more difficult to trace the contribution made by each individual. 
In other words, the intensity of work is less publicly verifiable than the number of work hours. 
Workers will find it attractive to compete by increasing their work intensity only if they expect that 
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employers register and reward this additional effort. Workers will abstain from entering into a 
work-intensity rat race if intensity is not adequately measured or measurable. 
It bears mentioning that insofar as workers do participate in work-intensity rat races, these are 
particularly burdensome. Staying longer at the workplace can often be done with comparably little 
effort, especially when workers decrease their work intensity. Working more intensely on the other 
hand is almost always associated with additional strain. This means that if work-intensity rat races 
occur they give rise to concern as well. 
For the sake of the argument, imagine for a moment that the new rat race around work intensity is 
equally or even more harmful than the one around working time. Would this give us reason to 
refrain from removing the working time rat race? Or would it rather give us reason to issue 
legislation that removes the work intensity rat race as well? If it were true that the removing of each 
rat race would always lead to the emergence of a new and equally harmful rat race, then it would 
indeed be futile to pass any such legislation. But it’s implausible to assume that this is the case. 
Remember the above example of the educational arms race where parents attempt to provide their 
children with comparative advantages e.g., by sending them to expensive private schools. Imagine 
that a state decides to address this arms race by prohibiting private schools. Supposedly parents 
could now redirect their efforts and enter a different arms race, say by providing their children with 
additional private lessons in their free time. Does this mean that the prohibition of private schools 
is futile? Not necessarily, because we would expect the new arms race around private lessons to be 
less expensive and therefore less wasteful. 
Something similar is true for the rat race around working hours. We can expect that workers will 
not always be able to find new ways of signalling motivation and commitment that have equally 
harmful effects than the working hours rat race. At some point workers may attempt to signal their 
motivation by smiling when their boss is around or by walking through the corridors of the firm 
in an especially energetic way. At this point, states may well decide that although problematic in 
some sense, these rat races are not worth regulating because their effects are not profound enough 
to justify intrusive and coercive measures. 
2.6 Why can’t the market solve the rat race? 
To conclude, let me come back to a concern that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
Some might worry that I am underestimating the capacity of the market to solve collective action 
problems like the rat race ‘organically’, that is without state intervention. Consider the following 




for fewer work hours, and if they’re willing to work for lower wages in order to obtain their 
preferred working-time arrangement, then we would expect that some companies try to attract 
these employees by offering jobs that involve fewer work hours. The fact that we observe so little 
part-time employment might mean that workers prefer not to take up opportunities for reduced 
working time when firms offer such opportunities, because they prefer income over free time. 
Another reason why workers might prefer not to take up opportunities for reduced working time 
is that working conditions have improved significantly over the course of the past two centuries. 
Many jobs that used to be boring or hazardous are now interesting and safe, so that there is less 
reason for workers to reduce work hours. 
I mentioned previously that transaction costs and regulations, such as minimum wage laws, can 
make it difficult for firms to pass the costs of part-time employment on to employees. But let’s 
assume for a moment that some, or perhaps even most of the costs of part-time employment can 
be passed on to employees, so that those who want to work less can do so if they’re willing to work 
for a lower hourly wage. If this is true, then the prevalence of long work hours might mean that 
there is after all no demand for jobs with reduced working time. Claims of workers who say that 
they would prefer to work less even if this results in reduced income might be disingenuous: when 
confronted with the choice between income and free time they opt for income. 
In the subsequent chapter I address this concern by offering another explanation for why there is 
so little part time employment. As I will show, collective action problems around increased working 
time occur not only between individual workers but also between firms. Collective action problems 
between firms offer an additional explanation for the prevalence of excessive work hours. They 
also help explain the related fact that industrialized societies continuously increase the production 
of consumer items, while the amount of free time that citizens enjoy has remained largely constant 





3. The Rat Race between Firms 
In this chapter I assess a complaint against economic institutions of contemporary societies that 
incentivize firms to produce an abundance of consumer goods and insufficient opportunities for 
workers to enjoy free time. Let me begin by drawing attention to some historical trends regarding 
material production and working time. 
The economic history of humanity can be divided into two fundamentally different periods: One 
before and one after the onset of economic growth.1 During the first part, which lasted several 
thousand years, most humans were relatively poor and during the much shorter second part, 
economic activity and average incomes grew very rapidly. Since the onset of the industrial 
revolution, living standards in many countries have improved dramatically. “Before 1750, per capita 
income in the world doubled every 6,000 years; since then, it has doubled every 50 years.”2 Today, 
there are some countries where average life expectancy is twice as high as 200 years ago and “no 
country in the world has a lower life expectancy than the countries with the highest life expectancy 
in 1800.”3 
In spite of this progress, there is growing scepticism over the value of perpetual economic growth.4 
One source of such scepticism has to do with the fact that economic growth has dramatically 
increased the availability of consumer products, but it hasn’t led to comparable expansions of 
citizens’ free time.5 To illustrate, since the Industrial Revolution the average UK citizen has seen a 
29-fold increase in prosperity.6 Average working time, in contrast, increased during the time of the 
industrial revolution and is now roughly at the same level as before the industrial revolution. 
According to Juliet Schor, 
 
1 Max Roser (2020) - "Economic Growth". Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: 
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3 Max Roser, Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Hannah Ritchie (2013) - "Life Expectancy". Published online at 
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4 E. J. Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth, Pelican Books (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969); Giorgos 
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5 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 40th anniversary ed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998). 
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One of capitalism's most durable myths is that it has reduced human toil. This myth is 
typically defended by a comparison of the modern forty-hour week with its seventy- or 
eighty-hour counterpart in the nineteenth century. The implicit – but rarely articulated – 
assumption is that the eighty-hour standard has prevailed for centuries. […] We are asked 
to imagine the journeyman artisan in a cold, damp garret, rising even before the sun, 
laboring by candlelight late into the night. […] These images are backward projections of 
modern work patterns. And they are false. Before capitalism, most people did not work 
very long hours at all. The tempo of life was slow, even leisurely; the pace of work relaxed. 
Our ancestors may not have been rich, but they had an abundance of leisure.7 
In an influential essay, John Maynard Keynes predicts that within two generations, technological 
progress will make it possible for humans to work as little as 3 hours per day. Today we know that 
Keynes was too optimistic in predicting the imminence of a society of abundant free time.8 
According to Todd Rakoff, 
changes in the economy have affected the distribution of hours among jobs much more 
than they have moved the overall averages. In recent years there has been a growth (or, 
historically speaking, a re-emergence) of jobs with very long hours—jobs more than 25 
percent longer than the 40-hour standard, jobs that cannot be seen as the 40-hour week 
plus a few hours of occasional overtime. Of men in their middle years (aged 25–54) in non-
agricultural employment, 22.2 percent worked 49 or more hours per week in 1976; by 1993, 
29.2 percent did. The comparable figures for women are 5.7 percent and 12.0 percent.67 
Much of this increase happened in the late 1980s. In 1985, almost 17 million non-
agricultural employees, men and women, worked 49 hours or more per week; by 1993 the 
figure had jumped to almost 22 million.9 
Many find this puzzling. Technological development continually increases the availability of 
consumer items but it hardly reduces the amount of time people spend at work.10 One might say 
 
7 Schor, The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure, Paperback:43; Messenger, Lee, and 
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8 John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion, vol. 1. publ. in the Norton Library (New York: Norton, 
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9 Todd D. Rakoff, A Time for Every Purpose (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 76. 
10 Some economists disagree with this observation, arguing that since the onset of the Industrial Revolution 
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enjoy much more leisure now than before the Industrial Revolution.Messenger, Lee, and McCann, Working 
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that capitalism has an output-bias: firms tend to employ increases in productivity to produce more 
goods and services, rather than using it to cater to popular demands for more free time, such as 
the call for a four day work week.11 The idea that technological progress should not only bring 
about higher output and higher wages, but also reductions of working time, has been endorsed by 
philosophers like Bertrand Russel, Hannah Arendt, and André Gorz, who claim that modern 
societies are ‘labouring societies’ that put too much emphasis on the value of work, while 
denigrating activities of leisure.12 According to these authors, the output-bias ought to be removed, 
so that the privilege of enjoying free time becomes more widely available – even if this means that 
fewer goods and services will be produced as a result. But why exactly should we be troubled by 
the fact that free time hasn’t grown to the extent that some philosophers wished or expected?  
My answer to this question draws on the claim that firms often face a morally objectionable 
collective action problem that makes it rational for each firm to increase output, although no firm 
is better off when all firms pursue this strategy. Before I elaborate on this explanation, I assess two 
alternative objections that are frequently raised against economic institutions that cause the output-
bias. Section 3.1, discusses the claim that such institutions are objectionable because they 
exacerbate the destruction of the environment. It shows that this ecology-based objection against 
the output-bias has much less force than is commonly assumed. Section 3.2 assesses an objection 
according to which output-biased institutions are objectionable because they diminish human 
welfare. The most rigorous version of this objection is advanced by G A Cohen. I explain that his 
account is unsatisfactory because it is incomplete. Section 3.3 develops Cohen’s intuitions and 
proposes a more convincing version of the welfare-based objection. I argue that the output-bias is 
morally objectionable because it is caused by a collective action problem that leaves those who 
sometimes prefer more free time over cheaper consumer items worse off than they could otherwise 
be. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 respond to objections according to which we shouldn’t abandon the 
output-bias because this would harm consumers and because the output-bias is necessary to 
generate economic resources to combat demographic change. These objections apply not only to 
the arguments for reduced work hours I consider in this chapter, but also to the proposal to reduce 
 
(at least in industrialized countries) is now somewhat lower than before the Industrial Revolution. However, 
longer life expectancies have not only increased retirement, they have also increased the number of years 
during which workers are employed. As a result, the effect of increased life expectancy and increased 
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back to the problem of how much free time individuals of different age groups enjoy in chapter 5. 
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expansions of workers’ free time. 
12 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, vol. Book, Whole (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959), 126–




work hours in general. I consider them here because they are particularly relevant in the context of 
discussions of economic growth. 
3.1 The Ecology Critique of the Output-Bias 
A frequently voiced critique of contemporary economies is that they are unsustainable.13 Some 
critics of the output-bias maintain that economic systems that mostly use productivity-increases to 
produce more consumer items are incompatible with a planet whose natural resources are finite.14 
According to Naomi Klein 
our economic system and our planetary system are now at war. Or, more accurately, our 
economy is at war with many forms of life on earth, including human life. What the climate 
needs to avoid collapse is a contraction in humanity’s use of resources; what our economic 
model demands to avoid collapse is unfettered expansion. Only one of these sets of rules 
can be changed, and it’s not the laws of nature.15 
Currently humans extract natural resources like fresh water, sand, timber, or oil at unsustainable 
levels and with potentially disastrous consequences for us and for other species. According to the 
Global Footprint Network, humans are depleting natural resources 1.6 times faster than they can 
be regenerated by ecosystems.16 In other words, we would need 1.6 earths to be able to continue 
resource-depletion and greenhouse gas emissions at the same rate than it currently occurs. To a 
large extent, these resources are extracted for the purpose of increasing the supply of consumer 
items. Something similar is true for current levels of greenhouse gas emissions, which – unless 
dramatically reduced – will cause catastrophic climate change.  
Adhering to an unsustainable economic system is morally objectionable for many reasons. For 
example, it harms the global poor – the group who has benefited least from past carbon emissions 
and who is most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, it might conflict with our duties 
towards future generations, and it harms other species.17 We might also have a duty to protect parts 
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15 Klein, This Changes Everything, 21. 
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of nature, such as the rainforest or the tundra, because their beauty makes them intrinsically 
valuable and therefore worth protecting – independently of whether they benefit sentient creatures. 
Critics motivated by these sustainability-concerns maintain that economic systems that are not 
output-biased are ones where everyone works less and where everyone – as a result of working less 
– produces and consumes less, so that less resource-depletion occurs. Recent studies lend some 
support to this hypothesis, suggesting that countries where people work less emit less greenhouse 
gases.18 According to one study, if European workers worked as long as workers in the United 
States, they would consume between 15 and 30 percent more energy.19 We can refer to this as the 
ecology critique of the output-bias.20 
However, considerations of sustainability and environmental protection provide much less support 
for reduced production and increased leisure than is often assumed. This is because there are many 
ways of combatting climate change, and increasing workers’ free time is not the most effective 
among them. While policies to reduce productive activity might be somewhat effective in 
protecting the environment, there are other policies that can achieve this goal much more 
effectively. To illustrate, states could disincentivise activities that involve pollution, waste-
production, and greenhouse gas emissions to a much greater extent than they currently do. Existing 
mechanisms, such as the ‘cap and trade’ system, that are set up to disincentivize emissions are 
effective in principle but have raised the costs of emitting greenhouse gases only to a very small 
extent. Carbon taxes would be more effective if they were pitched at a higher level and if fewer 
legal loopholes to avoid the paying of such taxes existed.21 Another example for a policy that would 
be highly effective at protecting the environment is the subsidising of renewable energies in 
combination with a prohibition to use fossil fuels to generate energy. Significant reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions could also be achieved by a prohibition of industrial animal farming. 
Policies like these are more effective at achieving ecological sustainability than reducing working 
time because we can expect that at least some workers would use expansions of their free time to 
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engage in activities that are harmful to the environment. For example, if workers have more free 
time, they might decide to use this free time to travel to distant countries – an activity that involves 
significant greenhouse gas emissions. Or they might spend their free time shopping and purchasing 
short-lived consumer items that are harmful to the environment. 
The above-cited positive correlation between working time and carbon emissions is contingent on 
several mediating variables and we can’t be certain that working time reductions will improve 
sustainability. To further illustrate the contingency of the relation between work hours and carbon 
emissions, consider two workers who work the same number of hours per week and earn the same 
income, but differ in their spending habits. One of them spends her disposable income on cinema, 
yoga classes, local concerts, and vegan restaurants, the other spends her income on short-lived 
fashion products, airplane travel, and meat dishes. These two persons might have carbon footprints 
of very different sizes although they work the same number of hours. 
If working time reductions are to improve sustainability, they must be accompanied with further 
regulation and incentives that make it attractive for workers to use their free time in ways that aren’t 
harmful to the environment, such as for example higher taxes on carbon emissions. This in turn 
raises the question of why we shouldn’t rely exclusively on these incentives in the first place. 
Given the urgency of the ecological crisis, policymakers should prioritise implementing measures 
that are known to be highly effective and that have the potential of curbing emissions within a 
short time span. Consider the problem of deforestation. One way of protecting forests might be 
to re-design economic institutions in ways that make everyone work less and as a result consume 
less – including fewer consumer items that are made of wood. This strategy might be somewhat 
effective but it is rather indirect in the sense that its success is contingent on several empirical 
premises, such as that people who work less consume fewer timber-products. An alternative 
strategy to avoid deforestation is to impose limits on how many trees per year can be logged and 
to impose sanctions on firms that don’t comply with these regulations. Such targeted measures 
reduce productive activity in those sectors of the economy that are particularly harmful to the 
environment but they don’t necessarily reduce overall productive activity. After all, sustainability 
might require growth in economic sectors that produce solar panels, bicycles, or railways. What’s 
more, policies that prohibit the logging of trees might be sufficient to combat deforestation. In 
other words, if policies to protect forests were sufficiently strict and if they were effectively 




This observation generalizes. If higher taxes on carbon emissions, a prohibition of fossil fuel power 
plants, etc were sufficient to avoid ecological catastrophe, then there would be no ecology-based 
reason for removing the output-bias. 
It is conceivable of course that all measures known to be most effective at protecting the 
environment taken together are not sufficient to avoid ecological catastrophe. Reducing everyone’s 
working time might then make some contribution to ecological sustainability above and beyond 
other measures. If this were true, there would be an ecology-based case for working time reduction 
to complement other measures of environmental protection. I don’t want to rule out that this might 
be the case and the urgency of the ecological crisis makes it important to figure out whether 
working time reduction might help achieve something that all of the more targeted policies taken 
together can’t achieve. All I want to show here is that the ecology-critique of the output-bias is 
significantly weaker than is often assumed in academic and in popular discourse. 
In some cases, moves towards more sustainability can actually lead to an increase in average working 
time. To understand why this might happen, consider the case of food production. One model of 
food production – let’s call it ‘industrial farming’ – is carried out by large corporations who produce 
food in a highly automated fashion on large monocultures or livestock farms, through extensive 
use of machinery, pesticides, fertilisers, antibiotics, etc. A competing model of food production 
that we can refer to as ‘organic farming’ is based on biodiversity and sustainability and is usually 
carried out by small-scale producers. It is widely held that organic farming is more sustainable than 
industrial farming and that moves towards the organic farming model are necessary to prevent 
further environmental destruction.22 Note however that organic production is much more labour-
intensive than industrial farming. More working time is needed to produce a certain amount of 
food through organic farming than through industrial farming because organic farming benefits 
less from economies of scale and because it relies less on automation. Making food production 
more sustainable might cause an increase of the total amount of work that is carried out in a society 
and therefore limits the prospects of working time reduction. Something similar is arguably true 
for other industries, where more sustainable modes of production would require more human 
labour. In a society that consumes less energy and less natural resources, some of the work that is 
now carried out by energy-consuming machines would have to be carried out by humans. As a 
result, average working time might increase instead of go down.23 
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In summary, the ecology-critique of the output-bias is inconclusive because the environment 
doesn’t always benefit from reductions of productive activity and because benefiting the 
environment can sometimes require increasing the share of human labour that goes into the 
productive process. The ecology critique of the output-bias is thus an example of the inconclusive 
consequentialist arguments to which I have referred in the introduction. I now turn to a more 
promising argument, according to which output-biased economies are objectionable because they 
promote human welfare to a lesser extent than economic systems that aren’t output-biased. 
3.2 The Welfare Critique of the Output-Bias 
A sophisticated version of a welfare-based objection to the output-bias is advanced by G.A. Cohen, 
according to whom 
The productive technology of advanced capitalism begets an unparalleled opportunity to 
lift the curse of Adam and liberating men from toil but the production relations of capitalist 
economic organization prevent the opportunity from being seized. The economic form 
most able to relieve toil is least disposed to do so.24 […] Because capitalism always favours 
expanding output, it will, for that reason and to that extent, be a detrimental economic 
system under certain conditions. […] American capitalism now functions detrimentally to 
human welfare in the stated respect.25 
Roughly, Cohen’s argument can be summarized as follows. 
Premise 1: Capitalist economies are highly productive and therefore create a potential for 
reduced working time but the dynamics of capitalist production prevent that potential 
from being realized. 
Premise 2: Humans would enjoy more welfare under alternative economic systems, such 
as democratic socialism, where everyone can work less, even if working less raises the 
price of consumer goods. 
Premise 3: A society where humans enjoy more welfare is preferable (other things equal) 
to one with less welfare. 
 
economic system that doesn’t exhibit the output-bias must necessarily be socialist and under socialism 
most work will no longer be tedious but rather pleasant. Therefore, we can both abandon the output-bias 
and expand leisure. Karl Marx’s Theory of History, 323. This solution isn’t convincing for several reasons. 
Importantly, Cohen argues neither for the assumption that the only conceivable economic system without 
output-bias is socialism nor does he argue for the assumption that work would be more pleasant under 
socialism than under capitalism. 
24 Gerald A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 306. 




Therefore, capitalism is objectionable because it promotes human welfare to a lesser 
extent than alternative economic systems.26 
We can refer to this as the welfare critique of the output-bias. Cohen maintains that Premise 1 is true 
because 
advances in productivity enable gains in either direction [more output or more leisure]27, 
typically at the expense of gains in the other direction. Now capitalism inherently tends to 
promote just one of the options, output expansion, since the other, toil reduction, threatens 
a sacrifice of the profit associated with increased output and sales and hence a loss of 
competitive strength.28 
This defence of his first premise is too brief and incomplete. Cohen claims that firms who use 
productivity-gains to increase output are more competitive than firms who use productivity-gains 
to reduce working time, but he offers no further argument to sustain this claim. Why exactly are 
firms that increase output more competitive than firms that reduce working time? After all, working 
time reductions reduce labour costs so that this might at least sometimes be profitable. Cohen 
doesn’t explain convincingly why capitalist economies normally favour expansions of output over 
expansions of free time. 
Something similar is true for the second premise of Cohen’s argument, which states that humans 
would enjoy more welfare in a society where everyone works less, even if consumer items become 
somewhat more expensive as a result. Cohen offers the following rationale to support this premise. 
Workers can be expected to benefit both from expansions of output and from expansions of 
leisure. Different workers prefer different work-leisure balances. Almost no one prefers to always 
expand output and never expand leisure. Recall that this is precisely what happened over the course 
of the past two centuries. Economic output has grown tremendously and working time has shrunk 
by only a very small extent. Even those who think of material wealth as more important than free 
time would perhaps agree that material wealth isn’t important enough to justify this extreme 
discrepancy. Economic systems that always expand output don’t cater to the interests of a large 
majority of workers who would like to see a more even mix between output and leisure. Cohen 
thinks it would be strange to assume that workers always favour cheaper consumer goods over 
expansions of free time. At least some of the time, workers would like to use productivity to reduce 
working time. This implies that the kind of work-leisure mix that we would find in a society without 
output-bias promotes human welfare to a greater extent than contemporary economic systems. 
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But Cohen offers little by way of argument to explain why exactly there is so much material 
production and consumption under capitalism despite the fact that this frustrates most people’s 
preferences. The most natural explanation for why people work as much as they work and consume 
as much as they consume is that this is what they prefer to do. After all, if there was demand for 
shorter work hours, we would expect capitalists to set up firms that cater to this demand by offering 
part-time employment. If Cohen’s assumption that workers would at least sometimes prefer to 
expand their free time is true, then why are there so few workers who choose part time work? 
Cohen’s analysis is incomplete because he offers no convincing answer to this question. 
Later in his career, Cohen walked away from many of his commitments in Karl Marx’ Theory of 
History and centred his critique of capitalism around other ideas such as that capitalism undermines 
solidarity and creates morally objectionable inequalities.29 But it would be premature to abandon 
his critique of the output-bias. As I will show, the gaps in his analysis can be filled out so that it 
becomes conclusive. My point of departure for a convincing welfare critique of the output-bias is 
the observation that the output-bias is caused by a collective action problem that prevents firms 
from reducing working time. If all firms in a market could coordinate their actions, they would 
sometimes use productivity-increases to expand workers’ free time. In the absence of a mechanism 
to facilitate coordination, firms must choose to use productivity-increases to expand output 
because they would otherwise face a competitive disadvantage. This explanation of the output-bias 
reconciles Cohen’s plausible intuition that workers sometimes prefer working time reductions over 
increased material production with the observation that working time reductions occur so rarely. 
3.3 The Rat Race Critique of the Output-Bias 
In order to illustrate the claim that the output-bias is caused by a collective action problem, consider 
the following example. 
Bakery: A new oven enables a bakery to bake twice as effectively as before. The new oven 
is also available to other bakeries that compete in the same market. The bakeries can now 
choose between: 
a) Increased output: Baking twice as much bread, while keeping stable average working 
time per worker. 
 
29 In a remarkable passage towards the end of his book Cohen states that “More recently, […] I have 
come to wonder whether the theory which the book defends is true (though not whether, as I claimed, it 
was affirmed by Karl Marx). I do not now believe that historical materialism is false, but I am not sure 




b) Reduced working time: Halving each employees’ working time, while keeping bread 
production stable. 
Firms can also realize combinations of a) and b), and in the real world the output-bias manifests 
itself as a combination of a) and b) whereby the share of a) is much larger than the share of b). For 
the sake of simplicity, I focus on a binary choice between more output and more leisure. At the 
moment I also put to one side other possible courses of action, such as dismissing half of the 
workforce while keeping stable average working time per worker. I will get to this and other 
complications in a moment. 
Let’s begin by noting that a) is an attractive choice because there are several ways in which 
increasing output can enhance the bakery’s competitiveness. First, increasing output directly 
reduces the unit costs of each loaf of bread so that the bakery will be able to offer its bread at a 
cheaper price.30 Second, economies of scale may lead to an indirect reduction of unit costs. An 
example of this would be synergies that result from larger production, such as the possibility to 
make cheaper bulk orders for wheat and yeast or to improve the division of labour in the baking 
process. Third, an increase in production can enhance the bakery’s competitiveness by increasing 
its market power and thereby its ability to influence prices. Economic models of perfect 
competition assume a large number of firms that are each small enough to not be able to influence 
prices. If firms systematically favour the strategy of increased output over the strategy of increased 
leisure, a process of growth and consolidation can be expected to take place. Firms that produce 
more output normally increase their market-share and this involves replacing smaller, less 
competitive firms. The result of such a process can be an oligopsony, i.e., an economy with 
relatively few firms that each have substantial market power. 
In fact, most contemporary economies are characterised by a trend towards corporate 
consolidation and one reason for this trend is the capacity of large firms to exert market power and 
influence prices31. An example for this is the beer brewing industry, where Anheuser-Busch InBev 
 
30 One might object to this assumption by pointing out that new technology doesn’t always reduce unit 
costs. If the cost of maintaining the oven were very high, production costs could be driven up by the new 
technology instead of making it cheaper. For example, we could imagine that the new oven is incredibly 
energy consuming and that electricity is very expensive. In reply to this objection we can maintain that 
engineers and other developers of new technology have little incentive to invent machines or other 
products that would drive up production costs. Presumably demand for machines that would make 
production costlier is very low. Therefore, it is likely that our bakery will be able to produce bread at a 
lower price if it chooses to use the oven as a means of expanding bread production. 
31 David Autor et al., ‘The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms’ (Working Paper, 
2019); Keith Cowling and Philip R. Tomlinson, Monopoly Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 




controls around 60% of the world market profit.32 This dominant position is the result of a series 
of acquisitions and mergers that are partly motivated by the prospect of gaining market power and 
partly by the competitive advantage that results from economies of scale. In extreme cases, so 
called winner-takes-it-all markets offer a very high premium on becoming the biggest player. 
To be sure, the fact that firms have some reason to expand output is not enough to establish the 
conclusion that these reasons normally outweigh reasons to adopt the alternative strategy of 
expanding workers’ free time. After all, working time reductions might be a way of reducing labour 
costs that go into the process of production. Sometimes the expected benefit of using new 
technology as a means of saving labour costs can be higher than the expected benefit of using 
technology as a means of expanding output. Especially when production is very labour intensive 
and when labour costs are high, firms have incentives to reduce production costs through working 
time reduction. In cases where the gains from reduced labour costs exceed the gains from increased 
output, firms will opt for working time reductions. Imagine for example a traditional vegetable 
farm where most sewing, cultivating, and harvesting is done by humans. If a tractor became 
available to this farm, it might be rational for the farm owner to use the tractor to reduce labour 
costs, rather than using it to produce more vegetables.  
One reason why we nevertheless observe so much material production and so little working time 
reduction might be that cases where working time reductions are more profitable than expansions 
of output are very rare. Perhaps the gains associated with expansions of output are so significant 
that they usually outweigh the benefits associated with reduced working time. In sectors of the 
economy that offer big premiums on firm-size and market share, this explanation has considerable 
force.33 
But there is another explanation for why we don’t observe significant working time reductions over 
time. This explanation has to do with the fact that firms can reduce the amount of labour that goes 
into the production process in two ways. They can either reduce each employees’ working time or 
they can fire some employees while leaving constant the working time of those who remain 
employed. For privately-owned firms, the latter option of dismissing a part of the workforce will 
often be more attractive. This is because dismissing some workers is normally cheaper than 
maintaining a larger number of part-time workers because each individual worker creates certain 
 
32 Jeff Spross, ‘What Beer Reveals about Monopoly Power’, The Week, 2017, 
https://www.theweek.com/articles/736059/what-beer-reveals-about-monopoly-power. 
33 Jonathan Tepper and Denise Hearn, The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death of Competition 




fixed costs such as social security expenses, office equipment, etc.34 What’s more, firms can’t pass 
all these costs onto employees because regulation such as minimum wage laws often make this 
impossible. The fact that a significant part of workers in industrialized countries are overemployed, 
i.e., that they would like to work fewer hours but don’t find jobs that offer these conditions, 
suggests that firms find it very difficult to offer one and the same job with different working time 
arrangements.35 This means that in cases where firms want to reduce the costs of labour, they’ll 
often find dismissals more attractive than working time reductions. The upshot of this is that, firms 
have incentives to prefer dismissals and expansions of output over expansions of workers’ free 
time because this generates a competitive advantage vis-à-vis those firms who decide to expand 
workers’ free time.  
With this in mind, we can now formalize the choice between output and free time as a game 
theoretical problem involving two players (firm A and firm B). 
 
 
When both firms decide to expand output (top left), their competitive standing relative to each 
other remains the same. We can assign values of 0 to each firm in this scenario because from the 
perspective of competitiveness, the choice to expand output is neither beneficial nor harmful to 
each firm. In cases where one firm decides to increase output while the other firm decides to reduce 
working time (bottom left and top right), the former of will gain a competitive advantage and the 
latter will consequently face a competitive disadvantage. Therefore, we can assign values of 1 and 
-1 to the respective outcomes. Lastly, if both firms jointly decide to reduce working time, their 
competitive standing relative to each other again remains unchanged, so that we can assign values 
of 0 to each firm in this scenario. This makes it individually rational for each firm to increase output 
but neither firm gains a competitive advantage if both firms choose to increase output. When firms 
 
34 Lonnie Golden, ‘Part-Time Workers Pay a Big-Time Penalty’ (Economic Policy Institute, 2020), 
https://files.epi.org/pdf/179038.pdf; Daniel Aaronson and Eric French, ‘The Effect of Part‐Time Work 
on Wages: Evidence from the Social Security Rules’, Journal of Labor Economics 22, no. 2 (2004): 329–252. 
35 Golden and Gebreselassie, ‘Overemployment Mismatches: The Preference for Fewer Work Hours’. 
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are unable to coordinate their actions, they will choose to expand output in order to avoid the 
disadvantageous situation depicted in the bottom left and top right box of the matrix. 
For the firms’ employees, the most likely outcome (increased output) is suboptimal in the sense 
that all workers could enjoy more leisure if they could coordinate to reduce working time. At least 
sometimes, workers prefer expansions of free time over expansions of output but in the absence 
of a means of coordination, this option is not available. We can refer to this dynamic as the output 
rat race between firms. 
Note that this rat race occurs independently of whether or not there is a conflict of interest between 
the employees and the owners of a firm. One might think that the reason why firms often decide 
to increase output rather than reduce working time is that firm owners are primarily concerned 
with their firm’s profitability and are indifferent to employees’ welfare. This would suggest that the 
output rat race arises only in contexts where firms are owned privately and where workers can’t 
bring their work-leisure preferences to bear on the firm’s decision-making. From this perspective, 
the root of the problem is not a collective action problem but an ownership structure that prevents 
workers from expressing their preferences. Cohen defends this view, arguing that the output-bias 
wouldn’t arise under economic systems where firms are owned collectively. Here I disagree with 
Cohen. 
In order to assess whether it is true that the rat race between firms is caused by private ownership, 
assume for a moment that the bakeries from our example operate in a world where all firms are 
worker-owned cooperatives. Assume moreover that some cooperatives use their new ovens to 
expand workers’ free time and other cooperatives use the oven to expand output. Finally, assume 
that as a result of this choice, those cooperatives that expand output gain a competitive advantage. 
In the long run, the output-oriented cooperatives will drive the free-time-oriented cooperatives to 
extinction because they’re able to offer their product at a cheaper price. Just like in a world of 
privately-owned firms, this makes it individually rational for each cooperative to expand output 
because expanding leisure bears the risk of bankruptcy (which we can assume to be much worse 
for workers than a deviation from their preferred work-leisure balance). The upshot of this is that 
the output rat race is likely to occur not only when firms are owned privately but also under market 
socialism, where firms are owned collectively.  
To be sure, private ownership of firms can exacerbate the rat race when it prevents workers from 
realizing their preferences even in cases where expansions of output only lead to marginal increases 
in profitability. Capitalists whose aim it is to maximize profit will prefer increased output when it 




welfare. Worker cooperatives in contrast would opt for expansions of free-time in cases where this 
doesn’t threaten competitiveness because it leads to only a small increase in profitability.36  
Before I conclude my explanation of the output rat race, it bears pointing out that the 
competitiveness-gain that firms derive from expanding output is largely independent from the 
elasticity of demand for the firm’s product. Demand is highly elastic when consumers buy much 
more of a product when the price of the product goes down. Nonessential goods such as 
electronics, or dining out are examples of goods with highly elastic demand. Demand is very 
inelastic when consumers don’t buy more of a product, or only very little, when the price of the 
product goes down. Examples of goods with high inelastic demand are consumer staples such as 
tap water or salt. One might think that expanding output increases competitiveness only if demand 
for the product in question is highly elastic. As a result, the rat race will occur only in contexts 
where demand for the product in question is highly elastic. If this were true, it would diminish the 
scope of the rat race explanation for the output-bias. However, as I will now explain, firms have 
incentives to expand output independently of whether or not demand for their product is elastic. 
Coming back to our bakery example, imagine for a moment that aggregate demand for the bakery’s 
bread is rather inelastic. This means that consumers will not buy more bread when the bakery offers 
it at a cheaper price. At first sight, this seems to entail that producing more bread at a cheaper price 
is not attractive for the bakery because there are no or only few consumers who will buy the surplus 
bread. But let’s analyse more closely what happens when one bakery expands output and the other 
reduces working time. The bakery who expands output will be able to offer its bread at a cheaper 
price. In reaction to this, consumers will stop buying the more expensive bread offered by the 
‘reduce-work-hours-bakery’ and instead buy the cheaper bread offered by the ‘expand-output-
bakery’. In other words, the bakery that expands output increases its market share. Consumers 
don’t buy more bread overall but they buy a larger share from the ‘expand-output-bakery’. The 
prospect of selling more bread through an expansion of its market-share makes it rational for each 
firm to expand output. 
Contrast this with a scenario where demand is elastic. This means that as a result of cheaper prices 
aggregate demand will increase. In this scenario it is more straightforwardly rational for each firm 
to expand output because firms can sell more, even if they don’t expand their market-share. In 
 
36 Cohen is right to assume that private ownership makes it more likely that firms that want to reduce labour 
costs choose dismissals over working time reductions. As I explained previously, dismissals normally reduce 
labour costs more than working time reductions, so that profit-maximising capitalists prefer the former over 
the latter. Worker cooperatives prefer reducing everyone’s working time over dismissing some workers in 




summary, the choice to expand output is attractive independently of whether demand is or elastic 
or not. 
The output rat race between firms, like the rat race between workers that I discussed in the previous 
chapter, gives rise to a complaint on the side of those who participate in it. Many workers would 
prefer to have their working time reduced but they are unable to coordinate their efforts in ways 
that would bring this goal about. In the absence of a regulatory mechanism, the collective action 
problem locks them in a rat race toward ever increased production. This is significant because it 
means that regulatory intervention could improve workers’ welfare. In many cases, regulation can 
make workers of competing firms better off because it facilitates access to the otherwise unavailable 
option of reduced working time. 
Assume now that an outside agent, say the state, could enact a policy that helps the workers 
coordinate their conduct but refuses to do so and fails to provide goods reasons for its refusal. In 
this case, workers can mount a complaint against the state. Its refusal to act leaves them worse off 
than they could otherwise be for no good reason. 
To clarify the nature of this complaint, consider the structurally similar collective action problem 
around tax competition between countries. Nowadays, states must choose their preferred tax 
regime against a background of mobile capital. Wealthy individuals and international corporations 
can often pick and choose where to shift their capital and where to pay taxes. This makes it 
individually rational for each state to attract foreign capital by offering low taxes or other attractive 
conditions, such as strong bank secrecy laws. However, this strategy ceases to be beneficial if it is 
pursued by many states. A race to the bottom around lower taxes can result in a situation where 
no state achieves its goal of attracting a disproportionately large share of foreign capital but each 
state suffers a loss from having eroded its tax base at home.37 Citizens who suffer from these effects 
can mount a complaint against a situation where they could be better off if a mechanism to 
coordinate the actions of states was in place so that a race to the bottom can be avoided. 
Something similar is true for the output rat race. It leads to a situation where the gains of 
productivity are one-sidedly turned into increased output so that workers find it difficult to access 
more leisurely lifestyles. Workers have a complaint against situations where states can facilitate 
mechanisms of coordination that help firms overcome the rat race but fail to do so for no good 
reason. 
 





Another reason why the rat race explanation of the output-bias is significant is that it shows why 
an objection against regulating rat races between individual workers fails. In the previous chapter I 
explained how collective action problems between workers can lead to morally objectionable 
outcomes where workers work more than they would in the absence of these collective action 
problems. Some are sceptical about this argument for working time regulation because, as I explain 
in section 2.6, it is conceivable that the market would solve these collective action problems 
between workers if workers really had preferences for reduced work hours. If there is demand for 
part-time employment, then one might expect that firms would cater to this demand by offering 
jobs that involve fewer work hours. The fact that we observe so little part-time employment might 
mean that workers prefer not to take up opportunities for reduced working time when firms offer 
such opportunities. However, as I have shown in this chapter, rat races occur not only between 
workers but also between firms. This means that the market by itself can’t provide a solution to rat 
races between workers. Objections against working-time regulation according to which such 
regulation is unnecessary because markets generate sufficient opportunities for part-time 
employment fail because they overlook the rat race between firms. 
3.4 Consumer Interests 
One might object to this that there is in fact a good reason for states not to regulate the output rat 
race. In justifying their refusal to intervene, states can appeal to the interests of consumers who 
benefit from the rat race because expansions of output reduce the price of consumer items. 
Consumers benefit when firms use novel technology to produce more goods because increased 
production, in combination with market competition, results in lower prices of consumer items. 
Solving the rat race through working time regulation benefits workers but it might harm consumers, 
so that we’re unsure whether solving the rat race is desirable or not. I have already discussed a very 
similar objection in section 2.4 but it is worth getting back to some of the concerns about consumer 
interests as they arise in the context of the rat race between firms. 
In response to this objection, we must first note that the extent to which consumers benefit from 
increased material production depends on the level of wealth of a given society. For a poor society, 
an increase in economic output leads to a significant increase in citizens’ life-satisfaction and for a 
society that is already quite rich, the same increase in economic output leads to only a marginal 




further increases in well-being through increases in material production.38 One might say that 
material production has diminishing returns on well-being. 
Regulating the output rat race in very poor countries might be impermissible because citizens of 
these countries stand to benefit a great deal from lower prices. This is not to say that citizens of 
poorer countries wouldn’t also benefit from expansions of free time. It is estimated for example 
that collectively women around the world spend a total of 40 billion hours collecting water each 
year, which is “equivalent to all the hours worked in a year by the entire workforce in France.”39 
For women who spend several hours each day collecting water, additional free time might be more 
valuable than cheaper consumer products. But it is at least conceivable that the welfare gains 
associated with cheaper consumer items sometimes outweigh the welfare gains associated with 
expansions of free time in poor countries. This would be true in cases where someone can’t meet 
her basic needs because she can’t afford to purchase essential products like food or clothes unless 
prices of these products go down. 
The welfare of citizens of wealthy countries, in contrast, increases only marginally when material 
production increases. In some cases, the output rat race can even be harmful to consumers. 
Consider the phenomenon of planned obsolescence. In order to be able to expand output, many 
firms limit the durability of their products, so that consumers must soon dispose of them and 
replace them with new products. Planned obsolescence occurs in almost all sectors of the economy. 
Products as different as smartphones, cars, and furniture are often designed to have a deliberately 
limited lifetime, after which consumers must dispose of them. Demand for these products is often 
rather inelastic, so that consumers replace them as soon as they break down. According to studies 
of the European Parliament and the European Commission, planned obsolescence severely 
reduces the welfare of citizens of all European countries.40 This is especially true for low-income 
households because “The more dependant agents are on the product for their income, the more 
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likely it is that they will benefit from an extension of the product’s lifespan.”41 The output rat race 
incentivize as firms to use planned obsolescence to increase the number of goods they can sell. If 
it is true that the output rat race causes planned obsolescence, then it follows that the output rat 
race doesn’t always benefit consumers– it often sets back their interests. 
Another way in which the output rat race sets back consumers’ interests is through negative 
externalities that are caused by excessive working time. Overwork impacts workers’ health and 
stress-related sick leave poses a significant burden for the economies of industrialized countries.42 
In Germany for example, job strain is estimated to create an economic cost of 30.8 billion Euros 
each year.43 The main reason why many employers nevertheless demand excessive work hours of 
their employees is that the costs associated with treating burnout and other stress-related diseases 
can be ‘externalised’ in the sense that these costs are covered by taxpayer-funded healthcare 
systems. The possibility of externalising the costs of overwork, in combination with the possibility 
of hiring fresh staff from the ‘reserve army of the unemployed’ can make it rational for firm owners 
to treat employees as disposable capital that can be replaced when it has been used in an 
unsustainable fashion. 
The upshot of these considerations is that the output-bias does not necessarily benefit consumers. 
This is important because it shows that the output-biased can’t be defended on the grounds that it 
reduces the prices of consumer goods. Noticing this strengthens the welfare objection against the 
output-bias. Yet we must be cautious not to dismiss the effect of the rat race on consumer prices 
entirely. Output rat races between firms might sometimes be morally permissible when they occur in 
contexts where citizens’ interest in accessible consumer items outweighs workers’ interest in free 
time. The case against the output-bias is much stronger in affluent countries where we can expect 
consumers’ interest in cheaper goods to be outweighed by other considerations, such as workers’ 
interests in free time or consumers’ interests in durable products. 
3.5 Demographic Change 
Finally, one might object to what I have said so far by explaining that the rat race is morally 
justifiable because it helps states discharge other duties of justice. Importantly, states must find 
adequate responses to the challenge of demographic change, which involves a growing number of 
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old people, who no longer participate in the productive process, must be provided with the 
necessities of life and with a fair share of society’s resources. As the populations of industrialized 
countries grow older, the same number of workers must cater to the needs of a larger number of 
retirees. It might seem that further expansions of economic output are needed to countervail the 
pressure that demographic change exerts on the welfare state. If states issue legislation to eliminate 
the output rat race, there will be fewer goods and services available for redistribution to the old 
than would otherwise be available. This means that while eliminating the output rat race would be 
beneficial to middle-aged workers, it would be harmful to the retired who have an interest in 
expansions of output.44 
Note that this is not only an objection against the rat race critique of the output-bias but also against 
other arguments in favour of working time reduction. The worry that shorter work hours will harm 
the old also casts doubt on the arguments presented in other chapters of this dissertation. I reply 
to it here because concerns about the costs of demographic change are voiced especially often in 
the context of discussions of economic growth. But my remarks should be read to apply more 
widely. 
In reply to the demographic change objection we can point out that the interests of retirees aren’t 
only set back by reductions in the amount of goods and services that are available to them but also 
by reductions in the amount of time that workers can spend with their elderly relatives and friends. 
According to the United States’ National Poll on Healthy Aging, 1 out of 3 retirees reports a lack 
of companionship.45 This is significant because loneliness and social isolation are among the most 
significant threats to the health and wellbeing of elderly persons.46 One straightforward way of 
addressing the so called ‘loneliness epidemic’ amongst the elderly is to expand workers’ free time. 
To be sure, there is no guarantee that all or even most workers will use their additional free time 
to provide company to their elderly relatives and friends. But something similar is true for the 
expansion of output. Many retirees would likely benefit from increased output but in the absence 
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of further regulation and incentives, there is no guarantee that the gains of increased output end 
up in the hands of retirees. In any case, we can expect that increasing workers’ free of time will 
cause some workers to dedicate more time to elderly relatives or friends so that this move would 
at least provide some benefit to this group. 
It also bears emphasizing that demographic change is not a natural or unavoidable phenomenon 
that industrialized countries must deal with – whatever else they do. The ageing of the populations 
of industrialized countries only occurs against the backdrop of a policy of closed borders that 
prevents younger persons from other countries from entering industrialized countries. If the 
conditions to enter industrialized countries were less strict, more young people would enter these 
countries and thereby countervail the effect of demographic change.47 
Lastly, we must note that over the course of a whole life, everyone, including those who are now 
old, benefit from working time reduction. Most of those who receive pensions when they are old 
have previously been workers themselves, and at this earlier time of their life they would have 
benefitted from expansions of their free time. Those elderly who enjoyed the benefits of reduced 
working time when they were middle-aged can’t reasonably ask the younger generation to work 
more, for them to enjoy a higher standard of living. We might say that enjoying free time at one 
stage of our life compensates us for some (though not all) hardships that we encounter at later 
stages of our life. We shouldn’t look at retirees and workers as two separate groups who compete 
for society’s resources but as one group that lives through different life-stages over the course of 
time. Adopting this perspective is not sufficient to address the objection from demographic change 
but it weakens its force. I will get back to the question of how much access to free time individuals 
should have at different stages of their lives in chapter 5. 
Taken together, the insights on loneliness, replacement migration, and fairness between age groups 
suffice to address the demographic change objection. Retirees who live in societies without output-
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4. Breadwinners and Homemakers 
In the previous chapter I have shown how collective action problems between firms preclude 
opportunities for reduced working time and explained that this is concerning because it reduces 
workers’ welfare in objectionable ways. Thus far my focus has been on work that is carried out 
inside formal labour markets, where workers and firms compete and experience problems of 
collective action. This chapter broadens the scope of my analysis to include work that is carried 
out outside formal labour markets. More specifically, I engage with the question of how paid work, 
housework, and care work is shared among men and women and discuss the morality of traditional 
breadwinner-homemaker arrangements 
4.1 Setting the Stage 
Let me begin by explaining what such traditional arrangements are and why one might be 
concerned about them. On average, women work more than men.1 When we sum up time spent 
on paid work, care work and household work, we find that women across the world spend 
significantly more time working than men. What’s more, men dedicate many more hours to paid 
labour than women. In particular, more men than women work in full-time occupations, while 
women represent a larger share of part-time employees.2 The flipside of men engaging more often 
in full time paid work is the fact that women specialise more often in care and housework.3 We can 
refer to this as the gendered division of labour. To a significant extent, the gendered division of labour 
is caused by entrenched social norms and patriarchal institutions that stigmatise deviations from 
‘traditional’ lifestyles and make it more costly for women than for men to choose long work hours 
arrangements.4 Vice versa, men often find it costly to reduce the time they spend on paid 
employment. On the one hand this is because full-time employment normally offers superior pay 
and better working conditions than part-time employment and on the other because social norms 
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that ascribe to men the role of ‘breadwinners’ stigmatize housework and parenting. I will elaborate 
on the causes and the effects of the gendered division of labour in the next section. 
The gendered division of labour is especially disadvantageous for women. Part-time workers earn 
lower hourly wages, are less likely to get tenure, are less likely to be promoted, receive fewer 
bonuses and are generally less likely to occupy influential positions in the labour market. Recent 
research suggests that the gender pay gap – the fact that women often have lower wages than men 
– is largely caused by this part-time pay penalty.5 
As a result, both men and women are restricted in their ability to choose divisions of labour that 
involve an equal-split of paid and unpaid work between partners.6 By ‘restricted’ I don’t mean that 
it is impossible for couples to split paid and unpaid work equally but that the financial and social 
costs of choosing an equal-split-lifestyle are higher than the costs of choosing a ‘traditional’ division 
of labour. Note that while obstacles to accessing the option of an equal-split of paid and unpaid 
work between partners are harmful to both women and men, they are disproportionately harmful 
to women, so that the gendered division of labour remains a distinctly feminist concern or, as Gina 
Schouten puts it, “the linchpin of gender injustice”.7 
I will refer to traditional divisions of labour, whereby men dedicate more time to work in the labour 
market and women dedicate more time to care- and housework, as specialization. And I will refer to 
arrangements, whereby couples divide the tasks of paid work and unpaid work in an equal fashion 
as equal-split. It bears emphasizing that there are two ways of understanding the idea of an equal-split 
of paid and unpaid work between men and women. Equal-split can be interpreted to apply to 
individuals, so that each person engages in some paid work and in some care- and housework. This 
is the sense in which I will use the term equal-split in this chapter. It can also be interpreted in an 
aggregate way, as a statistical average. On this understanding, equal-split is compatible with the idea 
that some or even all couples specialise but it requires that roughly the same number of men and 
women specialise in paid work and roughly the same number of men and women specialise in 
unpaid work. We can imagine a society where everyone specializes but work is split equally on 
aggregate, so that around 50 per cent of men work as homemakers and around 50 per cent of 
 
5 Claudia Goldin. Hours Flexibility and the Gender Gap in Pay. Centre for American Progress. 2015. Kristi 
Olson, The Solidarity Solution: Principles for a Fair Income Distribution (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2020) Ch. 8. To be sure, the gender pay gap also has other causes, such as sexist discrimination by 
employers. However, according to Goldin, sexist discrimination is not the main cause of the gender pay 
gap. 
6 Here, I use the term ‘gender-egalitarian’ in a narrow sense: I use it to describe arrangements between 
couples who divide the tasks of paid work, care work and housework equally between each other, so that 
both engage in some amount of paid work and in some amount of care- and housework. 




women work as breadwinners. In other words, couples specialise but a person’s gender can’t predict 
whether she’s more likely to specialize in a particular way. 
My main concern in this chapter is not with specialization per se but with specialization along 
traditional gender lines, i.e., arrangements where men mainly work as breadwinners and women 
mainly work as homemakers. I will use the term specialization to refer to this latter, ‘traditional’ 
division of labour. Arrangements where couples divide the tasks of paid employment and unpaid 
work against the grain of established social norms are less concerning because they don’t perpetuate 
patriarchal norms and I therefore dedicate much less discussion to this kind of specialization.8 
My aim in this chapter is to explain that it is unjust that in contemporary societies the lifestyle of 
equal-split is more costly to access than the lifestyle of specialization. Beyond that, I defend the idea 
that increasing the availability and the quality of part-time work are necessary (though not 
sufficient) to overcome the gendered division of labour. My argument proceeds as follows: Section 
4.2 describes the extent of inequality in working time between genders in industrialized countries 
and explains how this unequal working time distribution carries with it an unequal distribution of 
benefits that are exclusively obtainable through long work hours in the labour market. Section 4.3 
assesses several unsatisfactory ways of objecting to the gendered division of labour and Section 4.4 
presents a successful account of what is morally objectionable about this division of labour. Section 
4.5 answer is an objection that this account faces and section 4.6 argues that established sets of 
policies that aim at removing patriarchal social norms that give rise to the gendered division of 
labour – in order to be more successful – ought to include policies of working time reduction and 
subsidies for part-time employment. 
Apart from the gendered division of labour, there are other work-related gender-inequalities such 
as the sectoral division of the economy into male-dominated and female-dominated sectors. 
Important though they are, I will set discussion of these other inequalities to one side in this 
chapter. 
 
8 Another reason why I don’t say much more about the difference between the individualised and the 
aggregate understanding is that many of the strategies and policies that can be employed to achieve either 
individual or aggregate equal-split are very similar. Both, the decision to share paid and unpaid work 
equally between partners and the decision to specialise against the grain of tradition are stigmatised by 
patriarchal norms and both kinds of decisions – if taken by a large number of individuals – have the effect 
of eroding these social norms. Therefore, policies that encourage and subsidise individual equal-split also 
help those who seek to specialise against the grain of social norms. Vice versa, policies that encourage 




4.2 The Extent of Gender Inequality in Working Time 
According to a report of the European Parliament, 
Women are more likely than men to work part-time across all Member States. In the EU28 
in 2012, although women represented 46% of those employed, they accounted for a 
massive 76% of all part-time workers and conversely only 38% of all full-time workers.”9  
Women spend fewer hours on paid work than men and more often work in part-time occupations. 
In addition to that, the share of employed women (as opposed to those who do not engage in paid 
work at all) is significantly smaller than the share of employed men. The same report finds that the 
share of employed women in the EU28 lay at 64% in 2014, while the share of employed men lay 
at 75%.10 The gender inequality in time devoted to paid work doesn’t stop here: Men also devote 
more years of their life to paid work than women. On average, men spend 37.4 years of their life 
on paid work, while women do so only during 29 years of their life. 11 What makes this fact even 
more remarkable is that men have lower life expectancies than women, which means that in 
proportion to an individual’s lifetime, this inequality is even greater. Lastly, men are much more 
likely to work long hours in the labour market, defined as work hours in excess of 48 hours per 
week.12 For the purpose of this chapter, this latter fact is of special importance because as I will 
explain later, commitment to long work hours is often necessary for being promoted and climbing 
the career ladder. The highest positions both in the private and the public sector almost always 
require full-time or more than full-time commitment. 
The flipside of the underrepresentation of women in paid employment is a larger commitment to 
household and care work. 13 In the UK, women engage in 26 hours of unpaid work per week while 
men do so only during 16 hours per week.14 This finding generalizes: “Everywhere, women devote 
1 to 3 hours more a day to housework than men; 2 to 10 times the amount of time a day to care 
 
9 Davaki, Konstantina. (2016). Differences in Men’s and Women’s Work, Care and Leisure Time. A Study for the 
Directorate General for Internal Policies, Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 
Gender Equality, European Parliament, Brussels, page 17. Compare also: J. Evans, D. Lippoldt, and 
Marianna P., „Trends in Working Hours in OECD Countries“, 2001, p. 12 
10 Davaki op. cit, p.15 
11 See for example Davaki op. cit, p.16. 
12 In his book A Time for Every Purpose, Todd D. Rakoff (2002, 76) explains that: “Of men in their middle 
years (aged 25–54) in non-agricultural employment, 22.2 percent worked 49 or more hours per week in 
1976; by 1993, 29.2 percent did. The comparable figures for women are 5.7 percent and 12.0 percent.” 
13 The degree to which men participate in unpaid work strongly correlates with a country’s wealth. This 
means that women in poor countries face a larger share of unpaid work than their counterparts in rich 
countries. See: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The world’s women 2015, Sixth 
edition (New York: United Nations, 2015), 89, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/988086142. 





(of children, elderly, and the sick), and 1 to 4 hours less a day to market activities.”15 What’s more, 
women don’t spend more time only on care- and housework, but they also devote more mental 
and emotional energy to the management and functioning of households.16 
It is important to note that the unequal division of working time between genders mostly occurs 
between mothers and fathers, not so much between childless couples.17 Childless couples often 
find it easier to achieve a more equal distribution of paid employment, housework and care work. 
“Caretakers at every income level have fewer options than non-caretakers at the same income 
level”18 This also gets reflected in the amount of free-time available to parents and childless couples. 
“Parenthood generally imposes more time pressure on mothers than fathers […] having children 
costs women almost 7 hours compared to under 4 for men.”19 Importantly, when we look at the 
total amount of work carried out by any individual (that is paid employment and care and 
housework combined) we find that women work significantly more than men. This is often referred 
to as a ‘double shift’ that is disproportionately often taken up by women.20 
To a significant extent, these inequalities in working time between genders are explained by what 
Susan Moller Okin calls the “gender system”: A set of patriarchal norms, traditions and institutions 
that present the gendered division of labour as natural and desirable and nudge women into the 
role of housekeepers and caretakers.21 Another reason why parents often decide against equal-split 
arrangements is that given currently existing economic institutions, it is more efficient to choose a 
specialised division of labour. This means that parents who opt for specialization will often be 
economically better off than those who share the tasks of parenting and paid employment. 
Note that the fact that specialization is often more efficient than equal-split doesn’t explain why it is 
mostly men who specialise in paid employment and women who specialise in care and housework. 
Again, part of the reason why we still observe a division of labour along these gender lines is that 
 
15 World Bank, Hrsg., Gender Equality and Development, World Development Report, [34.]2012 (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2011), 80. 
16 Schouten, Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor, 33; Kristin Wong, ‘There’s a Stress Gap 
Between Men and Women. Here’s Why It’s Important.’, New York Times, 14 November 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/smarter-living/stress-gap-women-men.html. 
17 Claudia Dale Goldin, Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women, NBER Series 
on Long-Term Factors in Economic Development (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992). 
Kleven, Henrik, Camille Landais, and Jakob Egholt Søgaard. 2018. “Children and Gender Inequality: 
Evidence from Denmark.” Working Paper 24219. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://0-doi-
org.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/10.3386/w24219. 
18 Anne Alstott, No Exit: What Parents Owe Their Children and What Society Owes Parents (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 97. 
19 Alstott, 97. 
20 See for example Mark Smith, Women, Men and Working Conditions in Europe, 5th European Working 
Conditions Survey (Luxembourg: Publ. Off. of the Europ. Union, 2013), p.9. 




social norms stigmatise couples who divide labour against the grain of these norms. But there are 
other reasons. For example, women normally have to interrupt paid work during the first couple 
of months after giving birth and this can introduce a path dependency. Couples often find it 
convenient to stick with the division of labour that is initially introduced by the biological fact that 
it is women who give birth and who breastfeed. After some time, this division of labour is difficult 
to give up because women’s ability to access attractive jobs is reduced after having spent some 
months outside the labour market.22 
There are two further ways in which the gendered division of labour is disadvantageous for women. 
First, part-time work arrangements are inferior to full-time work in several respects. Hourly wages 
are lower for those who work few hours, training is less often granted to part-time workers, and 
the probability of securing permanent work contracts is much lower for part-time workers.23 Part-
time workers experience much less wage progression over the years than fulltime workers and 
many social security benefits are attainable only through full-time employment. As a consequence, 
women are less economically independent, earn lower wages and have less employment stability 
than men.24  
Second, positions of high political and economic influence are almost exclusively obtainable 
through full-time or more than full-time work. Women confronted with the challenge of combining 
paid and unpaid work are often less capable of using long work hours as a means of advancing 
their careers. This contributes to an extremely unequal distribution of power and influential 
positions: In the United Kingdom, “97 per cent of the top 100 FTSE organisations have male 
“chairmen”, two thirds of UK Members of Parliament are men and only one out of 12 judges at 
the Supreme Court is a woman.25 In spite of large differences between countries, this pattern 
generalizes: Men are much more likely than women to occupy supervisory positions in all European 
countries.26 
When couples who divide labour along gender lines split up, these disadvantages often persist.27 
 
22 Kathleen Gerson, The Unfinished Revolution: How a New Generation Is Reshaping Family, Work, and Gender in 
America (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
23 Evans, Lippoldt, and Marianna op cit. p. 13. 
24 Mark Smith, Women, Men and Working Conditions in Europe, Bd. 13/49, 5th European Working Conditions 
Survey (Luxembourg: Publ. Off. of the Europ. Union, 2013), p 10; Davaki op. cit, p.19 
25 LSE Commission on Gender, Inequality and Power. „Confronting Gender Inequality”, 2015, 13, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/gender/research/Gender-Inequality-and-Power-Commission. 
26 Mark Smith, Women, Men and Working Conditions in Europe, Bd. 13/49, 5th European Working Conditions 
Survey (Luxembourg: Publ. Off. of the Europ. Union, 2013), 31, 
http://gso.gbv.de/DB=2.1/PPNSET?PPN=791913112. 




When marriages collapse, divorce laws in American jurisdictions typically require an equal 
division of property when the settlement is contested but often do not require the primary 
bread-winner, who is usually the male, to share the expected income stream from his 
earning power enhanced during the course of the marriage through sacrifices typically put 
forth by both partners.28 
It bears mentioning that the fact that men earn higher salaries and occupy more influential positions 
is not exclusively caused by their willingness and ability to work particularly long hours. Other 
mechanisms, such as direct discrimination against women, favouritism towards men and different 
aspirations and attitudes that are themselves shaped by social norms can play a role as well. 
However, recent studies suggest that flexibility in work hours is the primary cause of the gender pay 
gap and it might well be the most important reason for why men find it easier to obtain positions 
of influence.29 
In summary, I have reported on the extent of inequality in the distribution of working time between 
genders and on resultant inequalities in income, working conditions and power. I now turn to 
assessing the question of what makes these inequalities unjust. Political philosophers have objected 
to the gender system and patriarchal social norms on various grounds. For example, it is often 
claimed that the distribution of labour that arises from the gender system is objectionable because 
it is chosen involuntarily, because it violates equality of opportunity or because it reduces citizens’ 
autonomy. The next section assesses and rejects these objections to the gendered division of labour. 
Subsequently, I introduce a more promising account of what is morally troubling about the 
gendered division of labour according to which ‘specializers’ harm those who would prefer to enact 
equal-split by imposing a disproportionate negative externality on them. 
4.3 Unsatisfactory Objections to the Gendered Division of Labour 
In order to illustrate different objections that have been raised against the gendered division of 
labour, consider the following scenario:  
Greta and Lukas: Greta and Lukas are young adults who each want to raise families and 
pursue a career.30 They can each individually choose between three different combinations 
of housework and gainful employment. They can choose a) career which involves lots of 
work in the labour market and little unpaid work, b) equal-split which involves an equal mix 
 
28 Richard J. Arneson, ‘Feminism and Family Justice’, Public Affairs Quarterly 11, no. 4 (1997): 314. 
29 Claudia Goldin. Hours Flexibility and the Gender Gap in Pay. Center for American Progress. 2015. 





of unpaid work and gainful employment and c) housework which involves lots of unpaid 
activities such as caring for dependants and raising children and little or no gainful 
employment. The sort of jobs they can get when they choose career are different from the 
jobs they can get when they choose equal-split or housework in that they offer better pay and 
better working conditions. Moreover, Greta would be stigmatised if she pursued equal-split 
or career because her society tells her that housework is the more appropriate thing for her to 
do. Housework is furthermore attractive to her because most of her preferred potential 
partners engage in career and look for houseworkers as their preferred partners. Lukas on 
the other hand would be stigmatised if he pursued housework and faces significant 
opportunity costs when he chooses equal-split over career because of the advantages 
associated with the jobs available through career. As a result, Greta chooses housework and 
Lukas chooses career.31 
Many will regard this situation as unjust – either to Greta or to both Greta and Lukas. One reason 
why it might be unjust is because Greta’s and Lukas’s choices may not be voluntary. 
4.3.1 Voluntariness 
Greta’s and Lukas’s decisions to pursue housework and career might be influenced or even determined 
by deeply internalised social norms so that they can’t be assumed to be authentic choices of their 
own. And, so the argument goes, individuals ought to be able to take important decisions 
voluntarily. Some theorists argue that compliance with established gender norms is morally 
objectionable because it is not voluntary or not sufficiently voluntary.32 Consider the following case 
of involuntary behaviour. 
Hypnosis: A person is being hypnotised to alter her lifestyle preferences so that she chooses 
to become a lawyer instead of a carpenter. 
The person in this example has a complaint against the hypnosis because it undermines her capacity 
for independent reasoning. Arguably, our decisions can be assumed to be voluntary only if our 
capacity to reason is sufficiently great to recognise different options and assess their value.33 After 
 
31 We can imagine that Greta and Lukas are a couple but this assumption is not necessary to demonstrate 
that they have a complaint about their situation. 
Clare Chambers, ‘Choice and Female Genital Cosmetic Surgery’, in Female Genital Cosmetic Surgery, ed. 
Sarah M. Creighton and Lih-Mei Liao, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 72–79.32 Clare 
Chambers, ‘II—Ideology and Normativity’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91, no. 1 (2017): 175–
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the person in our example is hypnotised, she’s unable to see other options than to become a lawyer 
and because of that her choice to become a lawyer is not voluntary. 
However, choices to comply with patriarchal social norms are often not similar enough to hypnosis 
to establish that they’re not voluntary. Most citizens have access to information about different 
lifestyle choices and while social norms may provide strong incentives to prefer one lifestyle over 
the other, they can’t be said to completely undermine citizens’ capacity to reason. To be sure, not 
too long ago in the past, the grip of patriarchal norms on citizens’ imagination was much stronger 
and its’ effects were more similar to hypnosis. But most contemporary societies are somewhat diverse 
and allow citizens to reflect on lifestyle choices to a reasonable degree.34 The upshot of this is that 
decisions to lead gendered lifestyles should normally be considered voluntary if we understand 
voluntariness to mean the absence of brainwashing or other factors that undermine our ability to 
reflect on our decisions. It would be odd and perhaps disrespectful to dismiss someone who 
chooses to lead a traditional lifestyle as brainwashed.35 As Andrew Mason puts it: “Many women 
with childcare commitments who decide to look after their children personally regard themselves 
as having the option to act otherwise […]. If we deny that this is so, don’t we come dangerously 
close to failing to respect them as persons […]?”36 
However, our decisions can be said to be involuntary not only when our capacity to reason is 
undermined but also when we choose one particular option only in order to avoid unreasonable 
costs that would be associated with all alternative options.37 Your choice to hand your wallet to a 
robber who threatens you with death if you fail to do what he tells you is involuntary not because 
you are unable to reason but because the cost associated with the alternative of not handing out 
the wallet is unreasonably high. 
Is it possible that the choice to lead a gendered lifestyle is involuntary in the sense that the choice 
to lead gender-neutral lifestyles imposes an unreasonable cost? This depends on what we mean by 
‘unreasonable cost’ but even without specifying what exactly ‘unreasonable’ means we can see that 
the cost of enacting equal-split is not always unreasonably high. Consider the following analogy. 
 
34 Certainly there are important differences between countries and between social classes. For example , 
individuals from disadvantaged social backgrounds and with restricted access to education might find it 
more difficult to evaluate and resist patriarchal social norms. 
35 Compare Schouten, Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor, 96. 
36 Andrew Mason, ‘Equality, Personal Responsibility, and Gender Socialisation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 100, no. 1 (2000): 239. 
Serena Olsaretti, ‘Freedom, Force and Choice: Against the Rights-Based Definition of Voluntariness’, 
Journal of Political Philosophy 6, no. 1 (1998): 53–78.37 Serena Olsaretti, Voluntariness, Coercion, Self-Ownership, 




Religious belief: Stephen acquires faith in Christianity. He perceives his faith as his own choice 
although his upbringing and the culture that surrounds him encouraged the choice to 
become Christian. His religion imposes certain costs on him. For example he must regularly 
travel to the nearest church in order to attend mass.38 
The acquiring of a religion is similar to the adoption of gendered lifestyles in that it is often 
influenced by social norms and a culture that makes the choice of alternative lifestyles more costly. 
Yet, we insist that many costs associated with a religious lifestyle ought to be internalised by the 
individuals in question.39 We are reluctant to judge compliance with entrenched social norms as 
involuntary in this case and therefore we should also be wary about objections to the gendered 
division of labour that deny the voluntariness of these lifestyle choices. 
As I will explain later, I think that the most plausible account of why the gendered division of 
labour is morally objectionable is based on the observation that patriarchal social norms impose 
unjustifiably high costs on those who would like to enact equal-split arrangements. But the fact that 
the costs associated with equal-split arrangements are unjustifiably high doesn’t mean that decisions 
to lead traditional lifestyles are involuntary. By way of further illustration, imagine a political activist 
who opposes a law that the government is about to pass. A demonstration against the law takes 
place but the activist doesn’t participate in the demonstration because it’s cold and rainy outside. 
The activist’s decision not to participate in the demonstration results from the costs associated with 
participating and she might have a complaint against the organizers of the demonstration who 
should have chosen a sunnier day. But her decision to stay home is not best described as 
involuntary. After all, the activist herself and many of those who hold faith in a religion or who 
divide labour along traditional gender would reject descriptions that characterise their behaviour as 
involuntary. 
Before I proceed to discussing another account of the objectionability of the gendered division of 
labour, let me issue an important qualification. I have argued that decisions to divide housework 
and paid work along traditional gender lines are not involuntary because in many cases the costs 
associated with equal-split arrangements are not unreasonable. This is particularly clear in the case 
 
38 A very similar example is offered by Gina Schouten in „Is the Gendered Division of Labor a Problem 
of Distribution?“, in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 2, ed. by David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, 
and Steven Wall (Oxford University Press, 2016), 185–206, page 13 
39 To be sure, there are reasons to believe that some costs associated with religious lifestyles should be 
socialised. For example, there is an interesting question as to whether members of the Sikh-community 
should be allowed to ride motorcycles without helmets so that they don’t have to take off their turban. In 
countries with universal health care coverage, allowing this practice amounts to socialising some of the 
increased healthcare costs that result from the risky practice of riding motorcycles without helmets. But 





of middle-class parents who must forgo higher wages than they choose equal-split. It is less clear in 
the case of working-class parents where the income-loss associated with the part time penalty can 
have more severe consequences. There might be some cases where choosing equal-split over 
specialization would push working-class parents beneath a subsistence threshold. In cases like these, 
the costs associated with equal-split are indeed unreasonable and the decision to specialise should 
therefore be characterised as involuntary. Considerations of voluntariness are therefore not entirely 
irrelevant when we assess the morality of the gendered division of labour. What I have shown in 
this section is that there are many cases where considerations of voluntariness are not sufficient to 
determine that the gendered division of labour is morally objectionable. We must therefore look 
beyond voluntariness to determine what if anything makes the gendered division of labour 
objectionable. 
4.3.2 Equality of Opportunity 
Another intuitively appealing but not entirely satisfactory approach locates the injustice in Greta 
and Lukas in a violation of the demands of equality of opportunity. The general idea behind the 
principle of equal opportunity is that there are several factors that ought not to influence an 
individual’s prospects when she competes for desirable social positions. One specification of this 
principle demands that anyone’s success in competition for advantaged social positions depend 
only on talent, effort, and social background, but not on personal characteristics such as gender, 
race or age. G A Cohen refers to this as the “bourgeois” principle of equal opportunity.40 On a 
more demanding understanding – which Cohen calls the “left-liberal” principle of equal 
opportunity, a person’s prospects ought to depend only on talent and effort, not on social 
background and other personal characteristics.41 More demandingly still, we might insist that a 
person’s prospects depend exclusively on effort, not on talent, social background, or other morally 
arbitrary features of a person such as gender and race. Cohen refers to this as the “socialist” 
principle of equality of opportunity. 
To see whether the gendered division of labour as described above upsets equality of opportunity, 
consider the following scenario. 
 
40 G. A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism?, STU-Student edition (Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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Job Application: Greta and Lukas, who are equally talented and equally ambitious, compete 
for an attractive job that involves long work hours. Lukas gets the job because the employer 
knows that, on average, male applicants are more likely to be able to work long hours and 
less likely to intermit work to care for children or other dependants. 
On any of the three readings of equality of opportunity outlined above, equality of opportunity is 
upset by Job Application. Lukas’s gender works as a predictor for his success in a job application. 
Yet, gender is among the characteristics deemed as morally arbitrary by all specifications of equality 
of opportunity. This suggests that the selection process in Job Application is unfair because it violates 
equality of opportunity: Lukas ought not to obtain the position in virtue of his gender. 
However, this analysis overlooks the fact that there might be situations where the mechanism that 
generates the advantage that Lukas enjoys vis-à-vis Greta in Job application simultaneously generates 
a disadvantage for him when it comes to accessing care- and housework. Imagine that Lukas enjoys 
raising children, caring for his parents and conducting housework. However, patriarchal social 
norms stigmatise him when he doesn’t fulfil the role of the family’s breadwinner. Greta, who is 
disadvantaged in the competition for paid jobs, finds it much easier to take up these tasks. Just like 
paid employment, housework offers several valuable goods.42 For example, houseworkers and 
caretakers find it easier to develop valuable emotional bonds with those for whom they care or 
whom they raise. Moreover, their work is normally more self-directed because unlike paid 
employees they are neither subject to the direct rule of a manager nor to the indirect rule of 
profitability that private firms in free markets must obey.43 
The upshot of this is that in many cases the gendered division of labour simultaneously creates a 
disadvantage for one group on one metric and an advantage for the same group on a different 
metric. It is possible that Greta is not worse off than Lukas overall, because although she is denied 
opportunities for paid employment that Lukas enjoys, so too Lukas is denied perhaps equally 
valuable opportunities for care work that Greta enjoys. This means that we cannot conclude that 
Lukas’s opportunities are, on the whole, better than Greta’s. As Gina Schouten puts it,  
It is plausible that women enjoy fewer opportunities, on average, for leisure or for 
satisfaction and achievement in the world of paid work or in politics. But that difference 
 
42 John Baker, ‘All Things Considered, Should Feminists Embrace Basic Income?’, Basic Income Studies 3, 
no. 3 (2008). 
43 To be sure, care workers might be subject to the rule of a demanding child and they might resent that 
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renders their opportunity sets less valuable all-things-considered only if the value lost due 
to their relatively small share of these opportunities isn’t outweighed by the value gained 
from the opportunities of which women enjoy a more favorable share: opportunities to 
care for dependents, for example, and to form the bonds of intimacy that caregiving work 
enables.44 
It is therefore questionable whether we can object to the gendered distribution of labour solely by 
pointing to the fact that opportunities to access paid work are distributed unequally between 
genders.45 Why should we find it troubling if someone’s has less access to one good than someone 
else, if at the same time she’s got privileged access to a different good? It seems like the advantage 
that Lukas has in Job Application is only one aspect that needs to be taken into account for an all 
things considered judgment about the justice of a gendered distribution of labour.46 If we take a 
broader view, we find that in order to establish the claim that someone is being treated unfairly all 
things considered, it’s not sufficient to have knowledge about the distribution of opportunities in 
the competition for desirable jobs. 
To illustrate, imagine a world where preferences for care work and work in the labour market are 
formed freely, i.e. without undue pressure from patriarchal social norms. Imagine also that 
opportunities to access paid work and care work are unequal in this world. This means that some 
face higher costs when they want to access paid work and others face higher costs when they want 
to access care work. Lastly, imagine that the goods enjoyed by those who engage in care work are 
equally valuable than the goods enjoyed by those who engage in paid work. It is difficult to see why 
equality of opportunity would require equalising everyone’s access to paid work and care work 
despite the fact that (in our imaginary world) the bundles of goods accessible through both kinds 
of work are equally valuable. 
But not everyone agrees that the demands of equality of opportunity are best understood from 
such a global, all-things-considered perspective. Rather, we might think that equality of opportunity 
must pertain locally, in different particular contexts, where opportunities are equalised separately 
and independently from advantages that individuals enjoy in other contexts. From this perspective, 
it is bad if someone is denied equal opportunities to access attractive jobs even if the person who 
is denied these opportunities is very advantaged in other regards. Local equality of opportunity tries 
to equalise opportunities in different realms one by one without considering an individual’s overall 
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level of advantage. The reason for preferring local over global equality of opportunity might be 
that some goods aren’t substitutable so that privileged access to one good can’t compensate for 
difficulties in accessing another good. Let’s consider some further examples in order to see whether 
this local understanding of the demands of equality of opportunity is preferable to the global 
understanding. 
Time-poverty: consider the following two kinds of jobs: a) the job of a corporate consultant 
which involves good working conditions, a very high salary and long work hours (i.e. 
limited access to the goods of leisure) and b) the job of a delivery worker which involves 
bad working conditions, poor pay and long work hours. Money and free time aren’t fully 
substitutable, so that the corporate consultant, can’t use her wealth to buy as much free 
time as she would like to enjoy. 
Organ transplant: consider two persons, one poor and one rich, who both need an organ 
transplant. 
A local reading of the principle of equality of opportunity would require providing the workers in 
time-poverty with the same entitlements to accessing free time or with the same amount of 
compensation for their lack of free time. In the case of organ transplant, it would require flipping a 
coin rather than giving the organ to the poor person. On the global understanding, the delivery 
worker has the stronger claim to free time protections and the poor person should get the organ 
transplant. These two examples show that a global understanding of equality of opportunity 
delivers more plausible outcomes. Consider now a third example. 
Stephen Hawking: Because of his disability, Stephen Hawking must use a wheelchair in order 
to be mobile. Equality of opportunity requires that everyone have access to mobility. In 
realms other than mobility, such as money, education and social esteem, Stephen Hawking 
is very advantaged. 
It might seem like global equality of opportunity – implausibly – would deny him the wheelchair 
because his disadvantage in the realm of mobility might be outweighed by advantages in other 
realms so that overall-speaking he doesn’t count as disadvantaged.47 Local equality of opportunity 
in contrast would provide the wheelchair to Hawking because it proceeds independently from an 
individual’s overall level of advantage. 
But it’s not true that global equality of opportunity would prevent Stephen Hawking from using a 
wheelchair. Rather, a society committed to global equality of opportunity might say to him: “Look, 
 




you’re already a millionaire. You can afford buying your own wheelchair. This will enable us to 
provide an additional wheelchair to someone who can’t afford it.” To be sure, states might have 
other reasons to provide wheelchairs to everyone who needs them – independently of how 
advantaged they are. For example, universal coverage might be more efficient than means-testing. 
The point here is merely that the implications of global equality of opportunity in Stephen Hawking 
are more plausible than they initially seem. 
To this, the proponent of local equality of opportunity might reply that the global equality of 
opportunity approach only generates a plausible result in Stephen Hawking because the goods of 
mobility and money are substitutable. Wheelchairs can be bought with money. Hawking can use 
his wealth to improve his situation. If the goods of money and mobility weren’t substitutable, then 
we would have to equalise opportunities locally, one by one. But note that while money and 
mobility are partly substitutable (the wheelchair increases Hawking’s mobility), they aren’t fully 
substitutable. Even if Hawking was incredibly wealthy, he probably couldn’t achieve the same level 
of mobility than a person without disability by buying further mobility-enhancing devices. Where 
does this leave the dispute between a global and local understanding of the demands of equality of 
opportunity? Would Hawking’s access to mobility look any different if we adopted a local equality 
of opportunity perspective? Presumably not. In this case, funds to pay for mobility-enhancing 
technology would come from general tax revenue rather than out of Hawking’s own pocket. But 
the fact remains that access to some goods, such as health or mobility, can’t always be made 
perfectly equal. Therefore, the global equality of opportunity perspective generates plausible results 
in Stephen Hawking. And if the global reading of equality of opportunity is right, then it isn’t clear 
why unequal access to goods such as paid employment is objectionable in all cases, i.e., even when 
individuals have advantaged access to other goods. This is because advantages on one metric (say, 
the goods of care work) can off-set disadvantages on another metric (say, the goods of paid work). 
The local equality of opportunity approach also faces the difficult task of identifying in an anti-
perfectionist fashion those contexts of social life that require an equalising of opportunities 
regardless of an individual’s overall level of advantage and those that don’t. Attractive paid jobs 
and care work seem to be plausible candidates of contexts where local equality of opportunity 
should obtain but there might be others.48  
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Why should paid work and care work figure among the goods whose access should be regulated 
by equality of opportunity whilst access to other goods, such as love, free time or nature might not 
be regulated by this ideal? Any answer to this question must involve claims about the special 
importance of paid work and care work for human flourishing that at least some citizens will 
reasonably reject. As Gina Schouten puts it, “Because individuals may reasonably disagree about 
the relative value of work and leisure—and indeed, of paid and caregiving work—inequalities in 
kinds or amounts of work cannot straightforwardly be identified as objectionable distributions 
without violating the constraint of neutrality.”49 
On the other hand, it is just as difficult to defend the idea that only opportunities to access paid 
jobs – not opportunities to access care work – should be equalised without invoking some notion 
of what is necessary for humans to lead a good life. Not everyone will agree that apart from 
equalizing opportunities to engage in attractive paid work we should also equalise opportunities for 
everyone to engage in care work. The types of reason we can offer for including care work to the 
list of realms where local equality of opportunity should obtain will necessarily involve 
controversial assumptions about the importance of care work for human flourishing. 
Those who maintain that the demands of equality of opportunity are best understood as a global 
assessment of an individual’s level of advantage do not face this problem. We can circumvent the 
objectionably perfectionist strategy of determining what is necessary for humans to flourish by 
directly exploiting individual judgments. More specifically, we can make use of Ronald Dworkin’s 
envy-test in order to find out whether an individual’s opportunities to engage in care work and paid 
work are unjustly limited or not.50 In some cases, women will envy men’s superior opportunities 
with regards to accessing attractive jobs. If they could, these women would give up their privileged 
opportunities to engage in care work in order to obtain improved access to paid work. Vice versa, 
some men might envy women’s opportunities to care and would give up their privileged access to 
paid work if they could.51 If there are many women who envy men’s opportunities for paid work 
and few men who envy women’s opportunities for care work, then the envy test yields the result 
that the gendered division of labour generally makes women worse off than men. This strategy of 
determining whether someone’s access to paid work or care work is objectionably limited is 
attractive because it provides helpful guidance while remaining neutral between different 
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conceptions of the good. At the same time this type of analysis is rather different from traditional 
accounts of equality of opportunity. The most plausible way of determining whether someone’s 
access to a certain good is unfairly limited doesn’t make use of the language of equality of 
opportunity.  
In summary, what I have established in this section is that traditional accounts of equality of 
opportunity are unsatisfactory because they ignore an individual’s overall level of advantage. 
Therefore, objections against the gendered division of labour that point to a lack of equality of 
opportunity in the realm of paid work or in the realm of care work aren’t conclusive. They establish 
that an individual is disadvantaged in one regard but this leaves open the possibility that the 
individual is not disadvantaged all-things-considered. 
4.3.3 Discrimination 
Another way of sustaining the claim that there is something morally objectionable in Job Application 
is to say that the employer engages in wrongful statistical discrimination.52 In the context of job 
applications, statistical discrimination occurs when employers use information about the 
distribution of certain characteristics (such as the likelihood of taking parental leave) as a means of 
assessing the qualification of individual applicants. When women compete for positions that 
involve long work hours, employers may know that on average women are less likely to make long 
hours a priority and more likely to intermit work to care for children or other dependants. They 
then use this information when making recruitment or promotion decisions and discount the merit 
of women who apply accordingly.53 Consequently, women are less likely to obtain desirable 
positions that involve long-working-time. 
Job Application is an instance of statistical discrimination because it involves the use of distributional 
probabilities about a socially salient group. If the employer were to reject Greta on the grounds 
that she has directly informed him that she is intending to take parental leave, she would engage in 
non-statistical discrimination.54 Note that the causal relation between discrimination, unequal 
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opportunities and the gendered division of labour is complex and not unidirectional. When 
discriminatory employment decisions like in Job application are widespread, they can lead individuals 
to adopt gendered divisions of labour. On the other hand, when lots of couples engage in 
specialization along traditional gender lines, employers may use that information as a basis and 
justification for discrimination. We might say that individual decisions and social norms are 
mutually reinforcing. But in order to find out whether discrimination provides a good explanation 
for the moral badness of the gendered division of labour it is not necessary to figure out the exact 
causal mechanism between discriminatory hiring practices and decisions to enact specialization. It’s 
enough to know that discrimination of the kind described in Job application occurs frequently and is 
avoidable in the sense that employers could decide not to discriminate. In this section I set aside 
the question of how large the causal contribution of discrimination to the gendered division of 
labour is. Instead, I focus on the question of whether it is discrimination or some other moral 
consideration that best explains the badness of the gendered division of labour.  
Against the claim that Greta is a victim of wrongful statistical discrimination, one might object that 
not all instances of statistical discrimination are morally objectionable. In fact, some instances of 
statistical discrimination are plainly permissible. “For instance, for obvious reasons riot police pay 
more attention to young males at Premier League matches than to elderly females at botanical 
garden displays even if the latter gather in large, unruly crowds.”55 A simple way of drawing the 
distinction between objectionable and permissible statistical discrimination is to say that statistical 
discrimination is objectionable only when those who are discriminated against are part of a socially 
salient group that is harmed by the discriminatory practices. In other words, it is necessary (though 
perhaps not sufficient) to establish that someone is a victim of wrongful statistical discrimination 
that that person is a member of a socially salient group and that the discriminatory practice harms 
that person. According to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “a socially salient group is one in which 
membership significantly affects social interactions across a wide range of social relations. On this 
account, men and women and, in many societies, blacks and whites form socially salient groups, 
but a particular family and the group of people in whose surname the letter P appears twice do 
not.”56 To illustrate this further, being a member of a political party is not usually a socially salient 
characteristic but being a member of the group ‘women’ is socially salient. 57 Greta is a woman and 
she’s harmed by the employers’ discriminatory practice, since the employer’s decision leaves her 
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worse off than she could have been if she had been hired. This suggests that what’s morally 
objectionable about Job application is that Greta is a victim of wrongful statistical discrimination. 
To this one might object that adopting this definition of statistical discrimination implausibly forces 
us to conclude that young men at Premier League matches are also victims of wrongful statistical 
discrimination. After all, they too belong to a socially salient group (‘young men’) and they too are 
harmed by the police’s stop and search practices. But this objection overlooks a relevant difference 
between the two cases. The extent to which the (let’s assume respectful) stop and search 
interventions set back the young men’s interests isn’t large enough to constitute a significant harm. 
After all, the football fans also benefit from interventions that ensure for example that no one 
carries weapons to the stadium. What’s more, the young football fans are relatively advantaged, 
which makes it easier to justify imposing costs like those associated with police controls.58 Being 
rejected in a job application is different from police controls at Premier League matches in that it 
sets back the interests of those who are rejected to a very significant extent and because there is no 
way in which this practice benefits persons like Greta. 
But there is another reason to be wary about the idea that the badness of the gendered division of 
labour is best cashed out in terms of statistical discrimination. Upon closer inspection, the concern 
about a disadvantage that Greta faces when applying for attractive jobs is hardly distinct from the 
concern about equality of opportunity that I discussed in the previous section. We are troubled by 
inequalities in opportunity because some are made worse off by these inequalities for no good 
reason and in much the same way we are troubled by statistical discrimination because it creates an 
unjustifiable disadvantage for those who are subject to this practice. In many cases, statistical 
discrimination is bad precisely because it undermines equality of opportunity. In order to illustrate 
the idea that the moral badness of statistical discrimination might reside in its’ equal-opportunity-
undermining effects, consider the following example.  
Forced retirement: An airline establishes a maximum age from which on pilots may no longer 
work for the airline because on average, pilots above a certain age, say 65 years, are less 
able to perform the demanding tasks that the job of a pilot involves. 
Some pilots will still be able to competently perform all tasks after having passed the age of 65. 
Competent pilots above 65 who would wish to continue their work could complain that they’re 
not allowed to do so in spite of the fact that they’re still qualified. Yet, many think that this is an 
instance of permissible statistical discrimination because over the course of a lifetime, all pilots 
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have the same opportunity to perform their job during a specific period of time. The reason why 
many feel less troubled by Forced Retirement than by Job Application is that in Job Application, Greta’s 
opportunity to perform an attractive job is unequal, while opportunities among pilots – over the 
course of a lifetime –are not negatively affected by the policy of forced retirement.59 
Previously I said that statistical discrimination is bad insofar as it is harmful and one way in which 
people can be harmed is when they their opportunities are limited for no good reason. The 
comparison of the examples of Forced Retirement and Job Application suggests that statistical 
discrimination is objectionable in the case of Job Application because it upsets equality of opportunity 
and it is permissible in the case of Forced Retirement because it doesn’t upset the pilots’ equality of 
opportunity. If it is true that the concerns of statistical discrimination and equality of opportunity 
(at least in the case of Job Application) are so intimately related, then it becomes apparent that the 
concern I raised about equality of opportunity in the previous section also bites against statistical 
discrimination as a way of objecting to the gendered distribution of labour. The presence of 
statistical discrimination merely shows that someone is disadvantaged when applying for jobs. But 
when the same characteristic of a person that generates the disadvantage in job applications 
generates an advantage in access to care, we are forced to conclude that all things considered the 
individual in question may not have a complaint. 
In order to salvage statistical discrimination from this critique, we can point out that statistical 
discrimination is not bad only when it upsets equality of opportunity but also when it is 
disrespectful. For example, the reason why many find it troubling when police engages in racial 
profiling – which is an instance of statistical discrimination – is because it is disrespectful towards 
those who are the target of racial profiling. Racial profiling treats everyone who belongs to a racial 
group as a potential criminal and thereby expresses a general attitude of disrespect towards that 
group. 
Does the employer treat Greta with disrespect when she bases her hiring decision on the 
assumption that Greta is more likely to intermit work because of pregnancy than Lukas? Note that 
unlike police who engages in racial profiling, the employer doesn’t treat Greta as a criminal. We 
might say that she fails to treat Greta according to her merit because she simply assumes that what 
is true for women on average is also true for the particular applicant Greta. But this failure to treat 
her according to her merit is not necessarily disrespectful. It might simply reflect the fact that the 
employer wants to hire someone who is likely to be able to work long hours for a long period of 
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time. This need not imply an assumption according to which women are generally worth less than 
men. But there is another sense in which the employer’s conduct can be regarded as disrespectful. 
The employer’s decision to reject Greta reflects the longstanding patriarchal assumption that men 
and women are fundamentally suited for different roles.60 Until today, hiring decisions and labour 
market institutions are often based on the idea of an ‘ideal worker’ who doesn’t have care 
obligations.61 In treating Greta as less well-suited for the labour market and better suited for care 
and housework, the employer reinforces a disrespectful stereotype. This is true whether or not the 
employer actually believes in the truth of this stereotype. In short, the employer’s decision to reject 
Greta in Job application is morally objectionable because it is disrespectful and this insight must be 
part of any explanation of why the gendered division of labour is unjust. However, as I will explain 
in a moment, it can’t be the whole story. 
To recapitulate, we have established so far that we cannot object to the gendered distribution of 
labour on the grounds that it causes harmful statistical discrimination. This is because the same 
mechanism that generates a disadvantage for Greta when competing for jobs in the labour market 
might also create an advantage for her when it comes to accessing the goods of care so that on the 
whole we’re not sure whether she’s harmed by the gendered division of labour or not. We have 
also established that unequal treatment in job applications can be morally objectionable because it 
discriminates against women in a disrespectful way. But what about aspects of the gendered 
division of labour other than job applications? What about the decision of Lukas and Greta to enact 
a traditional division of labour because social norms make equal-split arrangements more costly to 
access? Here, the analytic framework of discrimination doesn’t yield further insights. 
Discrimination helps us understand one aspect of the moral badness of the gendered division of 
labour but it can’t explain why other aspects, such as the case of Lukas and Greta are also wrong. 
We can imagine that a gendered division of labour could exist in a world without statistical 
discrimination. Imagine for example a society without statistical discrimination against women that 
nevertheless patriarchal social norms. In this society, norms that stigmatise deviations from 
traditional specialization are powerful enough to generate a gendered division of labour even if 
employers don’t discriminate against women. Considerations other than discrimination are needed 
to explain why one might object to the existence of this division of labour. In contemporary 
societies, statistical discrimination likely contributes to the continued existence of the gendered 
division of labour but there are also several other factors that causally contribute to the 
perpetuation of this division of labour. This means that we must look beyond considerations of 
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discrimination, equality of opportunity, and voluntariness in order to find out why we’re troubled 
by Lukas and Greta. 
In the next section I analyse two kinds of objections to the gendered division of labour that both 
appeal to the value of autonomy. I will argue that these too are ultimately unsatisfactory ways of 
objecting to the gendered division of labour. After that, I go on to explain what I think is a more 
decisive argument against it. 
4.3.4 Autonomy 
One might argue that the incentives that cause Greta and Lukas to lead gendered lifestyles are 
objectionable because they - for no good reason - limit the set of lifestyle options from which Greta 
and Lukas can choose. We can imagine alternative societies without social norms that nudge 
individuals into particular lifestyles and we might think that members of these societies have more 
freedom to choose between different valuable options. This is significant because the freedom to 
choose between valuable options is an important part of personal autonomy, understood as the 
ability to live a life of one’s own choosing.  
To make this clearer, it is helpful to observe that by “freedom” we ordinarily mean not only the 
absence of interference from others but also a set of further conditions that all fall under the label 
of personal autonomy. More specifically, it is common to distinguish roughly between three 
necessary conditions that facilitate autonomous decision-making.62 In order to be autonomous, an 
individual a) has to have a certain cognitive competence to form and pursue goals, b) has to be free 
from arbitrary external interference that prevents her from pursuing these goals and c) has to be 
able to choose from a range of valuable options. As is clear from condition (c), the extent to which 
an individual enjoys personal autonomy thus depends partly on whether the individual has access 
to valuable options from which to choose when pursuing her life plans.63 Someone who has access 
to a larger number of valuable options enjoys autonomy to a greater extent than someone whose 
option set is more limited.64 
Greta’s and Lukas’s options are reduced through the attitudes of other members of their society 
and feminists have long contended that the gender system has precisely this effect of narrowing 
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the range of valuable options from which individuals can choose. Liberal feminists are particularly 
concerned with this effect of patriarchal institutions because they regard freedom as a fundamental 
value and one important aspect of freedom is personal autonomy. An autonomous person can live 
her life directed by intentions and considerations that are her own and not merely imposed from 
outside. This means that in order to be free, we need to be autonomous or in other words that 
personal autonomy is a necessary condition for freedom. 
In the presence of patriarchal norms, the options of career, equal-split and housework are available at 
differential costs to Greta and Lukas, so that their ability to choose between them is limited in one 
sense. Greta and Lukas might have a complaint against the current state of our societies because it 
reduces their personal autonomy for no good reason. 
In an alternative society without patriarchal norms, Greta and Lukas would each face the same 
costs for choosing career, equal-split, or housework. To illustrate, the costs that Lukas faces when he 
opts for housework would be the same than the costs that Greta faces when she chooses housework. 
Their gender doesn’t determine how much resources they must forgo to access each of these 
lifestyles and as a result they can both choose between a wider set of options. Note that in a world 
without patriarchal norms, equal-split might still be more expensive than specialization because 
specialization is sometimes economically more efficient. This is because couples who specialise might 
be able to carry out tasks more efficiently, so that they earn higher incomes and enjoy more free 
time. Governments can enlarge citizens’ set of options even further by introducing subsidies and 
taxation that aim at equalising the costs of all three lifestyle options, so that each of them is equally 
costly to access. Arguably, a person who can choose between three equally accessible options is 
more autonomous than a person who can choose between two equally costly options and a third 
option that is more costly.  
But note that Greta’s and Lukas’s choice sets cannot be expanded for free. Interventions that aim 
at equalising the costs of career, equal-split and housework must subsidise equal-split so that this choice 
becomes equally affordable than the gendered division of labour where one person pursues career 
and the other housework. The same is true for the more moderate proposal to only equalise the costs 
of career and housework for both genders. Policies that make housework more accessible for men 
include for example parental leave subsidies and policies that make career more accessible for 
women include for example the subsidising of childcare. 
In order to make equal-split more affordable, states must use a part of their budget to subsidise it. 
This means that less resources are available for other projects that states might fund. As a result, 




Imagine for example that resources that are spent on subsidising equal-split could alternatively be 
spent on the construction of a bridge that facilitates access to an island. Expanding the opportunity 
set of those who prefer to enact equal-split comes at the expense of shrinking the opportunity set 
of those who would like to have better access to the island. 
Note moreover that we could expand citizens’ autonomy by subsidising all sorts of reasonable 
lifestyles that are currently expensive to pursue. For example, it is difficult and costly for most 
people to become astronauts. Those who would like to become astronauts would see their choice 
sets expanded if states used a larger part of their budget to fund space travel. Assuming that the 
choices that sustain patriarchal norms and the gendered division of labour are voluntary, why 
should states cater to the interests of those who enjoy equal-split? Why not also subsidise lifestyles 
that involve space travel, football, or art history? Liberals think that states ought not to use their 
budget to subsidise any of these particular lifestyles because exercises of state power are legitimate 
only when they are justifiable to all reasonable citizens independently of their convictions of what 
makes for a good life.65 To illustrate this concern, consider the following example of how 
interventions can change the costs of different lifestyles. 
 
 Equal-split Career Housework 
No subsidy 7 4 4 
Equal-split Subsidy 5 5 5 
 
The figures in this table represent opportunity costs associated with the lifestyles of equal-split, career 
and housework under a ‘laissez-faire’ and under an equal-split-subsidy scenario. For example, the 
costs of choosing equal-split under the subsidy scenario are high because of the considerable benefits 
associated with career and housework in this scenario. 
Through equal-split subsidies, this payoff structure can be changed. Subsidies are used to make equal-
split more attractive with the effect of decreasing the attractiveness of a life solely dedicated to career 
or housework. Such interventions modify the prices of different lifestyles but it would be wrong to 
say that they expand everyone’s opportunity set because opportunities to pursue career and housework 
are reduced in the intervention scenario. For this reason, we cannot object to the gendered division 
of labour by pointing out that it reduces everyone’s autonomy because the autonomy of those who 
 




like to enact equal-split can’t be increased without reducing the autonomy of those who enjoy 
traditional specialization lifestyles.66 
4.3.5 Autonomy and Citizenship Interests 
Faced with this difficulty, Gina Schouten advances a different objection against the gendered 
division of labour that invokes the value of autonomy in a more complex way. She observes that 
there is a sense in which equal-split arrangements can be regarded as particularly autonomous 
because decisions to enact equal-split embody the ideal of free and equal citizens. Equal-split 
embodies the ideal of freedom because it shows that citizens have the capacity to take decisions 
autonomously, even when these decisions go against the grain of established traditional lifestyles. 
And equal-split embodies the ideal of equality because partners share the tasks of paid work and 
unpaid work, thereby showing that men and women (in the case of heterosexual couples) aren’t 
necessarily suited for different kinds of work. She describes lifestyles that embody the ideals of 
freedom and equality in this way as ‘comprehensively autonomous’. 
Schouten then notes that we can’t justify equal-split subsidies by appealing directly to the value of 
comprehensive autonomy because citizens will reasonably disagree about the question whether 
there is something particularly valuable about comprehensively autonomous lifestyles. She 
endorses the liberal commitment to a strong presumption against policies that promote specific 
conceptions of the good.67 This liberal neutrality constraint rules out interventions to subsidise 
equal-split when these interventions are justified by appeal to the idea that comprehensively 
autonomous lifestyles are more valuable than traditional lifestyles, such as specialization. 
However, there is a different way in which equal-split subsidies can be justified with the appeal to 
the value of comprehensive autonomy that is compatible with the liberal neutrality constraint. In 
order to understand this alternative appeal to autonomy it is important to observe that the liberal 
neutrality constraint doesn’t require neutrality of outcomes in the sense that states should help 
every citizen advance their conceptions of the good to the same degree. Instead, it requires 
justificatory neutrality. This means that the reasons that states invoke when justifying coercive 
policies must be acceptable to everyone. Arguments that are based on the purported value of one 
specific conception of the good over which citizens can reasonably disagree are not permissible 
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from that perspective. The upshot of this is that policies whose effect is to promote 
comprehensively autonomous lifestyles such as equal-split are not illegitimate per se. Instead, their 
legitimacy depends on the types of reasons that can be offered in favour of their implementation. 
In order to illustrate this idea, Schouten asks us to 
Suppose (probably counterfactually) that the monogamous family were essential to 
children’s development of the moral powers of citizenship. In this case, a politically liberal 
regime might legitimately incentivize monogamy. The state could not invoke the value of 
monogamy itself to justify such incentives, but it could invoke values implied by interests 
of citizenship—in this case, the development of moral powers.68 
As a next step in her argument, Schouten posits that all citizens have a strong interest in protecting 
an important aspect of their moral personality: The ability to develop and revise an idea of what is 
of value to them and what sort of life they want to live. She draws on Rawls, according to whom 
we must protect our ability to form and revise a conception of the good because this ability is a 
fundamental condition for the creation of a just society. 69 This is because citizens, in order to take 
part in social life and appreciate the merits of a social system where people come together to interact 
on mutually advantageous terms, must be able to develop a sense of justice and an idea of what 
their interests and life plans are. A just society must provide conditions that allow for the 
development of a moral personality thus understood and arguably this involves ensuring that 
citizens be able to assess and modify their life plans. 
From positing the fundamental importance of this abstract citizenship interest, Schouten goes on 
to argue that in order to be able to revise our conception of the good, we need to be exposed to 
role models who enact lifestyles that embody autonomous choices.70 According to her, the ability 
to imagine one’s life otherwise depends in part on the visibility of different ways of life that 
individuals can observe and from which they can choose.71 It is very difficult, she claims, for 
someone to imagine her life otherwise if she can’t see enactments of autonomous lives around her. 
Without role models who make visibly autonomous choices, citizens are less likely to be able to 
critically reflect on their own lifestyles. From this perspective, enactments of comprehensively 
autonomous lifestyles, such as equal-split, are politically valuable because they help others see that 
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lifestyles other than those recommended by tradition and social norms are available and can be 
taken up if one decides to do so. In Schouten’s words, 
Protecting the capacity for revising one’s conception of the good requires ensuring the 
capacity for comprehensively autonomous reflection and action. If a person is immersed 
in a lifestyle that discourages developing that capacity, then we can have assurance that she 
can develop that capacity only if role models of comprehensive autonomy are visible to 
her. It follows that citizens have an interest in ensuring that lifestyles enacting 
comprehensive autonomy be taken up sufficiently broadly that the autonomy remain 
accessibly role modeled, even to those who do not value it. If broad enactment of 
comprehensively autonomous lifestyles does not obtain as a matter of course, then a 
citizenship interest favors subsidizing those lifestyles.72 
According to Schouten, it is particularly important that gender-egalitarian ways of life, such as equal-
split are visible and genuinely available to citizens. Partly this is because enactments of gender-
egalitarian lifestyles will enable others to make autonomous choices.  
Beyond that, Schouten also thinks that the stability of liberal societies depends, among other things, 
on the question whether comprehensively liberal lifestyles are in broad circulation. She claims that 
in order to elicit stable endorsement over time, the institutions of liberal societies must be 
congruent with citizens’ conceptions of the good life. This doesn’t mean that each citizen’s 
conception of the good must be promoted but that the institutional structure of a liberal society 
mustn’t impose costs “that citizen[s] might reasonably regard as unfair in light of shareable political 
values.”73 Arguably, the high costs of accessing equal-split are of this type. Until today, many jobs 
offered to men are predicated on the assumption that men have no care or housework obligations 
that they must meet alongside their paid employment. By the same token, employers often assume 
that women are likely to carry out care work and housework alongside their jobs. Throughout most 
of history these assumptions have been implicit in the design of labour market institutions. To 
illustrate, there are still many countries where provisions for men to take paternal leave are less 
generous than those offered to women.74 
This institutionalized assumption contradicts the liberal ideal of free and equal citizens who take 
important decisions, such as what type of work to pursue, autonomously. Citizens can reasonably 
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regard this institutional arrangement as unfair, not because it poses an obstacle to one particular 
conception of the good but because it undermines the shareable political value of being able to 
choose autonomously and to critically assess one’s life plans.75 According to Schouten, the upshot 
of this is that states may legitimately subsidise policies that aim at promoting the gender-egalitarian 
lifestyle of equal-split. 
Schouten’s citizenship-interest-based objection against the gendered division of labour is 
unsatisfactory in two respects. First, and perhaps less worryingly, Schouten fails to show whether 
it is empirically true that the existence of role models actually facilitates citizens’ capacity to analyse 
and revise their conception of the good. This assumption sounds plausible enough but needs to be 
backed up with sociological and psychological evidence. After all, it is conceivable that our ability 
to revise our conception of the good mostly depends on our parents and upbringing. Later in life 
it might largely depend on education and on fictional role models that we encounter for example 
in novels or movies, rather than on the real persons we encounter in everyday life. This would give 
states reasons to promote feminist art, literature, school curricula, etc. but it might not provide 
reasons to restructure the labour market. 
Second, it is unclear whether the role model requirement licences the types of interventions that 
Schouten envisions. Given the prominence of the role model requirement in her argument, it is 
striking that Schouten doesn’t spell out in any detail what it is and what it requires. She argues that 
Reflecting on and revising one’s conception of the good require that one have the capacity 
to judge which of the values she sees reflected around her are worthy and which are 
unworthy of her own endorsement and allegiance. It is this capacity that I claim, in order 
reliably to be realized, depends on visible access to role models of comprehensive 
autonomy.76 
Let’s assume it is true that our ability to assess our life plans in some way depends on the visibility 
of role models for comprehensively autonomous behaviour. In order to be able to determine 
whether subsidising gender-egalitarian lifestyles is justifiable in light of the role model requirement, 
it would be important to know more about what is meant by “visible access to role models of 
comprehensive autonomy”. Must a certain percentage of the general population act as role models 
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and, if yes, how high a percentage should be regarded as enough? How exactly must role models 
be distributed within a population? Is it important that they be dispersed more or less evenly across 
a country in terms of geography and in terms of race, age and social class?77 Must role models for 
comprehensively autonomous lifestyles be visible in ‘real life’, say in every school or in every village? 
Or does it suffice if gender-egalitarian lifestyles are modelled by a small number of prominent 
persons who are known to a wide public? Consider for example the case of New Zealand’s Prime 
Minister, Jacinda Ardern, who famously gave birth to a child while in office and who enacts a 
comprehensively autonomous lifestyle in many other ways. Might she alone, or a small number of 
persons like her, suffice to fulfil the role model requirement in New Zealand? 
Schouten explains that “ […] an enactment of comprehensive autonomy must be within the reach 
of any particular person […]” but fails to specify what “within the reach of any particular person” 
means. 78 We might find that the types of gender-egalitarian interventions that Schouten envisions 
can be justified by some specifications of the role model requirement and not by others. This worry 
can be overcome if it can be shown that the role model requirement demands a large number of 
role models and that it can be met only by implementing subsidies for gender egalitarian lifestyles 
for everyone. But consider now the following scenario. 
Successful role modelling: Let’s assume that citizens’ abilities to revise their conception of the 
good depends on a large number of role models for comprehensively autonomous 
behaviour, say 20 per cent of the population, more or less evenly distributed across 
territory, social class, race and age. Imagine a society where subsidies and incentives for 
gender-egalitarian lifestyles are in place. These subsidies ensure that at least 20 per cent of 
couples in the population enact the gender-egalitarian lifestyle of equal-split. These role 
models in turn make it easier for the other 80 per cent of couples to reflect on their 
conception of the good. But imagine that, while these role models facilitate reflection, they 
don’t actually lead the rest of society to pick up these lifestyles. 
It seems like in this society, Schouten’s citizenship-interests-based argument doesn’t recommend 
any further interventions to promote gender egalitarianism. In other words, her argument deems a 
society where 80 per cent of couples do not live gender-egalitarian lifestyles as gender-just. To me, 
this would be a troubling implication. The mere presence of role models for gender egalitarian 
lifestyles isn’t enough to justify the continued existence of a pervasive gendered division of labour. 
Should our support for policies that aim at overcoming the gendered division of labour be solely 
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motivated by the abstract citizenship interest of being able to revise our conception of the good? 
It seems counterintuitive to regard a society as gender-just where only a minority leads gender-
egalitarian lifestyles. As I will explain in the next section, there are reasons that militate for more 
equality of outcome. 
This concern about Schouten’s argument is further aggravated by the fact citizens’ ability to revise 
their conception of the good can arguably be facilitated by a variety of role models for 
comprehensively autonomous lifestyles – not only by gender-egalitarian role models. Recall that 
gender-egalitarian lifestyles such as equal-split are only one instance of a diversity of lifestyles that 
can be regarded as comprehensively autonomous. For example, one might argue that the ideal of 
free and equal citizens is also embodied by workers who own and manage their own companies 
and who collectively make decisions as to how to arrange the workplace and how to organize the 
process of production. 
Imagine a society where 10 per cent of the population work in worker cooperatives and 10 per cent 
of the population (who are not identical with those who work in the cooperatives) enact gender-
egalitarian lifestyles. Together, these two groups satisfy a requirement according to which at least 
20 per cent of the population must act as role models for comprehensively autonomous lifestyles 
in order to enable citizens to reflect on their conceptions of the good. The upshot of this might be 
that Schouten’s argument also deems a society as gender-just where 90 per cent of the population 
don’t live gender egalitarian lifestyles. Perhaps Schouten thinks that we can’t aggregate role models 
across different contexts of social life in this way, so that a minimum role-model-threshold must 
be met within each relevant context of social life. But what reasons could be offered in favour of 
such a non-aggregative view? After all, what counts from Schouten’s perspective is the protection 
of citizen’s ability to form and revise a conception of the good. If this can be achieved through 
enactments of comprehensively autonomous lifestyles other than equal-split, then it is difficult to 
see why we shouldn’t aggregate role models across different social contexts. What’s more, a non-
aggregative view faces the difficult task of identifying the relevant contexts of social life that each 
separately must meet the role model requirement. It seems difficult to identify a non-arbitrary 
criterion to distinguish those social contexts where the role model requirement must be met from 
those where it doesn’t have to be met. 
To be sure, this doesn’t contradict Schouten’s claim that some subsidies and incentives for gender-
egalitarian lifestyles can be justified by abstract citizenship-interests. What it shows is that 
citizenship-interest considerations aren’t enough to justify the feminist demand that the gendered 
division of labour be completely eroded and that gender mustn’t work as a predictor for what sort 




Until now, I have pointed out how arguments from voluntariness, equality of opportunity, 
discrimination and autonomy are unsatisfactory in establishing the injustice of the gendered 
division of labour. We must assume that many specializers take their decisions to divide labour in 
a traditional way voluntarily. We must also assume that parenting, care and housework – just like 
gainful employment in the labour market – provide access to important goods so that we can’t 
defend equal-split-subsidies on the grounds that they facilitate access to the superior goods of gainful 
employment. We can object to statistical discrimination against women in the labour market 
because this kind of discrimination is disrespectful. But statistical discrimination is only one aspect 
of the gendered division of labour and while abolishing discrimination is very important, it’s not 
enough to overcome the gendered division of labour. On what grounds can we justify further 
interventions, such as the subsidising of equal-split arrangements? 
4.4 Harmful External Effects 
As I pointed out of above, the set of valuable lifestyle options from which citizens can choose can’t 
be expanded gratis. In order to make the lifestyle of equal-split as affordable as career and housework, 
states must use funds to subsidise equal-split. Moreover, policies that erode patriarchal social norms 
and the gendered division of labour set back the interests of those who celebrate traditional 
specialization because they reduce the social recognition of this lifestyle. There is therefore a 
challenge in adjudicating between the competing claims of those who would like to see an erosion 
of the gendered division of labour and those who want to retain the status quo. 
An alternative approach to analysing the morality of decisions to specialize and the justifiability of 
equal-split-subsidies starts with the observation that decisions of couples to specialise impose a 
negative externality on those couples that would like to enact equal-split. Decisions of couples to 
specialise along traditional gender lines impose a negative externality on those who would like to 
enact equal-split because they sustain social norms according to which men should be breadwinners 
and women homemakers.79  
Compliance with social norms normally (though perhaps not always) reinforces these norms.80 An 
example for this phenomenon is that most men in western societies don’t wear dresses. Presumably 
this is because of social norms that stigmatize men when they wear dresses. We can speculate that 
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these norms would be much weaker, or indeed non-existent if there was a sizable number of men 
who don’t comply with this norm. 
We can expect patriarchal norms to be stronger in societies where almost everyone specializes and 
to be weaker or non-existent in societies where roughly 50% of couples specialize against the grain 
of tradition, i.e. where half of those men who specialise work as homemakers and half of those 
women who specialise work as breadwinners. We would also expect patriarchal norms to be weaker 
in societies where most couples enact equal-split. As I explained in the previous section, it might 
also make a difference what the identities of those who decide to specialise are. Individuals who 
are particularly visible, well-known, popular, respected or advantaged in other ways likely have 
greater influence on social norms than less advantaged individuals who are largely invisible in 
popular discourse. This in turn affects the size of the externality that they impose. 
Note that no negative externalities are generated by couples who specialise against the grain of 
established social norms i.e., couples where men mainly work as homemakers and women mainly 
work as breadwinners. As I said previously, I use the term specialization to refer to divisions of labour 
along traditional gender lines and my discussion of negative externalities focuses on this kind of 
specialization. But as I will explain in a moment, the interests of those who prefer to specialise in 
some way – whether traditional or not – are also affected by subsidies for equal-split and therefore 
need to be taken into account. 
The negative external effect of any individual’s decision to specialise is very weak but the aggregate 
effect of a large number of persons who all decide to specialise can be powerful. Imagine a world 
where only one person believes that men should be breadwinners and women should be 
homemakers. This wouldn’t be enough to establish a widespread social norm that imposes costs 
on other person’s behaviour. By contrast, in a society where a majority believes in the 
breadwinner/homemaker norm, the external effects of this belief can be quite strong.  
There is an interesting question as to whether individual actions whose effects are imperceptibly 
weak can be morally objectionable and whether states may regulate this kind of individual 
conduct.81 This question is familiar from debates around the consumption of meat or greenhouse 
gas emissions. Important though it is, I will set discussion of this problem to one side and simply 
 




assume that it can be wrong for individuals to make very small contributions to something that is 
harmful only when a large number of persons contributes to it.82 
A significant number of those who specialise don’t specialise because they endorse and celebrate 
patriarchal norms but because they find it individually costly to deviate from these norms. These 
individuals face a collective action problem where it is individually rational for each person to 
comply with traditional norms but the group as a whole could be better off if everyone jointly 
decided to deviate from traditional norms. In the presence of social norms that stigmatise men 
when they act as homemakers and that stigmatise women when they act as breadwinners, it is 
rational – because less costly – for each individual to comply with the social norm. However, social 
norms lose their force when non-compliance with these norms becomes normalised. When equal-
split lifestyles are enacted by a large number of persons, the social norms that stigmatise equal-split 
are eroded. Each individual finds it costly to act in ways that go against the grain of established 
social norms. But non-compliance with norms is much easier when enacted simultaneously by a 
large number of people. To illustrate, imagine the following scenario. 
Skinniness: The fashion industry establishes a social norm that penalises young women when 
they are not skinny. Some would prefer to be less skinny but individually, each woman 
finds it costly to violate the norm because non-compliance leads to stigmatization. 
Those who don’t like the norm would find non-compliance much easier if they could coordinate 
to jointly move away from the skinniness-norm. This would normalise more diverse body shapes 
and reduce stigma. 
Let’s assume that states could facilitate this collective move away from compliance with the 
skinniness-norm, for example by requiring the fashion industry to display a larger variety of body 
shapes. Those who are adversely affected by the skinniness-norm might have a complaint against 
the state when it refuses to provide this move for no good reason. Plausibly, the interests at stake 
for those who suffer from the norm (e.g., interests in health) are more important than the interests 
of those who would like to retain the norm because they endorse it and benefit from it. 
To be sure, not all social norms have effects that are harmful enough to justify coercive 
interventions. Consider a social norm where the interest at stake for those who don’t comply are 
less weighty. 
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Dress code: Managers are expected to wear suits. If someone shows up at work in casual 
clothes, their non-compliance with the suit-norm is very visible and they are being 
stigmatized. However, not everyone likes wearing suits. Many would prefer to dress in more 
casual ways. Each manager would find it much easier to dress casually if he could coordinate 
his behaviour with a sizeable number of like-minded managers who would like to dress 
casually as well. 
If the suit-norm was successfully eroded, everyone would find their set of dress-choices expanded 
by the option of casual clothes. But the move to a world without the suit-norm wouldn’t benefit 
everyone. For the sake of argument, we can assume that firms might be more successful when all 
managers wear suits, perhaps because this puts their business partners under an impression of 
discipline and professionality. A norm like this doesn’t licence governmental intervention to erode 
it because the interest at stake on the side of those who suffer from the suit-norm (i.e., the superior 
comfortableness of casual clothes) is not particularly weighty. 
The interests at stake in Lukas and Greta are more similar to those in skinniness than to those in dress 
code. Those who would like to enact the lifestyle of equal-split can point to two important sets of 
goods, both of which they might consider crucial to their well-being: The goods of paid work and 
the goods of care work. Apart from monetary income, paid employment often facilitates several 
other important goods, such as social recognition and community.83 Care work on the other hand 
is valuable because it facilitates the forming of emotional bonds and the sense of being needed.84 
Those who prefer equal-split insist that enjoying both of these goods to some degree is crucial to 
their flourishing and that equal-split is the only lifestyle that truly provides access to both. They feel 
deep regret about situations where they’re unable to enjoy both of these goods and their feeling of 
regret is such that they often report a willingness to make significant sacrifices in order to access 
the lifestyle of equal-split.85 
One might worry that pointing to the value of care work and paid work is an impermissibly 
perfectionist way of establishing the desirability of equal-split subsidies. After all, citizens can 
reasonably disagree over the question of whether a good life should contain both care- and paid 
work. But my point here is not that equal-split lifestyles are more valuable than specialization lifestyles. 
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Rather, what I’m observing is that many citizens attach great importance to equal-split and the 
interests of these citizens are set back by those who generate stigmatising social norms that make 
access to equal-split very costly. Compare this to the case of skinniness. Social norms that stigmatise 
deviations from skinniness (i.e., average body weight and overweight) are objectionable because 
they severely set back the interests of those who would like to deviate from the skinniness-norm. 
To reach this judgement it is not necessary to assume that it is better for people to have average 
body weight or overweight, as opposed to being skinny. It suffices to observe that the harmful 
effects of the skinniness-norm are strong enough to justify policies that aim at eroding this norm. 
In order to determine whether the external costs imposed on those who prefer equal-split are 
significant enough to justify subsidising this lifestyle we must compare them to the costs that those 
who prefer specialization incur when equal-split is subsidized. 
Those who prefer specialization can invoke the value of efficiency to establish their complaint against 
equal-split-subsidies. In some cases, specialization can be more efficient in the sense that the monetary 
income gained from one full-time job is greater than the income gained from two part-time jobs. 
To be sure, subsidies for the lifestyle of equal-split wouldn’t force any individual specialiser to split 
paid and care work equally between partners. But a society where incentives that cause a significant 
number of partners to take up the lifestyle of equal-split is one where overall less goods and services 
are produced and the aggregate effect of such efficiency losses across a whole economy might be 
significant. The specialisers can therefore complain that they live in a society that produces less 
material wealth than an alternative society where no equal-split subsidies are in place. Note that this 
is not a complaint about Pareto-inefficiency. The move from a society with equal-split subsidies in 
place to a society without such subsidies is not Pareto-improving because it leaves the equal-split-
lovers worse off. But the specialisers can mount a narrower efficiency-complaint according to 
which they could be wealthier if they lived in a society without gender-egalitarian subsidies. 
The strength of this efficiency-based complaint depends to a large extent on the overall level of 
wealth and technological development of a society. In very poor countries, efficiency gains are vital 
because they can help meet basic needs and bring about significant improvements of living 
standards. In rich countries, further efficiency gains aren’t normally necessary to meet basic needs. 
What’s more, social scientists disagree whether further increases in the production of goods and 
services in rich countries can bring about further wellbeing-improvements at all. For rich countries, 
it is often preferable to forgo increases in the production of goods and services in order to improve 
access to other goods such as the goods of care and the goods of paid employment.86 
 




It bears mentioning that the interests of those who want to specialise against the grain of patriarchal 
norms don’t align with the interests of traditional specialisers. Men who want to work as 
homemakers and women who want to work as breadwinners often face stigma when they pursue 
their preferred occupation. Equal-split subsidies, such as entitlements to paternal leave, normalise 
deviations from tradition and erode social norms that penalize deviations and therefore facilitate 
access to specialization that goes against the grain of patriarchal norms. Some policies that facilitate 
equal-split also facilitate specialization against the grain of social norms. At the same time, the 
interests of those who want to specialise against the grain of social norms don’t align fully with the 
interests of those who prefer equal-split.  
For example, if I am skilled at laundering and child care and enjoy these forms of work but 
my income-earning capacity is slight, while my wife is a cardiologist who hates housework, 
many deviations from an equal-split arrangement involving my doing more laundering and 
child care and my wife doing more paid labor and controlling more of the income from 
paid labor would be better for both of us.”87 
Beyond the significance of the interests affected by the choice between status quo and equal-split 
subsidies, we must consider the number of individuals who are adversely affected in each scenario. 
Some studies suggest that in western societies the number of those who prefer a lifestyle of equal-
split is much higher than the number of those who prefer are a lifestyle of specialization. According 
to Kathleen Gerson, in the United States 
[…] most want to create a flexible, egalitarian partnership with considerable room for 
personal autonomy. Whether reared by homemaker-breadwinning, dual-earner, or single 
parents, most women and men want a committed bond where they share both paid work 
and family caretaking. Three-fourths of those reared in dual-earner homes want their 
spouses to share breadwinning and caretaking, but so do more than two-thirds of those 
from traditional homes and close to nine-tenths of those with single parents. Four-fifth of 
the women want egalitarian relationships, but so do over two-thirds of the men.88 […] if 
social arrangements allowed men and women to enact their values, most would prefer to 
equal-split market and nonmarket work rather than specializing in one at the expense of 
the other.”89 
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In summary, specialisers generate a negative externality that harms those who would like to enact 
equal-split because the specialisers’ decisions sustain and perpetuate social norms that stigmatise 
equal-split. Obstacles to accessing equal-split are concerning because they limit access to two 
important sets of goods: the goods of paid employment and the goods of care. States can remove 
or mitigate this externality by subsidising equal-split and by helping those who would like to enact 
equal-split to overcome their collective action problem and jointly move away from compliance with 
patriarchal norms. In rich countries, this can be done at the comparably low cost of a mild 
efficiency-loss.  
4.5 Does the externality argument show too much? 
One worry about this externality argument against patriarchal social norms is that it shows too 
much. Externalities arise in many contexts of everyday life and it would be implausible to think 
that states should always intervene to help those who are adversely affected by these externalities. 
Consider an example offered by Andrew Mason who discusses social norms that stigmatise adults 
who decide not to become parents.90 Those who decide not to become parents are sometimes 
stigmatised because of a widespread belief that being a parent is an integral part of a good life, or 
because of an assumption according to which there is a moral duty to contribute to society through 
having children. This is especially true in societies with high birth rates, where the decision not to 
have children is sometimes regarded as selfish or as foolish. One might think that the externality 
argument implies that governments should intervene to help those who suffer from the social 
pressure to be a parent, for example by adopting public policies that aim at reducing birth-rates. 
This appears to be an implausible implication. 
One reason why this implausible implication doesn’t follow from the externality argument is that 
liberal societies protect a right for would-be parents to procreate or to adopt, so that governments 
can’t use coercive measures that prevent citizens from becoming parents to protect the interests of 
those who suffer from the stigma of childlessness. The interest in being free from social norms 
that stigmatise childlessness can’t justify coercive measures that prevent citizens from becoming 
parents. What’s more, there are many countries where the social stigma attached to childlessness is 
very mild, so that even non-coercive measures that aim at reducing a country’s birth rate cannot be 
justified with appeal to the interest in being free from stigma. And even in countries where 
childlessness-stigma is severe, governments might be able to adopt a range of policies other than 
reducing birth-rates that reduce this kind of stigma. For example, governments can adopt a secular 
curriculum in schools that doesn’t expose children to religious teachings according to which having 
 




children is a holy duty. Finally, there might be countries where childlessness-stigma is severe and 
where it can’t be reduced without reducing birth-rates. I regard it as an open question whether 
some policies, such as additional family-planning classes in school or the subsidising of 
contraceptives are justifiable on the grounds that they help alleviate childlessness-stigma. If in any 
case, it is not evident that the externality argument is implausible because it licenses controversial 
birth control policies. 
Having established that patriarchal norms are concerning because of their harmful external effects; 
I now turn to the more practical question of how states can help those who prefer equal-split 
lifestyles. In particular, I will assess the question of what role there is for policies of working time 
reduction in the fight against patriarchal norms. 
4.6 Working Time Reduction and the Gendered Division of Labour 
Feminists have long contended that the gender system and its associated injustices can be overcome 
or redressed by implementing policies that encourage equal-split lifestyles.91 Examples for such 
policies are paternity leave schemes that encourage an equal sharing of parenting between men and 
women and generous childcare provisions. These policies provide incentives for equal-split lifestyles 
by making it more affordable to share the tasks of parenting, care, and paid employment between 
partners. There is evidence that these incentives are effective in reducing the inequalities caused by 
the gendered division of labour.92 
However, even countries that have implemented generous childcare provisions and strong 
incentives to share parenting tasks are still far from overcoming the harmful effects of working-
time inequality between genders.93 One reason for this is that the injustices resulting from the 
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gender system are difficult to address because they are rooted in a long history of oppression and 
inequality between men and women and are thus deeply entrenched in institutions and in 
individuals’ imaginations. The failure to overcome the gender system through policies like childcare 
provision suggests that these may not be enough. Arguably, it is necessary to accompany these 
policies with further incentives and or with more coercive measures. 
One promising way of making further progress is to reduce the average amount of time people 
spend on the job and to promote the availability and quality of part-time work.94 Proponents of 
reduced working time have argued that this would tackle the gendered distribution of labour in 
three ways.95 First, it might cause more women who are currently homemakers to enter the labour 
market because if the average work week was reduced, it would be easier to combine paid work 
with care and housework responsibilities. Second, working time reductions would make it more 
difficult for men to use long work hours as a means of advancing their careers. In an economy 
where average working time is reduced, men and women compete on a more equal footing because 
men’s willingness to work particularly long hours becomes less decisive a factor in job 
competitions. Imagine an economy where the average workweek is 25 hours. In this economy, 
displaying a willingness to work full-time or more than full-time is less costly for everyone and 
therefore does less work in setting apart those who have this willingness from those who don’t. 
We can expect that as a result of this, women will find it easier to compete for desirable positions. 
Third, if the average work week was reduced, more men would find it attractive to engage in care 
and household tasks. If full-time employment consumes a smaller share of everyone’s time, those 
who pursue full-time work will find it easier to also engage in some housework and care work. 
Currently the gender system places expectations on men to work long hours. Without these 
expectations, men would arguably find it easier to dedicate a larger share of their time to care and 
household work. And if average working time was reduced, the opportunity cost for men to take 
up a share of housework and care work would go down. Reducing opportunity costs for care work 
is of course not sufficient to guarantee that men will pick up a larger share of care work. But it is 
arguably a necessary condition that can be complemented with further incentives such as generous 
paternal leave schemes. Together, these three effects help erode social norms that nudge women 
into the role of housekeepers and men into the role of breadwinners because they make non-
compliance with these norms less costly.  
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By way of further illustration, let’s see what impact working time reduction policies have on the 
case of Greta and Lukas. After the intervention, career involves significantly less time devoted to paid 
employment. This makes career, which used to consist of working long hours in the labour market, 
less distinct from equal-split. It reduces incentives to choose career ahead of equal-split because career 
is now less dramatically different from equal-split with regards to the rewards it offers. Equal-split 
still differs from career in that on top of working part-time in the labour market, individuals also 
take on care and housework responsibilities. For Lukas, career is now less attractive because he 
could no longer use very long work hours as a means for obtaining well-paid and or influential 
positions. 
Another implication of the intervention might be that Greta will be able to choose from a larger 
number of potential partners with whom her preferred choice of equal-split would be compatible. 
As a larger number of workers chooses equal-split over career, a larger number of individuals with 
whom to combine this type of lifestyle will be available to Greta. 
To the proposal of tackling the gendered distribution of labour in this way, one might object that 
in order to achieve the desired effect of making equal-split and career sufficiently similar in terms of 
how much working-time they require, policies of working time reduction would have to be very 
drastic. This is potentially problematic because drastic labour market interventions are likely to 
have several side effects, some of which may be undesirable. For example, we can imagine that 
limiting the amount of time that people can spend on the job will greatly reduce efficiency e.g., 
because it can force employers to hire two part-time workers in place of one full-time worker, 
which in turn is more expensive because it involves additional administrative costs and social 
security costs. 
Compare the concern around the drastic effects of reduced working time to a similar concern that 
is sometimes voiced about the proposal to introduce a generous universal basic income. Some 
economists complain that such a policy will have many far-reaching effects, some of which are very 
difficult to foresee.96 Note that the force of this complaint is limited in that it doesn’t make claims 
about the desirability of effects. But even so, depending on how much we value the status quo, it 
might be reasonable to be risk-averse and prefer little or no change over drastic and unpredictable 
change. 
One way of mitigating the force of this concern is to point out that a basic income need not be 
implemented overnight. Instead, we might want to take a more gradualist approach where the size 
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of the income is gradually increased so that effects can be observed and adjustments can be made 
depending on what types of effects the policy creates. Something similar is true for changes in 
working time. Reductions can be introduced step by step in order to rule out sudden unexpected 
changes. Moreover, working time reductions need not exclusively be achieved through coercive 
means such as maximum work hours legislation that arguably cause plenty of unexpected effects. 
Instead, incentives whose effects might be easier to anticipate can be used to complement these 
policies and to achieve some of the reductions in working time that are needed to tackle the 
gendered distribution of labour. 
One especially promising way of incentivising reductions in average working-time is to subsidise 
part-time work. As I pointed out earlier, part-time jobs are less attractive than fulltime jobs in most 
countries in that they offer less pay, inferior working conditions, etc. However, this need not be 
the case. Policy makers can employ several measures to improve the status of part-time work. We 
can speculate that subsidising part-time work would also lead to a reduction in average working-
time because there are many workers who would reduce their working-time if they could or who 
would reduce their working-time if doing so was more attractive. Some scholars propose that in 
order to achieve justice between genders, “All jobs should be available on a part-time basis without 
adverse career impacts.”97 In the Netherlands, a set of policies along the lines of this proposal have 
been implemented over the last three decades. 
“In 1993, a law removed hours-related thresholds for entitlements to the minimum wage 
and holiday allowance. In 1996, legislation prohibited all discrimination between employees 
based on working hours, and thus guaranteed equal treatment in terms of wages, holiday 
pay, bonuses, training and other entitlements.98 In 2000, another act introduced a right for 
employees to request an increase or decrease of their working hours. 99 Employers need to 
justify refusals. All these measures strengthened the position of part-time workers and 
stimulated people to opt for such jobs.”100 
Empirical evidence suggests that these policies are effective in incentivising part-time work. In the 
Netherlands, close to 40% of workers work part-time. The corresponding EU average lies below 
20%.101 Two other figures are interesting in this context. First, average working time in the 
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Netherlands also lies below the EU average.102 Second, the Netherlands is one of the most gender-
egalitarian countries in the European Union.103 To be sure, this incidence might be due to many 
reasons other than attractive conditions for part-time work. But it certainly suggests that the idea 
of a causal link between attractive part-time work and gender equality is worth taking seriously.
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5. Free Time Across the Life Course1 
My aim in the previous chapter has been to show how considerations of gender equality and 
objectionable externalities support demands for reduced working time. In chapters two and three 
I explained that there are big differences between current states of affairs, where competitive 
pressures drive up average working time, and counterfactual states of affairs, where no such 
competitive pressures exist. But there is also an intrapersonal reason for why people can lack free 
time that is often overlooked – that is, a reason that has to do with how free time is distributed 
across different stages within people’s lives.2 In the following chapter I turn my attention to this 
issue. 
In industrialized countries, citizens typically enjoy a very large amount of free time towards the end 
of their lives, when they are retired, but it is much more costly for people to access free time during 
the middle part of their lives.3 To illustrate, workers are often reluctant to interrupt their careers 
because re-entering the job market after a lengthy break from work can be very costly. This 
intrapersonal discrepancy between a time-scarce middle age and a time-rich old age provides 
another reason for why so many people in industrialized countries are pressured for time. 
The fact that middle-aged people face high costs in accessing free time is by no means natural or 
unavoidable. States can choose between different regulatory regimes that expand or reduce citizens’ 
opportunities to access free time at different life-stages. At one end of this spectrum are conceivable 
regimes that incentivize citizens to work as much as possible during middle age, in order to retire 
as early as possible. Under such regimes people might have an average work week of 70 hours and 
an average retirement age of 50. We can refer to a regime that tends towards this extreme of 
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possible distributions of free time across the life-course as a postponement regime because it 
incentivises citizens to postpone their enjoyment of free time until they’re retired.4 At the other 
end of the spectrum are conceivable regimes that incentivize the middle-aged to enjoy as much 
free time as possible, although this means that they must continue to carry out some work until 
they’re quite old. An example would be a regime with an average work week of 25 hours and an 
average retirement age of 75. Let’s refer to a regime that tends towards this pattern as a frontloading 
regime because it leads citizens to ‘consume’ a large part of their lifetime share of free time when 
they’re still relatively young. 
To illustrate the distinction between postponement and frontloading tendencies, consider the regulatory 
regimes of Japan and the Netherlands. Japan’s economy encourages workers to postpone the 
enjoyment of free time until old age.5 It does this for example by rewarding workers who don’t 
interrupt their career with wage-increases – a practice that is often referred to as ‘seniority-based 
pay’.6 Beyond that, Japan’s pension system makes it attractive (and in many cases mandatory) to 
retire early. Japanese workers thus work on average 1680 hours per year and retire on average at 
age 63.7 In the Netherlands, by contrast, workers have a right to decrease their working time and 
employers must justify the refusal of requests to reduce working time. What’s more, discrimination 
between workers based on work hours is prohibited, so that those who opt for part-time work are 
guaranteed equal treatment with regards to wages and other benefits. Meanwhile, a high legal age 
of retirement incentivises Dutch workers to not retire early.8 As a result, average working time 
during middle age is much lower in the Netherlands than in Japan, at 1433 hours per year, and 
 
4 Note that by a “postponement regime” I do not mean a regime of postponing retirement, but a regime 
of postponing the consumption of free-time.  
5 Recently, the Japanese government signalled that it wants to increase the average age of retirement. 
Tetsushi Kajimoto, ‘Retiring Late: As Pensions Underwhelm, More Japanese Opt to Prolong 
Employment’, Reuters Business News, 4 October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-economy-
retirement/retiring-late-as-pensions-underwhelm-more-japanese-opt-to-prolong-employment-
idUSKCN1RM0GP. 
6 What’s more, pay in Japan is largely ‘input-based’, which means that workers are rewarded for spending a 
lot of time at the workplace, even if this doesn’t lead to a proportionate increase in productivity. Hiroshi 
Ono, ‘Why Do the Japanese Work Long Hours? Sociological Perspectives on Long Working Hours in 
Japan’, Japan Labor Issues 2, no. 5 (n.d.): 35–49. 
7 OECD Labour Force Statistics, ‘Average Annual Hours Actually Worked per Worker’, 2019, 
https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS; OECD, Working Better With Age, Ageing and 
Employment Policies (OECD, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1787/c4d4f66a-en. 
8 Late retirement can also be incentivised in other ways, for example through sanctioning firms that 
require older employees to retire early against their will. Some countries, such as Spain and Poland, 
prohibit compulsory retirement and others, such as Italy and Japan, permit this practice. There is also 
evidence that increasing pay and improving the quality of jobs make it more likely that workers retire later. 
Patrick Pilipiec, Wim Groot, and Milena Pavlova, ‘The Analysis of Predictors of Retirement Preferences 




workers retire later at the average age of 67.9 The Netherlands are thus closer to the frontloading end 
of the spectrum, whereas Japan is closer to postponement.10 
The existence of a variety of free time regimes raises the thus far unexplored question of whether 
some points on the spectrum between frontloading and postponement are preferable to others, morally 
speaking. How should a just society structure the costs that individuals face when they want to 
access free time at middle and old age? My main claim is that justice requires contemporary 
societies, all of which have regimes that are relatively close to postponement, to move to a point that 
is closer to frontloading. This means that the distribution of opportunities to access free time at 
different life-stages in the Netherlands is preferable to that of Japan. Beyond that, I claim that even 
countries like the Netherlands should move further towards frontloading and make access to free 
time during middle age less costly, although this comes at the cost of further increases in the age 
of retirement. Even the Netherlands is still too close to the postponement end of the spectrum. 
My argument proceeds as follows. Section 5.1 explains why we should be concerned about regimes 
that incentivise people to postpone the enjoyment of much of their free time until old age. Section 
5.2 argues against three seemingly attractive principles that explain why it matters how resources 
such as free-time are distributed across the life-course, and that help determine how costly access 
to free time at different life-stages should be. Section 5.3 argues that the design of a regulatory 
framework that affects the costs of accessing free time should mimic the outcome of an idealised 
decision-situation, where prudent individuals behind a partial veil of ignorance choose between 
different types of protections to access free time at different life-stages. I claim that prudent persons 
would choose policies that make access to free time cheaper for the middle-aged and more costly 
for the old-aged i.e., a framework that is much closer to frontloading than those that currently exist. 
Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 respond to objections that can be raised against the hypothetical choice 
approach introduced in section 5.3. 
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Let me make some preliminary notes before I proceed with the main argument of this chapter. 
First, it is important to distinguish between two interpretations of the claim that societies should 
move closer towards the frontloading-end of the spectrum of access to free time across the life course. 
One possible interpretation of this claim is that justice requires forcing citizens to enjoy more free 
time earlier in life. Another interpretation is that justice requires giving citizens opportunities to enjoy 
more free time earlier in life. It is this second interpretation that I have in mind when I use the 
term frontloading. I will elaborate on this important distinction in Section 2. Second, I will frequently 
refer to two different age groups – the middle-aged and the old. For the purpose of my discussion, 
I define everyone between the age of 25 and 65 as ‘middle-aged’ and everyone above the age of 65 
as ‘old’.11  
5.1 Free Time: Too Much, Too Late 
The abundance of free-time that retirement brings at old age promises to compensate people for 
some of the hardships they incur during the middle-part of life, when they are economically 
productive. But for several reasons, this promise of free time that awaits us after our work-life is a 
cruel joke. 
First, there is a significant number of people who don’t reach the age of retirement because they 
die prematurely. “In 2017, there were 56 million deaths globally” and 27% among them “were 
between 50 and 69 years old” 12 Most of these victims of premature death didn’t reach retirement 
and the few among them who did reach retirement enjoyed very little of it, in comparison with the 
many years they spent working. In rich countries, the number of people who die prematurely is 
lower than the global average, but not by much. In Germany, the share of those who are between 
50 and 69 years old when they die lies at 18% and in the United States, it lies at 26%.13 Many of 
these individuals who die early work a lot, but premature death deprives them of the free time they 
were expecting to enjoy during retirement. 
What makes the fate of these individuals even more regrettable is that many of them are already 
disadvantaged during their lifetime. Among those who die early, the least-advantaged are 
overrepresented, so that early death exacerbates a misfortune that many have already been suffering 
during their lifetime. In other words, the poor and otherwise disadvantaged have shorter lives. An 
extensive literature documents that those of lower socioeconomic status are much more likely to 
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die early.14 To illustrate, among men in Norway, those who belong to the richest 1% live on average 
14 years longer than those who belong to the poorest 1%. Among women in Norway, this 
difference is 8 years.15 Among all disadvantages suffered by the poor, their shorter life expectancy 
might be the greatest and the one that most urgently calls for remediation. It is therefore striking 
that the poor, who are most in need of compensation for their unfortunate situation, are least likely 
to enjoy the rewards of retirement. 
Second, among those who reach the age of retirement, there are many whose physical and mental 
health has deteriorated, so that they are less capable of enjoying their free time. Just like premature 
death, ill-health at old age doesn’t strike people at random but occurs more often among the 
disadvantaged, for example because of hazardous working conditions or other kinds of stressors 
to which people of lower socioeconomic status are more heavily exposed. According to Crimmins 
et al, “People who have less education and who are poorer are more likely to experience earlier 
disease onset, loss of functioning, and physical impairment.”16 In other words, the poor age earlier, 
which makes it more difficult for them to enjoy their free time when they are old. 
Third, some of those who are healthy when they retire have relatives or friends who die 
prematurely. This reduces the value of the retirees’ free time because the loved ones they hoped to 
share that free time with are no longer around. For example, Bronnie Ware tells the story of John, 
whose wife Margaret passes away shortly after he retires. Toward the end of his life, after having 
lived through retirement without his wife, John says: “I worked too damn hard and now I am a 
lonely, dying man.”17 John’s retirement was much less valuable to him than it would have been if 
Margaret hadn’t died prematurely. Again, it bears emphasizing that the chances of losing a loved 
one or a relative are much higher for those of low socioeconomic status. This is because those 
from lower income brackets are more likely to marry someone who also occupies a low income 
bracket, which as we saw increases one’s risk of dying prematurely.18 As a result, the risk of having 
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a less valuable retirement because of losing one’s partner or one’s relative is much higher for those 
who belong to the group of the least advantaged. 
Fourth, among those who expect to reach old age in good health with their loved ones by their 
side, there are some who would prefer to carry out some amount of work when they are old in 
order to be able to work less intensely during the middle part of their lives. In other words, they 
would like to redistribute some of the free time that becomes available through retirement at old 
age to the middle part of their lives. ‘Frontloading’ some of one’s retirement in this way can be 
attractive for several reasons. Some people simply prefer to work less intensively at each point in 
time although this means that they will have to retire later. Others want to spend a lot of time on 
non-work activities that must be carried out before reaching old age. For example, the raising of a 
family can’t normally be postponed to old age, especially for women, and those who want to engage 
intensely in such ‘middle-age-exclusive’ activities can find it attractive to retire later in order to have 
more free time during middle age. What’s more, there are some activities that can in principle be 
postponed to old age but that are more rewarding when carried out during middle age because they 
involve a degree of investment in skills. For example, it is often more rewarding to learn to speak 
a foreign language or to play a musical instrument while we’re still relatively young because this 
allows us to enjoy using those skills during a longer part of our lives. Lastly, there are some activities 
that aren’t more rewarding but more enjoyable when carried out during middle age. An example of 
this may be the climbing of mountains, which becomes more difficult as physical strength declines 
with old age.  
These four considerations highlight a need to scrutinise regimes that incentivise postponement. In 
particular, the question arises whether within the existing range of regimes in force, frontloading isn’t 
in fact preferable to postponement, morally speaking. Is there a principled way to answer this question 
– that is, to identify morally better and worse ways of enabling certain patterns of free-time across 
the life course? 
5.2 Temporal Parts Equality, Pure Lifetime Equality, and Free Bargaining 
One explanation for why it matters how much free time is available to us at different life-stages is 
that principles of distributive justice apply to different temporal parts of life, so that whether 
someone enjoys fair access to free time must be evaluated separately for each stage of life.19 The 
idea underlying all versions of this ‘temporal parts view’ is that each stage of life has independent 
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importance when it comes to determining citizens’ entitlements to resources, capabilities or 
whatever the relevant metric of distributive justice is. Independent importance means that my 
entitlement to resources at one stage of life – let’s say old age – is independent of how many 
resources I enjoy during other stages of life. According to the temporal parts view we should 
determine my entitlement to resources at old age independently of whether I was resource-rich or 
resource-poor during earlier stages in life. 
Imagine for example that we’re interested in the question of how to interpret the requirement that 
everyone be equal in capabilities. On one understanding of the temporal parts view, we must ensure 
that the amount of capabilities I enjoy during a given stage of life – say, during my youth - is equal 
to the amount of capabilities that everyone else enjoys during their youth. The same applies to all 
other life-stages: the middle part of one person’s life mustn’t contain more capabilities than the 
middle part of someone else’s life, etc. This is the corresponding segments interpretation of the temporal 
parts view, because it says we must compare the temporal part of one person’s life with the 
corresponding temporal part in other people’s lives. On another interpretation of the temporal 
parts view, we must compare the simultaneous stages of our lives. Coming back to the capability 
example, this would mean that the stage of life that I currently live through (say, middle age) must 
contain as many capabilities as the stage of life that everyone else currently lives through, i.e. the 
youths of people who are currently younger than me and the old ages of people who currently 
older than me. This is the simultaneous segments interpretation of the temporal parts view. 
The temporal parts view faces two problems. The first problem concerns the possibility of 
compensation between different parts of a life and the second problem concerns responsibility: the idea 
that individuals should sometimes be held liable for their decisions. Sometimes, individuals who 
have fewer resources at one point in time can be compensated for this lack of resources by 
providing them with more resources at a different point in time.20 Imagine for example that your 
employer allows every employee to take one day of their choice off from work during one week. 
Your colleague chooses to take Tuesday off and you choose to take Thursday off. The fact that 
your colleague enjoys more free time than you on Tuesday isn’t unfair to you because you get to 
enjoy the same amount of free time on a different day. In other words, your free time on Thursday 
compensates you for the lack of free time on Tuesday. The temporal parts view implausibly holds 
that your lack of free time on Tuesday is morally concerning independently of what happens during 
the other days. 
 
20 McKerlie, Justice between the Young and the Old Ch. 2; Bou-Habib, ‘Distributive Justice, Dignity, and the 




The idea that temporal parts have independent weight when we assess individuals’ entitlements to 
free time might seem less absurd when we consider larger periods of time. Consider the idea that 
an abundance of free time during middle age can compensate for a lack of free time during young 
age. We might think that compensation isn’t possible here because there is something distinctly 
valuable to leisure activities that are typical for young age. Imagine someone who doesn’t enjoy a 
lot of free time or ‘fool around’ during her youth because she’s obsessed with solving an important 
mathematical problem and devotes all her time to this endeavour. As a result, she enjoys deep 
insights into mathematics when she’s middle aged. One might think that there is something 
distinctly regrettable about missing out on ‘fooling around’ during one’s youth and that this can’t 
be made good by one’s enjoying knowledge or other goods at a different life stage.21 Or imagine a 
person who misses out on climbing mountains during middle age and then discovers that she can’t 
make up for that when she’s old because her fitness has declined in the meantime. These examples 
suggest that it might not be possible to compensate someone for having missed out on a valuable 
activity at an earlier stage in life. 
This defence of the temporal parts view misunderstands the concept of compensation. It 
mistakenly assumes that compensation is impossible when some activity can’t be postponed to a 
different life-stage. However, individuals can be compensated for having missed out on an 
experience during an earlier life-stage even if they can’t repeat this same experience at a later life-
stage. Imagine that I give you an orange. Tomorrow, you can compensate me by giving back an 
orange. But if I like apples, you can also compensate me for the loss of an orange by giving me an 
apple. Likewise, the person who sacrifices her youth in studying mathematics, can be compensated 
for that loss even if she doesn’t get to repeat the activities upon which she missed out in her youth. 
The upshot of these considerations is that the temporal parts view is implausible because it can’t 
accommodate our intuition that having more valuable opportunities during one life-stage can 
sometimes compensate for having less valuable opportunities experience during another life-stage. 
The second problem that the temporal parts view faces is that it can’t accommodate the intuition 
that individuals should sometimes be held liable for their decisions.22 To illustrate, imagine two 
persons A and B. A decides to enjoy a lot of free time during middle age and saves little for old 
age. B works a lot during middle age so that she can enjoy plenty of free time during retirement. 
At old age, B has much more free time than A. The temporal parts view insists that we must 
compare B’s time-affluence at old age with A’s time-poverty at old age independently of what 
 
21 Patrick Tomlin, ‘Saplings or Caterpillars? Trying to Understand Children’s Wellbeing’, Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 35, no. S1 (2018): 29–46. Gheaus, Anca. (2015). Unfinished Adults and Defective Children: On 
the Nature and Value of Childhood. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy. 9. 1-21. 




happened during other stages in life. This seems wrong because B’s time affluence results 
exclusively from sacrifices she made during middle age. 
So, while the temporal parts view has implications that support the main claim of this chapter – 
namely that we should oppose inequalities in the amount of free time that we enjoy during middle 
age and during old age –the view itself is implausible.23 
This leads us to an alternative approach according to which we must compare the amounts of 
resources that individuals enjoy over their whole lifetimes. According to one version of this view, 
it doesn’t matter how resources are distributed across life-stages as long as individuals enjoy an 
equal amount of resources over their whole lifetime. From this perspective, we should worry about 
only interpersonal issues of distribution, where one person’s lifetime share of free time is greater 
or smaller than someone else’s lifetime share. Let’s refer to this as the pure lifetime view.24 This 
approach is appealing because it can accommodate our intuitions that individuals can be 
compensated and that individuals should sometimes be held responsible for decisions that affect 
the amount of free time (or other resources) they enjoy at different stages of their lives.25 
The pure lifetime view is indifferent about how free time is distributed within each individual’s life. 
Consider the following two allocations of free time over the lives of A and B. 
 
 Young Age Middle Age Old Age 
A 3 3 3 
B 4 1 4 
 
 
23 The temporal parts view would be much more plausible if there were no or only little psychological 
continuity over the course of our lives. Psychological continuity means that the self is stable over time: the 
person I am today is not fundamentally different from the person I was ten years ago. If we believe that 
there is no psychological continuity, that is if our life contains several different selves, then it would be 
more plausible to think that each of these different selves is entitled to enjoying an equal share of 
resources. Here I set aside discussions of this topic and assume that psychological continuity is normally 
true - at least over periods of life that exclude very young and very old age. 
24 Note that the pure lifetime and the temporal parts view can accommodate different kinds of distributive 
principles. For example, if we believe in equality of welfare, the pure lifetime recommends distributing free 
time and other resources in a way that makes the amount of well-being an individual enjoys over the 
course of her whole lifetime as large as the amount of well-being everyone else enjoys over their whole 
life. If we believe in equality of capabilities, then it requires that resources be distributed in a way that 
ensures that everyone enjoys as many capabilities over their whole life as everyone else, etc. 




A and B enjoy the same amount of free time over the course of their lifetime. This meets the pure 
lifetime view’s requirement that individuals be equal in their free-time-endowments over their 
whole lives. But we might think that the way in which free time is distributed within each individual’s 
life raises further questions of justice. For example, we might worry about the fact that B suffers 
from time poverty during middle age and that her society, indifferent to her plight, leaves her to 
spend all her waking hours at work. 
It thus appears to be the case that a society where everyone enjoys the same amount of resources 
over their whole lifetime can still be unjust in several ways. A plausible theory of justice should be 
able to make judgements not only about interpersonal but also about intrapersonal questions of 
distribution. For example, it should be able to answer the question of whether a just society should 
come to the aid of B when she suffers from time poverty at middle age. The pure lifetime view is 
not satisfactory because it doesn’t offer such intrapersonal judgments. However, as I will show in 
section 5.3, it can be amended in ways that enable it to evaluate intrapersonal distributions.  
Before that, it is worth pausing to ask why we shouldn’t endorse a seemingly more straightforward 
way of determining the costs that individuals should face when trying to access free time, where 
workers and employers are allowed to freely bargain for working-time and retirement arrangements 
that suit their individual preferences. According to this ‘free bargaining approach’, decisions about 
how to structure the costs of access to free time are best left to individual choice within the context 
of a free labour market. Those workers who find it risky or otherwise unattractive to postpone the 
enjoyment of most of their free time to old age can bargain for contracts that involve retiring later, 
in order to work less during middle age. Those who prefer working more intensively during middle-
age in order to retire sooner can strike agreements with their employers that facilitate this option. 
Just as we allow individuals to decide how many apples, oranges, and other consumer goods they 
consume at various stages of their life, so too perhaps we should allow individuals to decide how 
much free time they ‘consume’ at various stages of their lives. 
Free bargaining is appealing because it doesn’t impose controversial time-use patterns that at least 
some citizens will reject because they don’t fit their personal preferences and life plans. As I 
mentioned in the introduction, I am committed to the idea that governments should ensure that 
citizens have opportunities to frontload free time if they wish to do so – rather than forcing 
everyone to work less during middle age. The free bargaining approach fits well with this 
opportunity-focused interpretation of frontloading. To illustrate why the imposing of time-use 




Barcelona: imagine that the administration of Barcelona is convinced that it is best for 
citizens to work in the morning and to enjoy leisure in the afternoon. Motivated by this 
conviction, the administration penalises the use beaches in the morning, say by charging a 
fee for accessing them, and subsidises the use beaches in the afternoon, for example by 
providing free sun umbrellas and Mojitos. 
This kind of policy is objectionable because it can’t be justified to those who have good reasons 
for wanting to relax in the morning and work in the afternoon. Similarly, we might worry that 
promoting long-term time-use patterns such as postponement or frontloading will necessarily conflict 
with the reasonable life plans of some citizens. For this reason, it is tempting to conclude that states 
shouldn’t pass legislation that facilitates access to free time at particular life-stages, but instead that 
it should allow each individual to negotiate agreements that suit their particular preferences. 
There are two main concerns with this free bargaining approach: a fairness concern and an 
efficiency concern. The fairness concern is that many workers have only little bargaining power, so 
that they can’t negotiate for contracts that accommodate their free-time-preferences. Those who 
own neither wealth nor productive means are in a much weaker bargaining position, and will often 
have to agree to contracts that are unfair to them. Members of the working class, for instance, 
normally depend on market income for their subsistence and must eventually agree to some work-
contract, even if it specifies bad working conditions, whilst employers can often afford to wait and 
withhold their offers, which gives them superior bargaining power. Apart from material wealth, 
workers’ bargaining power is also affected by how attractive their skills are to employers. Some 
individuals have skills that are in high demand in the labour market, whilst others have skills that 
are barely sought-after. Those with highly sought-after skills will be able to bargain for favourable 
working conditions. In particular, they’ll be able to specify working conditions that fit their free-
time-use preferences to a much higher degree than the less skilled, who will find it hard to convince 
their employers to design schedules that are compatible with their life plans. Consider the following 
example. 
Jacob is 50 years old and lives in a society where the legal retirement age is set at 65 years. 
He would prefer to retire later, say at age 69, in order to be able to work less now, so that 
he can pursue important life goals that require more free time than he currently has. His 
employer doesn’t agree to this amendment of his contract. What’s more, Jacob’s skills aren’t 
sought-after in the labour market, so he can’t find another job that better suits his 




Workers like Jacob, whose labour can easily be replaced by other workers (or by machines), will 
also find it hard to bargain for other ways of accessing free time, such as sabbatical years or long 
paternity leave. 
A proponent of the free bargaining approach might object that this concern about inequalities in 
wealth and skills doesn’t tell against free bargaining. Rather, it tells against unjust inequalities that 
skew the results of free bargaining. Imagine a society where material resources are distributed fairly, 
so that workers and employers can negotiate contracts on a more equal footing. In this society, 
everyone would have fairer opportunities to bargain for contracts that facilitate their preferred way 
of accessing free time at different points in life. It is much less obvious why free bargaining isn’t 
an appropriate solution to the problem of free time allocation across life-stages in such an idealized 
scenario. 
This gets us only so far, however, because there is the remaining difficulty that skills, unlike material 
resources, can’t easily be redistributed between individuals.26 Still, it might be possible to address 
the problem that many workers lack marketable skills by using progressive taxation to redistribute 
wealth from the talented to the untalented. Redistributing money enhances the bargaining power 
of the less-skilled because it allows low-skilled workers to accumulate savings which enables them, 
in turn, to quit a job that doesn’t suit their free time preferences.27 
Redistributing money goes a long way in improving free-time-opportunities of low-skilled workers 
but it’s not enough. A society without a regulatory framework for work contract negotiations would 
have to ensure that all workers, without exception, have enough bargaining power to get contracts 
that are fair to them. But it would be very costly to ensure that everyone’s work contracts are fair 
without defining a set of rules and regulations that apply to everyone. A state that relies solely on 
free bargaining to distribute access to free time must find ways of a) identifying which individuals 
lack bargaining power and b) enhancing these persons’ bargaining power, as it were ‘one by one’ 
without issuing general laws and regulations. This is likely to be quite expensive. Alternatively, 
states can provide an institutional framework that sets parameters and boundaries to the 
negotiation of work-contracts. Such a general framework helps address the issue of fairness because 
it can specify certain free time protections that all workers in a society must enjoy. 
Apart from the fairness concern, there is also an efficiency concern about free bargaining. Free 
bargaining involves large transaction costs. To understand this concern, imagine a society without 
a regulatory framework for work-contracts. In this society, all factors that affect workers’ access to 
 
26 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 83–85. 




free time are negotiated from scratch each time a worker and an employer enter a contract. The 
negotiating parties would have to find agreement on a vast number of issues, starting from worker’s 
basic rights and entitlements to the definition of a retirement scheme, etc. In a pure ‘free bargaining 
society’, there would be no pre-existing health and safety regulation and no rights to sick leave, to 
paid leave or to refuse excessive overtime work, because all of these issues would be settled through 
individual negotiation. In a modern complex economy, where workers constantly enter and quit 
contracts, these negotiations would generate very large transaction costs that would undermine the 
economic viability of many businesses. Bargaining between workers and employers is much more 
efficient when it can use as a point of departure a base of relatively uncontroversial pre-existing 
terms and conditions, specified by the state. 
In summary, free bargaining can’t achieve justice in access to free time and states must therefore 
provide some institutional framework to facilitate negotiations in the labour market. This in turn 
raises the question of how this framework should be designed. After all, states must specify what 
exactly counts as excessive overtime work, how many days of vacation workers should minimally 
enjoy, etc. By the same token, all industrialized countries may wish to specify a legal retirement age 
that encourages some ways of accessing public pension benefits and discourages others.28 Some 
countries, such as for example Turkey, Luxembourg, and Slovenia incentivise citizens to retire early 
by defining a low legal retirement age that requires workers to quit the job market roughly at the 
age of 60.29 In these countries, citizens normally enjoy a lot of free time when they’re old. Countries 
like Iceland and Norway incentivise their citizens to retire much later, at the age of 67. 30 At the 
same time, Iceland and Norway are among the countries with the lowest average annual hours 
 
28 There is also an important gender-dimension to the question of how institutional frameworks should 
affect the costs individuals face when accessing free time at different life-stages. It is conceivable for 
example that some policies that expand access to free time during middle age, such as for example 
paternity leave entitlements, are preferable to others because they have the additional advantage of 
advancing gender equality. Apart from their effect on gender equality, policies like paternity leave might 
also be appealing for the simple reason that some people would prefer to access free time through 
paternity leave rather than through sabbatical leave or other policies. 
29 OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2017: OECD and G20 Indicators, 2017, 93, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2017-en last accessed 24.01.2021. 
30 OECD, 93 op cit. There are also big differences regarding the extent to which states penalise deviations 
from the legal retirement age. Sometimes workers decide to retire before having reached the legal age of 
retirement and states often penalize such deviations by reducing workers’ pension benefits by a certain 
percentage for each year of early retirement. The severity of this disincentive for early retirement varies 
greatly between countries. For example, Germany reduces early retirees’ pension benefits by a much larger 
margin than Austria. In a similar fashion states can penalise or incentivise work at old age, for example by 
allowing workers who have passed the legal retirement age to top up their retirement benefits with their 
market income. Bernard Casey, ‘Incentives and Disincentives to Early and Late Retirement’, Ageing 
Working Papers (OECD, 1997), 19, https://www.oecd.org/els/public-pensions/2428694.pdf; Hila 
Axelrad, ‘Early Retirement and Late Retirement: Comparative Analysis of 20 European Countries’, 




worked per worker in the world.31 This variety of regimes raises the question of whether some ways 
of distributing access to free across individuals’ lives are preferable to others. Is there a principled 
way of identifying morally desirable ‘free-time-guarantees’ that protect opportunities to access free 
time at different life-stages? 
5.3 Hypothetical Choice 
A principled approach that determines how much frontloading is desirable is necessary because 
opportunities to access free time during middle age can’t be expanded gratis. If it were possible to 
provide everyone with the option to enjoy more free time during middle age without imposing any 
costs, then this would be obviously desirable because – other things equal – it is better for 
individuals to have a larger set of options from which to choose. Policies that expand our 
opportunities during one stage of life without foreclosing opportunities at other stages of life don’t 
require special justification. 
However, policies that protect access to free time during middle age are costly in the sense that 
they affect the opportunity-range we enjoy at old age. Consider the example of a legal entitlement 
to sabbatical leave. A society that protects a right to sabbatical leave might be economically less 
productive than a society that doesn’t protect this right. This might be because employers must 
regularly find substitutes for those who are on sabbatical leave, which in turn generates costs related 
to advertising jobs, hiring new employees, transferring knowledge to these new employees, etc. 
What’s more, employees that spend a prolonged time outside the labour market might miss out on 
important developments in their professional field, so that they must catch up on knowledge and 
skills when they resume their jobs. We can expect that employers would pass these costs onto 
employees. So we must ask ourselves whether workers would nevertheless prefer to live in a society 
that protects a right to sabbatical leave. Given that expanding individuals’ access to free time during 
middle age is costly, how might frontloading policies such as the right to sabbatical leave be 
justifiable? Which point on the frontloading-postponement spectrum would a just society occupy? 
Recall that free bargaining appeared to be an attractive solution because it seemed to allow 
individuals to access free time in accordance with their preferences and life plans. This preference-
sensitivity makes the free bargaining approach anti-perfectionist: it doesn’t rely on controversial 
assumptions about what allocation of free time over the life-course is best for human flourishing. 
I now want to propose that we adopt an alternative approach to identifying a just free time regime 
that retains the anti-perfectionist character of free bargaining but that avoids its problems. This 
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approach asks what outcome would emerge from an idealised decision-situation, where prudent 
individuals behind a partial veil of ignorance choose policies that regulate access to free time. It 
uses the outcome of this decision-situation to identify a desirable free time regime. Different 
versions of this approach have been developed by political theorists in order to address other 
questions of social justice, such as, for example the just distribution of health care between citizens 
in different age groups and the just design of pension systems. 32My aim, here, is not to elaborate 
and defend the theoretical details of any one version of this approach but to provide a general 
outline of it and to show that it is a potentially promising way of identifying a just regime for 
distributing opportunities for free time over the life-course.33 
To understand what the prudent choice approach involves, we must unpack the notion of prudent 
choice and also understand what it means for prudent choosers to be ‘ideally situated’. The goal of 
a prudent individual is to allocate resources to the different stages of her life in a way that makes 
her life as good as possible, as judged by her own ambitions and values. In most cases, a prudent 
person wouldn’t make one stage of her life better at the expense of making her lifetime as a whole 
much worse. For example, it would be imprudent to enjoy too much free time early in life, say in 
our thirties, when we’re most able to be economically productive. A person who enjoys too much 
free time during her thirties might later go through great hardship because she hasn’t generated 
enough savings to sustain herself in old age; this might make her life go much worse as a whole. 
Prudent choosers must be ideally situated in the sense that they don’t have complete knowledge 
about themselves and their circumstances. There are two reasons for imposing this knowledge 
constraint. The first reason is that this can help identify what is prudent. To understand this, 
imagine a chooser who knows her age at the time she makes a choice about how to spread free 
time across her life. This person might imprudently allocate a lot of free-time-opportunities to her 
current stage of life because she is too short-sighted to appreciate fully the importance of free time 
at stages of life that lie far in the future. The second reason for why choosers shouldn’t have 
complete information about themselves is that this could distort their decision-making in morally 
objectionable ways. For example, if a person knows that she is in excellent health and that her 
 
32 Bidadanure, J. (forthcoming 2021) Justice Across Ages: Treating Young and Old as Equals. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
33 For two prominent examples of how prudential reasoning can be employed to settle questions of justice 
between age groups, see Daniels, ‘Justice between Age Groups: Am I My Parents’ Keeper?’; Dworkin, 
Sovereign Virtue Ch. 8. Approaches that use hypothetical prudential choice to solve (intrapersonal) 
questions of distributive justice face a number of well-known objections, such as the charge that 
substantive normative convictions can be smuggled into the theory under the guise of purportedly neutral 
considerations of prudence. I don’t have enough space to address these objections here. For replies to 





genes will allow her to live up to very old age, then she has an incentive to choose a regulatory 
framework that provides favourable conditions for the long-lived. Basing a regulatory regime on 
this choice would be unfair to those who die prematurely. In order to avoid biases of this kind, we 
must devise a ‘veil of ignorance’ that hides information from the prudent chooser about certain of 
her morally arbitrary characteristics. 
We can specify the knowledge constraint further by imagining that individuals don’t have 
information about their income earning capacity. This is important because if choosers knew for 
example that they will earn a very high wage, then they might devise free time protections that are 
beneficial only for high-income earners, who can meet their basic needs with fewer hours of work 
than the less-skilled (who instead must work long hours in order to make ends meet). Next, we 
assume that our prudent choosers know their preferences and life goals, as well as what types of 
activities and projects they can typically realise during the different stages of their lives. This will 
help make the regulatory regime they select preference-sensitive.34 What’s more, choosers know 
about people’s average lifespan and the distribution life-lengths across society but they don’t know 
up to what age, they, as individuals, are going to live. 
Having observed these ideal choice conditions, we can now turn to the question of how prudent 
individuals would design a regulatory framework that protects access to free time during middle- 
and old age.35 To do this, we can survey different strategies of accessing free time that choosers 
might employ. One possibility is that prudent choosers would opt for a regulatory framework 
whose sole aim it is to boost their financial income, so that they can always use money to buy more 
free time when they need it.36 In other words, individuals might not care about devising free time 
protections because they hope to be able to convert money into free time whenever they need it. 
This would be an appealing strategy because if successful, it would offer more flexibility than 
general free time protections that apply equally to everyone. However, as I explained in Section 
1.1, it is not always possible to convert money into free time. Consider the example of an employee 
whose lack of marketable skills forces him to work 60 hours per week. This employee certainly has 
 
34 As I noted previously, preference-sensitivity is attractive because it helps avoid perfectionism. Someone 
might object that there is an easier way to avoid perfectionism: We can hide from choosers their 
conception of the good. Individuals who don’t know their conception of the good will choose a strategy 
that maximises their possession of primary goods, i.e. goods that help advance a great variety of life-goals. 
This way of avoiding perfectionism is problematic because it faces the well-known ‘index problem’. We 
don’t know how much value individuals would assign to different primary goods when they compare their 
relative importance. As a result, approaches that hide from individuals their conception of the good might 
yield results that are insufficiently determinate to guide public policy. 
35 I set aside the question of how much access to free time prudent individuals would protect for young 
age. 





an interest in choosing policies that boost his income. But imagine furthermore that his job is only 
available on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, so that he can’t adjust his working time to say 40 hours per 
week. This gives him reason to also care about policies that protect access to free time.37  
We should therefore consider other regimes that prudent choosers might select in the ideal choice 
situation. Consider first an extreme version of a postponement regime – i.e. a regime in which people 
work as much as possible during middle age in order to retire very early. This regime would involve 
long weekly work hours, short vacations, and weak legal protections for workers’ ability to reduce 
working time if they wish to do so. Some individuals may well prefer this regime, given their life 
plans. These individuals may want to protect only enough free time during middle age to recover 
from the burdens they undertake in working and to carry out other essential activities such as eating 
and sleeping. As I explained in the introduction, amongst currently existing regimes, Japan 
approximates extreme postponement more than other countries.  
Would extreme postponement be selected in the ideal choice situation? For some individuals, 
postponement can be very rewarding. Imagine someone who is fortunate enough to have most of her 
important life goals related to, or identical with, the content of her job – for example, an artist who 
enjoys painting and who can live off the sale of her paintings. This person might think that she 
hardly needs any free time protections because she is realising her life goals through her work. The 
most rational thing for her to do may be to spend almost all of her middle age working as a painter, 
thereby realizing her life goals and creating generous savings for old age. To her, it would feel like 
a waste to have available more than the minimal protections offered by postponement because she 
doesn’t need much free time. 
Remember, however, that our artist doesn’t know how great her income earning capacity as a 
painter will be. The ‘veil of ignorance’ hides from the artist information about whether there will 
be members of her society who are going to buy her paintings. She must therefore consider the 
possibility of pursuing painting as a hobby while working on a job to earn money for her 
subsistence. What’s more, she might not be able or willing to delay the pursuit of her passion for 
painting until the age of retirement. In light of these considerations, it seems plausible that even 
someone whose work is largely aligned with her life goals would choose more than the minimal 
 
37 As I mentioned previously, the boosting of wages normally increases workers’ bargaining power vis-à-
vis their employers. One might think that this increase in bargaining power is by itself enough to enable 
workers to turn down, say 60-hours contracts and to force employers to specify 40-hours contracts 
instead. But the additional bargaining power derived from higher wages isn’t always enough to outweigh 
the employers’ interest in specifying contracts that involve very long work hours. Especially in situations 
where labour supply exceeds demand (i.e., when there is non-voluntary unemployment), employers might 




protections of free-time in middle-age that postponement offers because otherwise they would still 
risk being unable to realise important life goals that require free time and that can only be pursued 
during middle age. This is even more true, of course, for people whose work is not largely aligned 
with their life goals, such as for example construction line workers who regard their repetitive work 
as unfulfilling. 
What about people whose conception of the good involves engaging in a lot of paid work? These 
people differ from the artist in that they don’t value work intrinsically, i.e. because of the activities 
it involves, but instrumentally, because it increases their income and thus their capacity to buy 
consumer items. Imagine an extreme case of such an income-lover who prefers work over all other 
activities. Even this person would choose more generous protections of free time during middle 
age than those provided by postponement because she must be alive to the possibility that her 
conception of the good will change over the course of her lifetime.38 We can imagine for example 
that our income-lover, who spends most of her waking hours on the job, discovers at some point 
that she also wants to raise a family. The institutional setup of a society guided by the strategy of 
postponement would make it very costly for her to adjust her work schedule to accommodate her 
newly discovered desire to be a parent. A prudent person would value the opportunity of being 
able to realize such a change, even though she might end up not making use of the opportunity. 
We can contrast extreme postponement with another extreme strategy that consists of enjoying as 
much free time as possible during middle age – the strategy of extreme frontloading. Two of the 
considerations I introduced in section 5.1 might speak in favour of maximizing the availability of 
free time during middle age. First, middle-aged individuals normally have a significantly wider 
opportunity set than the elderly. Physical and mental health decline with old age, thereby limiting 
the range of activities that the elderly can pursue. Individuals might want to expand access to free 
time during middle age in order to be able to choose between a wider range of activities. Imagine 
a person whose favourite activities include diving and raising children. Knowing that these activities 
won’t be available to her at old age, this person might want to pursue them intensely during middle 
age, while she’s still capable to do so. Additionally, as I mentioned before, one and the same activity 
might be less burdensome and therefore more enjoyable for someone of middle age than for 
someone who is old. Imagine someone who likes hosting barbecue parties and horseback riding. 
She might still be capable of engaging in these activities when she’s old but it’ll be much more 
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burdensome for her to do so. This provides another reason to maximise access to free time during 
middle age. 
The second consideration that counts in favour of frontloading has to do with the difficulty that not 
everyone lives until old age. Individuals who opt for postponement know that if they die before 
reaching the age of retirement, they will not have had enough time to realise some of their life goals 
during middle age. Given the fact that the risk of early death can eventuate at any moment, 
individuals might find it attractive to enjoy as much free time as possible while they’re still middle-
aged. To illustrate this, consider the following example. 
Betty and Rufus: In one world, Betty and Rufus both pursue the strategy of postponement. Betty 
dies shortly before she reaches retirement age and Rufus lives through retirement until very 
old age. In another world, Betty and Rufus pursue a frontloading strategy. In this world too, 
Betty dies before she reaches retirement and Rufus lives until very old age. 
There is a sense in which the early death suffered by Betty in the first world constitutes a greater 
disadvantage because she doesn’t get to enjoy the later reward for her efforts during middle age. 
Frontloading the enjoyment of free time partly compensates those who die prematurely for their 
bad fortune.39 Individuals must also be aware of the risk that early death affects persons who are 
important to them. Recall the case of John and Margaret, where John regrets having postponed 
too much of his free time because the early death of his wife Margaret severely impugns his ability 
to enjoy his free time. There are also instances of bad luck that are less severe than early death but 
that nevertheless make it attractive to enjoy a lot of free time early in life. For example, the prudent 
chooser might be concerned about disability or painful illnesses that sometimes come with old age 
and that make it more difficult to enjoy one’s free time. 
But there is also an important consideration that counts against frontloading. Workers must use their 
ability to be economically productive during middle age in order to create enough savings for old 
age (or in order to contribute to an intergenerational pension scheme), when they are less able or 
unable to earn income. Prudent persons would at least generate minimally enough savings for 
subsistence at old age.40 What’s more, they must avoid the risk that time poverty and an obligation 
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to work a lot at old age makes their life as a whole worse than it could have been if they had 
generated enough savings during middle age. 
We must conclude then, that prudent choosers would neither opt for extreme postponement that 
involves lots of work during middle age and no work during old age, nor would they choose 
extreme frontloading that involves minimising time spent on work during middle age. Instead, they 
would choose an intermediate solution that enables middle-aged persons to pursue life goals other 
than paid work before reaching old age. 
This insight is consistent with empirical findings according to which many workers complain about 
a lack of work-life balance and report always feeling rushed.41 Many would like to reduce their work 
hours, even if this results in reduced income.42 As I explained previously, countries today are all 
relatively close to the postponement end of the spectrum. Even in the Netherlands, many workers 
express preferences for a slower transition into retirement and for reduced work hours before 
retirement. More specifically, 22% of men aged between 51 and 65 in the Netherlands currently 
work part-time and 57% of men “would like to reduce their work hours and take some form of 
gradual retirement, but for some reason are not able to do this.”43 Many more women of the same 
age group already work part-time but among those women who work full-time an overwhelming 
majority of 90% also wants to transition to part-time.44 What’s more, there is a sizeable number of 
people in the Netherlands who die before they reach old age. 19,4% of everyone who died in 2017 
in the Netherlands was aged between 50 and 69.45 A prudent chooser who knows this fact but 
doesn’t know her life expectancy would count it as a weighty reason to move closer to an intermediate 
free time distribution over the life course. 
A regulatory framework that facilitates an intermediate solution would redistribute opportunities to 
access free time from the old to the middle-aged, for example through long vacations, shortened 
work weeks or through the option for workers to take several sabbatical years over the course of 
their work life. In order to make these additional opportunities for free time available, the average 
working time of those of old age must be increased, for example through raising the age of 
retirement. 
 
41 L. Thornthwaite, ‘Working Time and Work-Family Balance: A Review of Employees’ Preferences’, Asia 
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Balance: An Integrative Review’, Applied Research in Quality of Life 13, no. 1 (2018): 229–54; Hamermesh, 
Spending Time Ch. 3. 
42 Golden and Gebreselassie, ‘Overemployment Mismatches: The Preference for Fewer Work Hours’. 
43 Tunga Kantarci and Arthur Van Soest, ‘Gradual Retirement: Preferences and Limitations’, De Economist 
156, no. 2 (2008): 132. 
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5.4 Why do we observe so much postponement? 
Let me now consider an objection to the case I have made for more frontloading. If, as I have argued, 
more frontloading than is currently implemented across industrialised countries, is the most prudent 
regime, then one might ask why it is that no country is currently implementing it? Why is it that so 
many people don’t do what would be prudent, namely work less during middle age and more during 
old age? Doesn’t the fact that postponement-lifestyles are so common show that this is what people 
really prefer?  
In fact, there are several reasons for why the prevalence of postponement-lifestyles might not reflect 
people’s actual preferences. First, unjustly low wages make it unavoidable for many that they must 
work long hours both during middle age and old age. The least-advantaged often don’t enjoy the 
luxury of deciding at which stage of life they want to access most free time because their situation 
forces them to work long hours throughout their whole life. What’s more, the least-advantaged are 
often unable to plan how they want to distribute free time across their lives because they work in 
precarious jobs that they can lose at any moment, so that long-term planning becomes impossible.46 
Second, we can speculate that there are many who would decide to frontload more free time if 
there weren’t such powerful incentives to postpone the enjoyment of free time. Currently 
observable time-use patterns only reveal information about what people prefer under the given 
institutional setup. But if my argument is correct, most people would choose to swap the current 
regulatory framework for an alternative framework that facilitates an intermediate free time 
distribution, if this option to swap frameworks were available. 
Third, as I have argued in chapter 2, there are many workers who decide not to reduce their average 
monthly working time because they are trapped in collective action problems that make it very 
costly for them to reduce their working time.  
Fourth, there is a number of fortunate individuals whose decision to work a lot during middle age 
isn’t the result of poverty, unwelcome incentives, or collective action problems. These individuals 
decide to postpone the enjoyment of their free time because they are convinced that this strategy 
is best for them. However, some of them later regret that decision. Recall the case of John, who, 
reflecting on his previous choices, says “I worked too damn hard and now I am a lonely, dying 
man.”47 It might be that such retrospective judgments about the value of our life-plans are more 
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accurate than judgements that are made earlier in life, when the outcomes of risks like premature 
death have not yet eventuated. It is psychologically difficult to take the risk of dying prematurely 
or of losing one’s loved ones into consideration when we make decisions about how to plan our 
lives and this should make us cautious about taking the preferences of ‘postponement-lovers’ at face 
value. 
Fifth, and related to the previous point, there are some who might prefer postponement but only 
because of severe psychological biases. For example, they might they seriously overestimate their 
own life expectancy, not realising their chances of dying young. 
Lastly, while there are some individuals whose decision to work a lot during middle age isn’t the 
result of poverty, unwelcome incentives, or collective action problems and who don’t come to regret 
this decision, we should not assume that this group of individuals constitutes the majority of persons 
in society. Thus, while postponement might be widespread, only few people may genuinely endorse 
this way of allocating free time across the life-course. For most people, postponement gives them their 
their free time when its too late. 
5.5 The Early Death Objection 
Another concern about the hypothetical choice approach is that it doesn’t go far enough in 
redistributing opportunities for free time from the elderly to the middle-aged. In particular, one 
might think that the problem of early death should lead states to adopt the more extreme frontloading 
strategy, which requires much larger expansions of free time for the middle-aged. To understand 
this possible implication of the ‘early death problem’ we must note a) that it’s often impossible to 
know which individuals will suffer an early death and b) that once someone has died, we can no 
longer compensate her for this instance of bad brute luck.48 Recall furthermore that those who die 
early will often belong to the group of the least advantaged. On the one hand, this is because 
premature death deprives people of future years of life that would have been valuable to them and 
to others.49 On the other hand, those who die early often already belonged to the group of the least 
advantaged before the fate of death aggravated their situation. In most countries, the rich live much 
longer than the poor, so that the short-lived are often extremely disadvantaged.50 
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As I just said, once someone has died, she can no longer be compensated for her bad fortune.51 
But there is a way in which the badness of premature death can be mitigated by making more free 
time available to everyone early in life. Consider the following example. In one world, persons A 
and B both pursue the strategy of postponement. A dies shortly before she reaches retirement age and 
B lives through retirement until very old age. In another world, A and B pursue a frontloading 
strategy. In this world too, A dies before she reaches retirement and B lives until very old age. 
There’s a sense in which the early death suffered by A in the first world constitutes a greater 
unfairness because A doesn’t get to enjoy the reward for her efforts. States that help citizens to 
pursue a frontloading strategy effectively compensate short-lived individuals for the ‘disadvantage’ of 
early death.52 Given the fact that those who die early are extremely disadvantaged, states might have 
reasons to undertake great efforts to improve their situation before they die. One way in which 
their situation can be improved is to make free time available to them. The upshot of these 
considerations then might be that public policy modelled on prudent choice recommends 
redistributing too little free time to earlier life-stages. 
In order to understand whether this critique of the hypothetical choice approach is justified, it is 
helpful to observe that hypothetical choices are taken ex ante, i.e., before risks like early death have 
played out. The above-sketched argument from compensating for early death judges individuals’ 
fates from an ex post perspective, that is it evaluates individuals’ level of advantage after the risk of 
early death has eventuated. In this sense, the early death problem is an instance of the broader 
question of whether the demands of liberal egalitarian conceptions of justice should be understood 
to apply before or after the outcomes of individual decisions under conditions of risk or uncertainty 
have played out. 
For an illustration of these two understandings of when equality should obtain, imagine two car 
drivers who face the same risk of suffering an accident. Both are equally risk-averse, have equal 
resource endowments and purchase the same level of insurance cover. One of them suffers an 
accident that leaves her permanently disabled.53 Assume that the disabled person regards herself as 
much worse off than the able-bodied person because even the most generous insurance indemnity 
 
51 Some philosophers disagree, claiming that there can be posthumous compensation. While I don’t want 
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can’t fully compensate her for the loss of some capabilities. This raises the question of whether 
justice requires redistributing resources from the able-bodied to the disabled person. 
If we understand the demands of equality to apply only to the choice situation prior to the accident, 
then we must conclude that no objectionable inequality between the two persons in the example 
exists. However, if we insist that equality must pertain ex-post, then the situation of the disabled 
person calls for further interventions to improve her plight.54 Within the context of Ronald 
Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources, this would mean transferring resources from the able-
bodied to the disabled person until a point is reached where the disabled person no longer envies 
the able-bodied person, i.e. where she doesn’t prefer the bundle of personal and impersonal 
resources of the able-bodied person to her own bundle of resources. 
This leads to the intuitively implausible consequence that we should provide the disabled person 
with a fantastically expensive ‘rescue policy’ that ‘levels down’ the able-bodied person and diverts 
resources from her until we reach “a state of mutually shared misery”.55 In the context of access to 
free time and the early death problem, ex post equality would require transferring enormous amounts 
of resources from the old to the young, up to a point where the old are so badly off that they’re 
indifferent between dying early or growing old. 
There are two reasons to think that the demands of equality are best understood to pertain ex ante, 
rather than ex post. First, levelling down is incompatible with the fundamental egalitarian 
commitment that states must pay equal concern to all citizens.56 Worsening the situation of the old, 
even when this doesn’t help anyone else, would amount to treating the old with less concern than 
others. Second, the adopting of rescue policies to improve the plight of those who die early upsets 
people’s autonomy. In order to fund rescue policies, states would have to collect a lot of revenue 
in taxes, thereby withdrawing funding from projects such as education or basic infrastructure that 
even the beneficiaries of rescue policies deem more important than the improvement of their 
situation.57 In doing so, states would impose on citizens a distributive pattern that they can’t 
endorse and override their express preferences against rescue policies. 
To conclude, the demands of equality don’t require redistributing more free time from the old to 
the middle-aged than recommended by the hypothetical choice approach and therefore states don’t 
have to promote the extreme frontloading strategy. 
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5.6 The Hardship Objection 
Up to now I have ignored an important difficulty that arises once we consider the fact that 
resources like free time might be more valuable to us when we’re young than when we’re old. As 
Dennis McKerlie explains, 
[…] prudence will only save for old age if the sacrifice that such saving requires early in life 
is less than the eventual gain when the resources are used during old age. In the case of the 
very old, illness and declining powers make it difficult for them to use resources to improve 
their lives So resources given to them might well produce less of the goods of life than if 
they were used by younger people, even if the younger people were much better off. Since 
prudence cares about maximizing the total lifetime score of well-being, this is another 
reason to scant extreme old age.58 
A prudent person who deliberates how much free time she should assign to the different stages of 
her life might find it attractive to assign a lot of free time to young and middle age even if this 
means that she’ll have to work a lot and suffer hardship when she’s old. This is because she knows 
that she’ll be less able to enjoy leisure activities when her faculties decline at old age. What’s more, 
this incentive to “scant extreme old age” is further aggravated once we include the possibility of 
early death in our considerations of prudential choice. The possibility of early death can incentivize 
prudent choosers to allocate very little free time to the stage of very old life and as a result, the 
elderly might suffer hardships that we intuitively think are unjust. 
To understand why this might be the case, consider an example provided by Dennis McKerlie who 
asks us to imagine a situation where a prudential chooser must allocate resources to different safety 
deposit boxes, whereby each box represents a year of the chooser’s life.59 The chooser knows that 
upon each birthday, she’ll be able to open the safety deposit box that corresponds to this year of 
her life. For example, on her 80th birthday she’ll access the resources that she allocated to the box 
that corresponds to this year. If she dies in her 79th year, the resources in the 80-years-box and all 
subsequent boxes will be lost. This setup makes it rational for her to allocate little resources to very 
old age. However, if she turns out to be exceptionally long-lived, she’ll have to put up with very 
 
58 McKerlie, Justice between the Young and the Old, 160. 




little resources.60 In other words, she’ll face a situation of hardship that we intuitively think requires 
alleviation.61 
This critique applies to the hypothetical choice approach because this approach relies on the idea 
of prudent individuals, who allocate resources in a way that makes their life as good as possible. 
The objection from hardship also highlights the above-mentioned problem that approaches to 
justice between age groups that are exclusively concerned with whole-lives-equality are implausible 
because they allow individuals to suffer hardship as long as the lives of those who suffer hardships 
aren’t worse overall than the lives of those who don’t suffer hardships.  
One way of remedying this troubling implication is to restrict or complement pure lifetime views 
with a requirement that individuals – at each moment in their lives – must have sufficient resources 
to protect their dignity. This solution is proposed by Paul Bou-Habib, who understands dignity as 
an intrinsic value that persons possess and that derives from an internal capacity for autonomy. By 
‘internal capacity for autonomy’, Bou-Habib means a number of psychological faculties that make 
it possible for a person to appreciate value and to design and adjust her life plans in accordance 
with that appreciation of value. What’s more, for a person to have dignity, it is not enough that she 
possesses the internal capacity for autonomy at one specific point or during one specific stage of her 
life but at each stage of her life.  
According to Bou-Habib, we can regard our dignity as protected if either of two conditions is 
satisfied. First, our dignity is protected if we can endorse our life plan. A person who endorses her 
life plan can look at a difficult or burdensome situation in her life as something that is worth going 
through or worth putting up with, given her life plan as a whole. To illustrate, consider a person 
who worked rather little during middle age in order to have enough free time to raise several 
children and travel the world. As a result, she receives a small pension that only covers basic 
necessities. Despite that, she endorses her life plan because she values having accumulated 
memories and experiences from her travel activity and because she values being surrounded by a 
large family. 
 
60 Along similar lines, Paul Bou-Habib explains that an implication of the hypothetical insurance approach 
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hardship consideration.” Bou-Habib, ‘Distributive Justice, Dignity, and the Lifetime View’, 292, 296. 
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Contrast this with someone who regrets having chosen a particular life plan in light of living 
through a difficult situation that results from this life plan. Imagine someone who made very little 
savings for old age because she spent most of her income on buying pieces of contemporary art 
and because she spent most of her free time on studying contemporary art. Later she comes to 
realise that these activities weren’t valuable and regrets that she’s too poor to pursue other activities 
that she now considers more valuable. This person’s dignity isn’t protected. 
The second condition that is by itself sufficient to protect dignity is that a person has a “decent set 
of opportunities to engage in valuable activities at each particular stage of life”.62 If a person wants 
to change her life plan, for example because her current life plan imposes unbearable hardship, she 
must have a set of valuable alternative options from which to choose. The availability of these 
options is sufficient to protect her dignity. For example, the disenchanted contemporary art lover 
must be provided with opportunities to amend the life plan she now regrets. 
Note that restricting the pure lifetime view in this way doesn’t only require alleviating hardship at 
old age but that all stages of life. “[…] what matters, for our autonomy, is that our lives are endorsed 
as they are lived, and that we continuously affirm our plans of life as we pass through all the stages 
of our lives.”63 
In summary, the requirement that our dignity must be protected at each stage of our lives imposes 
a constraint on the hypothetical choice approach that attempts to allocate resources in a way that 
maximizes the quality of a person’s life as a whole. Dignity can require limitations of individuals’ 
liberty to pursue their ambitions in order to ensure that a set of valuable options is always available 
to them. This amendment makes the hypothetical choice approach more plausible and allows us 
to use it as a guide to distributive justice between generations. 
Important implications for how free time ought to be distributed across different life-stages follow. 
To understand these implications, consider an example offered by Norman Daniels. 
Olga is a figure skater who has invested very heavily in the development of certain talents 
and skills while neglecting others. She has ignored the development of critical social skills, 
acquired only the narrowest education, and led an austere, even grim, childhood and youth. 
If she achieves wealth and fame in her career— becomes a star of the Ice Capades— then 
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she may feel the gamble has paid off. Later stages of her life will reap benefits from the 
sacrifices of earlier stages.64 
An institutional setup modelled after the kind of choices Olga would make, wouldn’t insist that 
individuals must always have a set of valuable options among which they can choose. It would 
leave persons like Olga to suffer hardship that result from their own choices. The dignity constraint 
prohibits such institutional arrangements. For example, a society committed to protecting 
everyone’s dignity might oblige young persons to acquire more than just “the narrowest education” 
and protect entitlements to annual leave even for those who’d rather have no vacation at all. 
In summary, this chapter has identified an intrapersonal reason for instituting policies, such as for 
example the right to sabbatical leave, that expand access to free time for the middle-aged. It thereby 
provides additional support for the proposal to regulate work hours and expand access to free time 
that motivates this dissertation. 
 
 





Widespread complaints about excessive work hours, time poverty, stress, and burnout make it 
urgent to understand what justice in access to free time requires. Yet, existing liberal egalitarian 
approaches don’t offer satisfactory answers to the question of how much free-time-protection 
citizens should ideally enjoy. According to Julie Rose, who currently offers the most sophisticated 
framework to think about this problem, social justice requires protecting at least the freedom to 
work no more than 8 hours per day.1 It is unclear whether her approach supports more radical 
demands, such as the 4-day work week, the 6-hours work day, or the right to periodic sabbatical 
leave. Those who support these radical demands often appeal to controversial perfectionist ideas 
about the importance of free time for human flourishing to justify their position. My aim in this 
dissertation has been to explain why those committed to liberalism and anti-perfectionism can also 
get on board with these demands. Grasshoppers face a number of morally objectionable obstacles 
when they attempt to access free time and justice requires removing these obstacles. Chapters 2 to 
5 offer thus far overlooked reasons to be concerned about the fate of grasshoppers in our societies. 
Taken together, these considerations make a strong case for expanding access to free time by 
implementing policies such as the right to work no more than four days per week. 
Rather than summarise my arguments, I will conclude by pointing to some interesting problems 
that my analysis leaves unaddressed and that warrant further research. As I mentioned in the 
introduction, my focus in this dissertation has been on the quantity of free time to which citizens 
have access. I largely set aside questions about control over free time and working time. Recent trends 
emphasize the importance of finding out how much control over free time and working time 
workers would have in a just society. New technologies are changing how we work and how we 
perceive the difference between working time and free time. For example, many workplaces are 
being digitalized and the platform economy creates more flexible work. Novel technology makes 
it easier for employers to hire workers ‘on demand’, that is without announcing schedules in 
advance and without guaranteeing stable long-term employment. This in turn makes it more 
difficult for workers to plan ahead and to schedule activities in their free time. Furthermore, we 
should expect the coronavirus pandemic to accelerate many of these changes because much work 
that used to be carried out in offices has been turned into digitalized remote work as a result of the 
pandemic. 
 




Many complain about ‘precarious’ jobs that involve unpredictable schedules and little employment 
stability but it is difficult to explain why this is morally objectionable. For example, recent findings 
suggest that precarious work is not detrimental to workers’ health and life-satisfaction.2 What’s 
more, some jobs, such as those of Hollywood stars, offer little control over schedules and little 
employment stability but are nevertheless attractive. Finally, many precarious jobs might not exist 
at all if employers were required to offer them on a basis of stable, long-term employment. This 
gives rise to a puzzle. Intuitively, precarious work seems problematic but it doesn’t produce 
obviously objectionable outcomes. I have not engaged with this puzzle in my dissertation but I 
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